The Germans in South West Africa, at the outbreak of the war, had succeeded in bribing and corrupting an ex-Boer General, Maritz, and issued a circular to the Boer farmers on the border, calling upon them "to free themselves from English dominion so long and unwillingly borne," and to exchange the British "yoke" for the German shackles. They forgot that the weight of the "yoke" was never felt.
On the declaration of war, a section of the Boers preached neutrality on the part of the Union, but the Boer leaders themselves denounced this doctrine as craven and pitiful.
While "a systematic German propaganda deliberately attempted to poison the integrity of a section of the people," to quote Mr John X. Merriman, the Germans found in the Union Premier, General Louis Botha, that, to the German mind, incomprehensible being, a man imbued with the sense of the very highest integrity and honour, in whose nature it was impossible to contemplate a breach of faith or to regard a treaty bearing his signature as a "scrap of paper."
The Germans found to their intense surprise Briton and Boer united, while the Union was swept by a wave of intense patriotism, revealed in the promise and offer of loyal support to General Botha by every section of the varied comities.
From natives, Cape "Boys," and Malays alike came assurances of their intense loyalty, with offers of help; while the native contributions in cattle swelled the relief funds.
Prior to the knowledge of Maritz's defection, General Botha had only mobilised a few thousand men for defence purposes; but on his assurance that the Union was able to undertake its own defence, the Imperial Government was enabled to remove the garrisons of regulars for service on the continent.
This was possibly regarded by the Germans as a ruse on General Botha's part to get rid of the British garrisons; and a few days after when a state of war existed between Great Britain and Germany, the Germans on the Orange River assumed the offensive.
At Nakob a garrison of five South African Mounted Rifles was attacked by 250 Germans with three maxims, but nevertheless gave a good account of themselves.
The traitor Maritz held an important command under the Union on the Orange River, and on 1st October, doubtless through his treachery, two squadrons of the South African Mounted Rifles and a section of the Transvaal Horse Artillery were led into a trap at Sandfontein, where they were attacked by 2000 Germans with ten guns—and overwhelmed.