3. These learned authors thus differ about what certainly admits of no other solution than that which is given in the Observation above. To parse the nouns in question, "as used indefinitely," without case, and to call them "objectives indefinite," without agreement or government, are two methods equally repugnant to reason. The last suggestion of Hart's is also a false argument for a true position. The phrases, "Its being me," and "To be a good man," are far from being constructed "in like manner." The former is manifestly bad English; because its and me are not in the same case. But S. S. Greene would say, "Its being I, is right." For in a similar instance, he has this conclusion: "Hence, in abridging the following proposition, 'I was not aware that it was he,' we should say 'of its being he,' not 'his' nor 'him.'"—Greene's Analysis, 1st Ed., p. 171. When being becomes a noun, no case after it appears to be very proper; but this author, thus "abridging" four syllables into five, produces an anomalous construction which it would be much better to avoid.
[361] Parkhurst and Sanborn, by what they call "A NEW RULE," attempt to determine the doubtful or unknown case which this note censures, and to justify the construction as being well-authorized and hardly avoidable. Their rule is this: "A noun following a neuter or [a] passive participial noun, is in the nominative independent. A noun or pronoun in the possessive case, always precedes the participial noun, either expressed or understood, signifying the same thing as the noun does that follows it." To this new and exceptionable' dogma, Sanborn adds: "This form of expression is one of the most common idioms of the language, and in general composition cannot be well avoided. In confirmation of the statement made, various authorities are subjoined. Two grammarians only, to our knowledge, have remarked OH this phraseology: 'Participles are sometimes preceded by a possessive case and followed by a nominative; as, There is no doubt of his being a great statesman.' B. GREENLEAF. 'We sometimes find a participle that takes the same case after as before it, converted into a verbal noun, and the latter word retained unchanged in connexion with it; as, I have some recollection of his father's being a judge.' GOOLD BROWN."—Sanborn's Analytical Gram., p. 189. On what principle the words statesman and judge can be affirmed to be in the nominative case, I see not; and certainly they are not nominatives "independent" because the word being, after which they stand, is not itself independent. It is true, the phraseology is common enough to be good English: but I dislike it; and if this citation from me, was meant for a confirmation of the reasonless dogmatism preceding, it is not made with fairness, because my opinion of the construction is omitted by the quoter. See Institutes of English Gram., p. 162. In an other late grammar,—a shameful work, because it is in great measure a tissue of petty larcenies from my Institutes, with alterations for the worse,—I find the following absurd "Note," or Rule: "An infinitive or participle is often followed by a substantive explanatory of an indefinite person or thing. The substantive is then in the objective case, and may be called the objective after the infinitive, or participle; [as,] It is an honor to be the author of such a work. His being a great man, did not make him a happy man. By being an obedient child, you will secure the approbation of your parents."—Farnum's Practical Gram., 1st Ed., p. 25. The first of these examples is elliptical; (see Obs. 12th above, and the Marginal Note;) the second is bad English,—or, at' any rate, directly repugnant to the rule for same cases; and the third parsed wrong by the rule: "child" is in the nominative case. See Obs. 7th above.
[362] When the preceding case is not "the verb's nominative" this phrase must of course be omitted; and when the word which is to be corrected, does not literally follow the verb, it may be proper to say, "constructively follows," in lieu of the phrase, "comes after."
[363] The author of this example supposes friend to be in the nominative case, though John's is in the possessive, and both words denote the same person. But this is not only contrary to the general rule for the same cases, but contrary to his own application of one of his rules. Example: "Maria's duty, as a teacher, is, to instruct her pupils." Here, he says, "Teacher is in the possessive case, from its relation to the name Maria, denoting the same object."—Peirce's Gram., p. 211. This explanation, indeed, is scarcely intelligible, on account of its grammatical inaccuracy. He means, however, that, "Teacher is in the possessive case, from its relation to the name Maria's, the two words denoting the same object." No word can be possessive "from its relation to the name Maria," except by standing immediately before it, in the usual manner of possessives; as, "Sterne's Maria."
[364] Dr. Webster, who was ever ready to justify almost any usage for which he could find half a dozen respectable authorities, absurdly supposes, that who may sometimes be rightly preferred to whom, as the object of a preposition. His remark is this: "In the use of who as an interrogative, there is an apparent deviation from regular construction—it being used without distinction of case; as, 'Who do you speak to?' 'Who is she married to?' 'Who is this reserved for?' 'Who was it made by?' This idiom is not merely colloquial: it is found in the writings of our best authors."—Webster's Philosophical Gram., p. 194; his Improved Gram., p. 136. "In this phrase, 'Who do you speak to?' there is a deviation from regular construction; but the practice of thus using who, in certain familiar phrases, seems to be established by the best authors."—Webster's Rudiments of E. Gram., p. 72. Almost any other solecism may be quite as well justified as this. The present work shows, in fact, a great mass of authorities for many of the incongruities which it ventures to rebuke.
