[176] This is a misapplication of the word between, which cannot have reference to more than two things or parties: the term should have been among.—G. BROWN.
[177] I suppose that, in a comparison of two, any of the degrees may be accurately employed. The common usage is, to construe the positive with as, the comparative with than, and the superlative with of. But here custom allows us also to use the comparative with of, after the manner of the superlative; as, "This is the better of the two." It was but an odd whim of some old pedant, to find in this a reason for declaring it ungrammatical to say "This is the best of the two." In one grammar, I find the former construction condemned, and the latter approved, thus: "This is the better book of the two. Not correct, because the comparative state of the adjective, (better,) can not correspond with the preposition, of. The definite article, the, is likewise improperly applied to the comparative state; the sentence should stand thus, This is the best book of the two."—Chandler's Gram., Ed. of 1821, p. 130; Ed. of 1847, p. 151.
[178] This example appears to have been borrowed from Campbell; who, however, teaches a different doctrine from Murray, and clearly sustains my position; "Both degrees are in such cases used indiscriminately. We say rightly, either 'This is the weaker of the two,' or—'the weakest of the two.'"—Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 202. How positively do some other men contradict this! "In comparing two persons or things, by means of an adjective, care must be taken, that the superlative state be not employed: We properly say, 'John is the taller of the two;' but we should not say, 'John is the tallest of the two.' The reason is plain: we compare but two persons, and must therefore use the comparative state."—Wright's Philosophical Gram., p. 143. Rev. Matt. Harrison, too, insists on it, that the superlative must "have reference to more than two," and censures Dr. Johnson for not observing the rule. See Harrison's English Language, p. 255.
[179] L. Murray copied this passage literally, (though anonymously,) as far as the colon; and of course his book teaches us to account "the termination ish, in some sort, a degree of comparison."—Octavo Gram., p. 47. But what is more absurd, than to think of accounting this, or any other suffix, "a degree of comparison?" The inaccuracy of the language is a sufficient proof of the haste with which Johnson adopted this notion, and of the blindness with which he has been followed. The passage is now found in most of our English grammars. Sanborn expresses the doctrine thus: "Adjectives terminating with ish, denote a degree of comparison less than the positive; as, saltish, whitish, blackish."—Analytical Gram., p. 87. But who does not know, that most adjectives of this ending are derived from nouns, and are compared only by adverbs, as childish, foolish, and so forth? Wilcox says, "Words ending in ish, generally express a slight degree; as, reddish, bookish."—Practical Gram., p. 17. But who will suppose that foolish denotes but a slight degree of folly, or bookish but a slight fondness for books? And, with such an interpretation, what must be the meaning of more bookish or most foolish?
[180] "'A rodde shall come furth of the stocke of Jesse.' Primer, Hen. VIII."—Craven Glossary.
[181] Midst is a contraction of the regular superlative middest, used by Spenser, but now obsolete. Midst, also, seems to be obsolete as an adjective, though still frequently used as a noun; as, "In the midst."—Webster. It is often a poetic contraction for the preposition amidst. In some cases it appears to be an adverb. In the following example it is equivalent to middlemost, and therefore an adjective: "Still greatest he the midst, Now dragon grown."—Paradise Lost, B. x, l. 528.
[182] What I here say, accords with the teaching of all our lexicographers and grammarians, except one dauntless critic, who has taken particular pains to put me, and some three or four others, on the defensive. This gentleman not only supposes less and fewer, least and fewest, to be sometimes equivalent in meaning, but actually exhibits them as being also etymologically of the same stock. Less and least, however, he refers to three different positives, and more and most, to four. And since, in once instance, he traces less and more, least and most, to the same primitive word, it follows of course, if he is right, that more is there equivalent to less and most is equivalent to least! The following is a copy of this remarkable "DECLENSION ON INDEFINITE SPECIFYING ADNAMES," and just one half of the table is wrong: "Some, more, most; Some, less, least; Little, less, least; Few, fewer or less, fewest or least; Several, more, most; Much, more, most; Many, more most."—Oliver B Peirce's Gram., p. 144.
[183] Murray himself had the same false notion concerning six of these adjectives, and perhaps all the rest; for his indefinite andsoforths may embrace just what the reader pleases to imagine. Let the following paragraph be compared with the observations and proofs which I shall offer: "Adjectives that have in themselves a superlative signification, do not properly admit of the superlative or [the] comparative form superadded: such as, 'Chief, extreme, perfect, right, universal, supreme,' &c.; which are sometimes improperly written, 'Chiefest, extremest, perfectest, rightest, most universal, most supreme,' &c. The following expressions are therefore improper. 'He sometimes claims admission to the chiefest offices;' 'The quarrel became so universal and national;' 'A method of attaining the rightest and greatest happiness.' The phrases, so perfect, so right, so extreme, so universal, &c., are incorrect; because they imply that one thing is less perfect, less extreme, &c. than another, which is not possible."—Murray's Gram., 8vo, Vol. i, p. 167. For himself, a man may do as he pleases about comparing these adjectives; but whoever corrects others, on such principles as the foregoing, will have work enough on his hands. But the writer who seems to exceed all others, in error on this point, is Joseph W. Wright. In his "Philosophical Grammar," p. 51st, this author gives a list of seventy-two adjectives, which, he says, "admit of no variation of state;" i. e., are not compared. Among them are round, flat, wet, dry, clear, pure, odd, free, plain, fair, chaste, blind, and more than forty others, which are compared about as often as any words in the language. Dr. Blair is hypercritically censured by him, for saying "most excellent," "more false," "the chastest kind," "more perfect" "fuller, more full, fullest, most full, truest and most true;" Murray, for using "quite wrong;" and Cobbett, for the phrase, "perfect correctness." "Correctness," says the critic, "does not admit of degrees of perfection."—Ib., pp. 143 and 151. But what does such a thinker know about correctness? If this excellent quality cannot be perfect, surely nothing can. The words which Dr. Bullions thinks it "improper to compare," because he judges them to have "an absolute or superlative signification," are "true, perfect, universal, chief, extreme, supreme, &c."—no body knows how many. See Principles of E. Gram., p. 19 and p. 115.
[184] The regular comparison of this word, (like, liker, likest,) seems to be obsolete, or nearly so. It is seldom met with, except in old books: yet we say, more like, or most like, less like, or least like. "To say the flock with whom he is, is likest to Christ."—Barclay's Works, Vol. i, p. 180. "Of Godlike pow'r? for likest Gods they seem'd."—Milton, P. L. B. vi, l. 301.
[185] This example, and several others that follow it, are no ordinary solecisms; they are downright Irish bulls, making actions or relations reciprocal, where reciprocity is utterly unimaginable. Two words can no more be "derived from each other," than two living creatures can have received their existence from each other. So, two things can never "succeed each other," except they alternate or move in a circle; and a greater number in train can "follow one an other" only in some imperfect sense, not at all reciprocal. In some instances, therefore, the best form of correction will be, to reject the reciprocal terms altogether—G. BROWN.