THE STATE OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES—SPECIMEN OF THE BARBARITY OF SOME OF THE AUSTRIAN OFFICERS—THE ARMISTICE.
The Austrian army, with its imposing numbers, high military reputation, and menacing attitude a few weeks before, when threatening and afterward invading Piedmont, from the line of the Mincio, had now become vastly weakened, reduced, and disheartened by the successive conflicts and defeats which have been briefly described. The causes of its misfortunes have been accounted for, by an eye-witness, in remarks which we abridge as follows:
"The Austrian military system has been changed completely within the last six or seven years; yet the change in part explains the shortcomings of the past few weeks. The Austrian army, up to this date, has been an army of very young soldiers, not long under training. According to the regulations, a fixed number of corps has to be maintained throughout the Austrian empire. At a fixed period of every year the youth of that empire are drafted into the army, and distributed among the corps. The arrival of these new drafts liberates an equal number of men who have already served. The latter, after one, or two, or three years' service, at the option of the colonels of regiments, retire to their homes on a furlough of indefinite duration, and are only called out again in the event of a war. The Austrian army at Montebello, Palestro, Magenta, and Cavriana was thus composed of young soldiers. It would have been wiser, doubtless, had the Austrians thought of this matter in time. They were aware that Louis Napoleon would move, if he moved at all, with the flower of his army. They knew that he had paid high premiums to induce old soldiers to remain in the ranks after the expiration of their usual time, and that the picked men of the French army, tried under the fierce sun of Africa, and in the hard campaign of the Crimea, would be opposed to them, and be assisted besides by an artillery of a novel and most effective kind. They did not take sufficient heed of these important facts, any more than they considered that generals who, ten years ago, fought with ability and success in the campaigns of Italy might possibly have lost some of their original vigor. The result has been such as to open their eyes to the necessity of supplying defects. The question, as far as the present war is concerned, is this: Which is best, to risk all the tried men first, and trust to recruits after, or employ first the young soldiers, and bring up reserves after? As far as the present campaign is concerned, the results favor the first of these alternatives.
"The advisers of his Imperial Majesty Francis Joseph, at last made up their minds that it was impossible, under present circumstances, to defend the line of the Mincio. Accordingly, the headquarters of the 2d Army, under Count Schlick, came into Verona from Villafranca; the headquarters of the 1st Army, under Wimpffen, being transferred to Mantua. Verona, Mantua, and the other strongholds of this great military quadrangle are very much stronger than they were ten years ago. There are great field works to be taken before any approach can be made to the main defences, and in the meanwhile Austria may have brought together again an army capable of risking another general action. The soldiers had one moment of enthusiasm; that was when the emperor led them in person on the 23d to the advanced position from which he intended to attack the enemy; but the events of the 24th seriously affected the morale of the army. Instead of attacking, as they were led to expect, they had to repel the assaults of the Allies, who knowing what was before them, had halted for a meal at two o'clock in the morning. The Austrians, whose baggage and cooking utensils accompany the columns even in the advance, bivouacked on the night of the 23d, and were attacked before they could get their breakfast. The baggage and cooking-carts were obliged to return to the rear out of the fire of the Allies, and the result was that the army of the Kaiser had to fight on empty stomachs. Hunger and hard knocks have a tendency to discourage even the bravest soldier. I was astonished to see men from the field of Solferino retiring unwounded, and lying down exhausted when out of the reach of the enemy's fire. I am told that many so exhausted laid themselves down only to die. The mystery is explained when one considers that these cases arose from want of ordinary sustenance.
"Lichtenstein's corps (the 2d) which should have taken part in the action of the day, was halted in consequence of the approach of some French cavalry in its vicinity, and Prince Lichtenstein, for reasons which he will doubtless have to explain, returned to Mantua. Again, General Zedwitz, commanding the cavalry brigade of the 1st Army, instead of advancing, as he should have done, fell back on Goito, thus depriving the emperor of six regiments of horse and a considerable amount of artillery. Thus, while on the part of the allies all the available guns that could be brought into action were used, on the side of the Austrians the artillery was weak and utterly unable to oppose an effectual fire to that of the enemy. It is true, on the other hand, that the French artillery did not commit the havoc which it might have done had its fire throughout the day been true to the mark, instead of being over it. Still, the effect of the inferiority under which the Austrians suffered in this respect, was disastrous, as it prevented them from repelling the advance of the infantry opposed to them. Among the wounded, to the number of 4,000 or 5,000 in Verona and the surrounding villages, it is remarkable how few suffered from wounds inflicted by artillery."
In contrast with the condition of the Austrian army, those of Piedmont and France were in most respects superior, and still more in the principles for which they fought. To mention again Napoleon's rifled cannon, in the words of a late writer:
"The superiority of the French artillery during the late Italian campaign was obvious to every one who made himself acquainted with the details of the great battles. At Solferino the heavy and very dangerous Austrian cavalry was thrown into disorder and rendered almost useless at distances to which their own batteries, more favorably placed, would not carry. The Austrians never yielded a foot on the hill of Solferino, till a battery of French rifled cannon was brought to bear upon them at a distance at which their own balls fell short. The Tower could not have otherwise been taken but with an infinitely greater slaughter than that which occurred. When Niel and McMahon had driven the Austrians back as far as the large open space known as the plain of Guidizzolo, there was a fair trial of artillery, which cost the Austrians dear; it was the last stand made by the immense left wing of the Austrian army, and one can well imagine how officers and men grew dispirited in face of artillery that silenced their own wherever it showed itself."
The following remarks on the plans and conduct of the war we abridge from the "London Times," of July 8th, 1860:
"As far as the Allies are concerned, their aim was driving the Austrians out of Italy. With this aim clearly and distinctly before them, the difficulties and chances could be more or less calculated in advance, and all that vagueness and uncertainty avoided which gives rise to those useless moves in two armies, neither of which knows what it is to do next.
"The Austrians were in this latter case when they began the war, nobody knew why, and while they were allowed to amuse themselves with their harmless offensive movements you saw all those insignificant skirmishes occur on the Sesia, which were put a speedy end to by the advance of the Allies. Since that time the war has been rolling along in great waves. The Allies went straight toward their aim, and the Austrians were so hard pressed, that they endeavored to oppose to a grand plan, executed with the most determined will, equally grand operations.