[321] Though oh and ah are most commonly used as signs of these depressing passions, it must be confessed that they are sometimes employed by reputable writers, as marks of cheerfulness or exultation; as, "Ah, pleasant proof," &c.—Cowper's Task, p. 179. "Merrily oh! merrily oh!"—Moore's Tyrolese Song. "Cheerily oh! cheerily oh!"—Ib. But even if this usage be supposed to be right, there is still some difference between these words and the interjection O: if there were not, we might dispense with the latter, and substitute one of the former; but this would certainly change the import of many an invocation.
[322] This position is denied by some grammarians. One recent author says, "The object cannot properly be called one of the principal parts of a sentence; as it belongs only to some sentences, and then is dependent on the verb, which it modifies or explains."—Goodenow's Gram., p. 87. This is consistent enough with the notion, that, "An infinitive, with or without a substantive, may be the object of a transitive verb; as, 'I wish to ride;' 'I wish you to ride.'"—Ib., p. 37. Or, with the contrary notion, that, "An infinitive may be the object of a preposition, expressed or understood; as, 'I wish for you to ride.'"—Ibid. But if the object governed by the verb, is always a mere qualifying adjunct, a mere "explanation of the attribute," (Ib., p. 28,) how differs it from an adverb? "Adverbs are words added to verbs, and sometimes to other words, to qualify their meaning."—Ib., p. 23. And if infinitives and other mere adjuncts may be the objects which make verbs transitive, how shall a transitive verb be known? The fact is, that the true object of the transitive verb is one of the principal parts of the sentence, and that the infinitive mood cannot properly be reckoned such an object.
[323] Some writers distinguish sentences as being of three kinds, simple, and complex, and compound; but, in this work, care has not in general been taken to discriminate between complex sentences and compound. A late author states the difference thus: "A sentence containing but one proposition is simple; a sentence containing two propositions, one of which modifies the other, is complex; a sentence containing two propositions which in no way modify each other, is compound."—Greene's Analysis, p. 3. The term compound, as applied to sentences, is not usually so restricted. An other, using the same terms for a very different division, explains them thus: "A Simple Sentence contains but one subject and one attribute; as, 'The sun shines.' A Complex Sentence contains two or more subjects of the same attribute, or two or more attributes of the same subject; as, 'The sun and the stars shine.' 'The sun rises and sets.' 'The sun and the stars rise and set.' A Compound Sentence is composed of two or more simple or complex sentences united; as, 'The sun shines, and the stars twinkle.' 'The sun rises and sets, as the earth revolves.'"—Pinneo's English Teacher, p. 10; Analytical Gram., pp. 128, 142, and 146. This notion of a complex sentence is not more common than Greene's; nor is it yet apparent, that the usual division of sentences into two kinds ought to give place to any tripartite distribution.
[324] The terms clause and member, in grammar, appear to have been generally used as words synonymous; but some authors have thought it convenient to discriminate them, as having different senses. Hiley says, "Those parts of a sentence which are separated by commas, are called clauses; and those separated by semicolons, are called members."—Hiley' s Gram., p. 66. W. Allen too confines the former term to simple members: "A compound sentence is formed by uniting two or more simple sentences; as, Man is mortal, and life is uncertain. Each of these simple sentences is called a clause. When the members of a compound sentence are complex, they are subdivided into clauses; as, Virtue leads to honor, and insures true happiness; but vice degrades the understanding, and is succeeded by infamy."—Allen's Gram., p. 128. By some authors, the terms clause and phrase are often carelessly confounded, each being applied with no sort of regard to its proper import. Thus, where L. Murray and his copyists expound their text about "the pupil's composing frequently," even the minor phrase, "composing frequently," is absurdly called a clause; "an entire clause of a sentence."—See Murray's Gram., p. 179; Alger's, 61; Fisk's, 108; Ingersoll's, 180; Merchant's, 84; R. C. Smith's, 152; Weld's, 2d Ed., 150. The term sentence also is sometimes grossly misapplied. Thus, by R. C. Smith, the phrases "James and William," "Thomas and John," and others similar, are called "sentences."—Smith's New Gram., pp. 9 and 10. So Weld absurdly writes as follows; "A whole sentence is frequently the object of a preposition; as, 'The crime of being a young man.' Being a young man, is the object of the preposition of."—Weld's E. Gram., 2d Edition, p. 42. The phrase, "being a young man," here depends upon "of;" but this preposition governs nothing but the participle "being." The construction of the word "man" is explained below, in Obs. 7th on Rule 6th, of Same Cases.