[365] Grammarians differ much as to the proper mode of parsing such nouns. Wells says, "This is the case independent by ellipsis."—School Gram., p. 123. But the idea of such a case is a flat absurdity. Ellipsis occurs only where something, not uttered, is implied; and where a preposition is thus wanting, the noun is, of course, its object; and therefore not independent. Webster, with too much contempt for the opinion of "Lowth, followed by the whole tribe of writers on this subject," declares it "a palpable error," to suppose "prepositions to be understood before these expressions;" and, by two new rules, his 22d and 28th, teaches, that, "Names of measure or dimension, followed by an adjective," and "Names of certain portions of time and space, and especially words denoting continuance of time or progression, are used without a governing word."—Philos. Gram., pp. 165 and 172; Imp. Gram., 116 and 122; Rudiments, 65 and 67. But this is no account at all of the construction, or of the case of the noun. As the nominative, or the case which we may use independently, is never a subject of government, the phrase, "without a governing word," implies that the case is objective; and how can this case be known, except by the discovery of some "governing word," of which it is the object? We find, however, many such rules as the following: "Nouns of time, distance, and degree, are put in the objective case without a preposition."—Nutting's Gram., p. 100. "Nouns which denote time, quantity, measure, distance, value, or direction are often put in the objective case without a preposition."—Weld's Gram., p. 153; "Abridged Ed.," 118. "Numes signifying duration, extension, quantity, quality, and valuation, are in the objective case without a governing word."—Frazee's Gram., p. 154. Bullions, too, has a similar rule. To estimate these rules aright, one should observe how often the nouns in question are found with a governing word. Weld, of late, contradicts himself by admitting the ellipsis; and then, inconsistently with his admission, most absurdly denies the frequent use of the preposition with nouns of time, quantity, &c. "Before words of this description, the ellipsis of a preposition is obvious. But it is seldom proper to use the preposition before such words."—Weld's "Abridged Edition," p. 118.
[366] Professor Fowler absurdly says, "Nigh, near, next, like, when followed by the objective case, may be regarded either as Prepositions or as Adjectives, to being understood."—Fowler's E. Gram., 8vo, 1850, §458, Note 7. Now, "to being understood," it is plain that no one of these words can be accounted a preposition, but by supposing the preposition to be complex, and to be partly suppressed. This can be nothing better than an idle whim; and, since the classification of words as parts of speech, is always positive and exclusive, to refer any particular word indecisively to "either" of two classes, is certainly no better teaching, than to say, "I do not know of which sort it is; call it what you please!" With decision prompt enough, but with too little regard to analogy or consistency, Latham and Child say, "The adjective like governs a case, and it is the only adjective that does so."—Elementary Gram., p. 155. In teaching thus, they seem to ignore these facts: that near, nigh, or opposite, might just as well be said to be an adjective governing a case; and that the use of to or unto after like has been common enough to prove the ellipsis. The Bible has many examples; as, "Who is like to thee in Israel?"—1 Samuel, xxvi, 15. "Hew thee two tables of stone like unto the first."—Exodus, xxxiv, 1; and Deut., x, 1. But their great inconsistency here is, that they call the case after like "a dative"—a case unknown to their etymology! See Gram. of E. Gram., p. 259. In grammar, a solitary exception or instance can scarcely be a true one.
[367] The following examples may illustrate these points: "These verbs, and all others like to them, were like TIMAO."—Dr. Murray's Hist. of Europ. Lang., Vol. ii, p. 128. "The old German, and even the modern German, are much liker to the Visigothic than they are to the dialect of the Edda."—Ib., i, 330. "Proximus finem, nighest the end."—Ib., ii, 150. "Let us now come nearer to our own language."—Dr. Blair's Rhet., p. 85. "This looks very like a paradox."—BEATTIE: Murray's Gram., Vol. i, p. 113. "He was near [to] falling."—Ib., p. 116. Murray, who puts near into his list of prepositions, gives this example to show how "prepositions become adverbs!" "There was none ever before like unto it."—Stone, on Masonry, p. 5.
"And earthly power doth then show likest God's,
When mercy seasons justice."—Beauties of Shakspeare, p. 45.
[368] Wright's notion of this construction is positively absurd and self-contradictory. In the sentence, "My cane is worth a shilling," he takes the word worth to be a noun "in apposition to the word shilling." And to prove it so, he puts the sentence successively into these four forms: "My cane is worth or value for a shilling;"—"The worth or value of my cane is a shilling;"—"My cane is a shilling's worth;"—"My cane is the worth of a shilling."—Philosophical Gram., p. 150. In all these transmutations, worth is unquestionably a noun; but, in none of them, is it in apposition with the word shilling; and he is quite mistaken in supposing that they "indispensably prove the word in question to be a noun." There are other authors, who, with equal confidence, and equal absurdity, call worth a verb. For example: "A noun, which signifies the price, is put in the objective case, without a preposition; as, 'my book is worth twenty shillings.' Is worth is a neuter verb, and answers to the latin [sic—KTH] verb valet."—Barrett's Gram., p. 138. I do not deny that the phrase "is worth" is a just version of the verb valet; but this equivalence in import, is no proof at all that worth is a verb. Prodest is a Latin verb, which signifies "is profitable to;" but who will thence infer, that profitable to is a verb?