[325] In the very nature of things, all agreement consists in concurrence, correspondence, conformity, similarity, sameness, equality; but government is direction, control, regulation, restrain, influence, authoritative requisition, with the implication of inequality. That these properties ought to be so far distinguished in grammar, as never to be supposed to co-exist in the same terms and under the same circumstances, must be manifest to every reasoner. Some grammarians who seem to have been not always unaware of this, have nevertheless egregiously forgotten it at times. Thus Nutting, in the following remark, expresses a true doctrine, though he has written it with no great accuracy: "A word in parsing never governs the same word which it qualifies, or with which it agrees."—Practical Gram., p. 108. Yet, in his syntax, in which he pretends to separate agreement from government, he frames his first rule under the better head thus: "The nominative case governs a verb."—Ib. p. 96. Lindsey Murray recognizes no such government as this; but seems to suppose his rule for the agreement of a verb with its nominative to be sufficient for both verb and nominative. He appears, however, not to have known that a word does not agree syntactically with another that governs it; for, in his Exercises, he has given us, apparently from his own pen, the following untrue, but otherwise not very objectionable sentence: "On these occasions, the pronoun is governed by, an consequently agrees with, the preceding word."—Exercises, 8vo, ii, 74. This he corrects thus: On these occasions, the pronoun is governed by the preceding word, and consequently agrees with it."—Key, 8vo, ii, 204. The amendments most needed he overlooks; for the thought is not just, and the two verbs which are here connected with one and the same nominative, are different in form. See the same example, with the same variation of it, in Smith's New Gram., p. 167; and, without the change, in Ingersoll's, p. 233; and Fisk's, 141.
[326] It has been the notion of some grammarians, that the verb governs the nominative before it. This is an old rule, which seems to have been very much forgotten by modern authors; though doubtless it is as true, and as worthy to be perpetuated, as that which supposes the nominative to govern the verb: "Omne verbum personale finiti modi regit ante se expresse vel subaudite ejusdem numeri et personæ nominativum vel aliquid pro nominativo: ut, ego scribo, tu legis, ille auscultat."—DESPAUTERII SYNT. fol. xvi. This Despauter was a laborious author, who, within fifty years after the introduction of printing, complains that he found his task heavy, on account of the immense number of books and opinions which he had to consult: "Necdum tamen huic operi ultimam manum aliter imposui, quam Apelles olim picturis: siquidem aptius exire, quum in multis tum in hac arte est difficillimum, propter librorum legendorum immensitatem, et opinionum innumeram diversitatem."—Ibid., Epist. Apologetica, A. D. 1513. But if, for this reason, the task was heavy then, what is it now!
[327] Nutting's rule certainly implies that articles may relate to pronouns, though he gives no example, nor can he give any that is now good English; but he may, if he pleases, quote some other modern grammatists, who teach the same false doctrine: as, "RULE II. The article refers to its noun (OR PRONOUN) to limit its signification."—R. G. Greene's Grammatical Text-Book, p. 18. Greene's two grammars are used extensively in the state of Maine, but they appear to be little known anywhere else. This author professes to inculcate "the principles established by Lindley Murray." If veracity, on this point, is worth any thing, it is a pity that in both books there are so many points which, like the foregoing parenthesis, belie this profession. He followed here Ingersoll's RULE IV, which is this: "The article refers to a noun OR PRONOUN, expressed or understood, to limit its signification."— Conversations on E. Gram., p. 185.
[328] It is truly a matter of surprise to find under what titles or heads, many of the rules of syntax have been set, by some of the best scholars that have ever written on grammar. In this respect, the Latin and Greek grammarians are particularly censurable; but it better suits my purpose to give an example or two from one of the ablest of the English. Thus that elegant scholar the Rev. W. Allen: "SYNTAX OF NOUNS. 325. A verb agrees with its nominative case in number and person."—Elements of E. Gram., p. 131. This is in no wise the syntax of Nouns, but rather that of the Verb. Again: "SYNTAX OF VERBS. 405. Active Verbs govern the accusative case; as, I love him. We saw them. God rules the world."—Ib., p. 161. This is not properly the syntax of Verbs, but rather that of Nouns or Pronouns in the accusative or objective case. Any one who has but the least sense of order, must see the propriety of referring the rule to that sort of words to which it is applied in parsing, and not some other. Verbs are never parsed or construed by the latter of these rules nor nouns by the former.
[329] What "the Series of Grammars, English, Latin, and Greek, ON THE SAME PLAN," will ultimately be,—how many treatises for each or any of the languages it will probably contain,—what uniformity will be found in the distribution of their several sorts and sizes,—or what sameness they will have, except that which is bestowed by the binders,—cannot yet be stated with any certainty. It appears now, in 1850, that the scheme has thus far resulted in the production of three remarkably different grammars, for the English part of the series, and two more, a Latin grammar and a Greek, which resemble each other, or any of these, as little. In these works, abound changes and discrepances, sometimes indicating a great unsettlement of "principles" or "plan," and often exciting our wonder at the extraordinary variety of teaching, which has been claimed to be, "as nearly in the same words as the as the genius of the languages would permit!" In what should have been uniform, and easily might have been so, these grammars are rather remarkably diverse! Uniformity in the order, number, or phraseology of the Rules of Syntax, even for our own language, seems scarcely yet to have entered this "SAME PLAN" at all! The "onward progress of English grammar," or, rather, of the author's studies therein, has already, within "fifteen years," greatly varied, from the first model of the "Series," his own idea of a good grammar; and, though such changes bar consistency, a future progress, real or imaginary, may likewise, with as good reason, vary it yet as much more. In the preface to the work of 1840, it is said: "This, though not essentially different from the former, is yet in some respects a new work. It has been almost entirely rewritten." And again: "The Syntax is much fuller than in the former work; and though the rules are not different, they are arranged in a different order." So it is proved, that the model needed remodelling; and that the Syntax, especially, was defective, in matter as well as in order. The suggestions, that "the rules are not different," and the works, "not essentially" so, will sound best to those who shall never compare them. The old code has thirty-four chief, and twenty-two "special rules;" the new has twenty chief, thirty-six "special," and one "general rule." Among all these, we shall scarcely find exact sameness preserved in so many as half a dozen instances. Of the old thirty-four, fourteen only were judged worthy to remain as principal rules; and two of these have no claim at all to such rank, one of them being quite useless. Of the twenty now made chief, five are new to "the Series of Grammars," and three of these exceedingly resemble as many of mine; five are slightly altered, and five greatly, from their predecessors among the old: one is the first half of an old rule; one is an old subordinate rule, altered and elevated; and three are as they were before, their numbers and relative positions excepted!
[330] "The grammatical predicate is a verb."—Butler's Pract. Gram., 1845, p. 135, "The grammatical predicate is a finite verb."—Wells's School Gram., 1850, p. 185. "The grammatical predicate is either a verb alone, or the copula sum [some part of the verb be] with a noun or adjective."—Andrews and Stoddard's Lat. Gram., p. 163. "The predicate consists of two parts,—the verb, or copula, and that which is asserted by it, called the attribute; as 'Snow is white.'"—Greene's Analysis. p. 15. "The grammatical predicate consists of the attribute and copula not modified by other word."—Bullions, Analyt, and Pract. Gram., P. 129. "The logical predicate is the grammatical, with all the words or phrases that modify it." Ib. p. 130. "The Grammatical predicate is the word or words containing the simple affirmation, made respecting the subject."—Bullions, Latin Gram., p. 269. "Every proposition necessarily consists of these three parts: [the subject, the predicate, and the copula;] but then it is not alike needful, that they be all severally expressed in words; because the copula is often included in the term of the predicate; as when we say, he sits, which imports the same as, he is sitting."—Duncan's Logic, p 105. In respect to this Third Method of Analysis. It is questionable, whether a noun or an adjective which follows the verb and forms part of the assertion, is to be included in "the grammatical predicate" or not. Wells says, No: "It would destroy at once all distinction between the grammatical and the logical predicate."—School Gram., p. 185. An other question is, whether the copula (is, was or the like,) which the logicians discriminate, should be included as part of the logical predicate, when it occurs as a distinct word. The prevalent practice of the grammatical analyzers is, so to include it,—a practice which in itself is not very "logical." The distinction of subjects and predicates as "grammatical and logical," is but a recent one. In some grammars, the partition used in logic is copied without change, except perhaps of words: as "There are, in sentences, a subject, a predicate and a copula." JOS. R. CHANDLER, Gram. of 1821, p. 105; Gram. of 1847, p. 116. The logicians, however, and those who copy them, may have been hitherto at fault in recognizing and specifying their "copula." Mulligan forcibly argues that the verb of being is no more entitled to this name than is every other verb. (See his Exposition," §46.) If he is right in this, the "copula" of the logicians (an in my opinion, his own also) is a mere figment of the brain, there being nothing that answers to the definition of the thing or to the true use of the word.