The English smuggling system was carried on on the very largest scale; in addition to this, there came the port duties on neutral ships, of which we have already spoken. In passing, we may observe that these port duties imposed on neutral vessels show with particular clearness the measurelessly arbitrary methods of dealing with foreign trade, adopted by Great Britain. She even went farther still: the same ships, on returning to their home across the seas, were obliged to call at an English port and to submit to being searched. As a matter of fact, the poor neutral countries have not been treated any better during the present war. But this is by the way. The main consideration for England was, not to impede neutral shipping, but to destroy it. The effect of the English blockade on the German States, can best be understood if we give a few examples. Owing to the blockade of the Hanoverian coast and of the mouth of the Elbe, the Silesian linen industry was almost entirely destroyed. The linen could no longer be exported by way of Hamburg; and the exporting of it through other ports proved so expensive, that foreign countries—especially England, America, and Spain—were obliged to seek a cheaper source of production. Prussia, who was entirely impotent, and whose statesmen were simple enough to suppose that the destruction of one of the leading industries of the country was not desired by England—Prussia protested in London against the closing of the Elbe. The same fate overtook Prussia’s woollen export trade. Later on, after the fall of Napoleon, when the blockades disappeared and shipping became free again, Prussian industry found all its markets absorbed by English industry. In addition to all this, England was at that time the only Power possessing a trading fleet; with the result that the European States had to pay her a further tribute in the shape of freight. The through transit from South to North Germany ceased altogether. In the whole of Germany the standard of living diminished, the State revenues sank in a truly disquieting manner, and everything was at a low level. The genius of Napoleon discovered, for France and the conquered countries, means whereby industry and commerce attained a surprising development in a short time. He also lessened, for these regions, the inevitable hardships inflicted by the blockade, by awarding so-called licences; he subventioned, in the most difficult days, industrial undertakings with cash, and in this way succeeded in creating a prosperity which exerted its salutary influence on various branches of industry and trade in Germany. But precisely these branches were subsequently ruined after the break-up of the Continental system and the fall of Napoleon; for then the vast quantities of goods accumulated in England overflooded the European, and especially the German, markets, and effectively crushed all competition.
English politicians of those days, and also later on, often raised their eyes piously to Heaven, and declared sanctimoniously that God had been exceedingly good to England; for He had permitted her to become ever richer and richer, and had saved her from the fury of war which had devastated the unfortunate continental countries. There was, certainly, a certain depression among English business-men at times, during the Continental Blockade. This is comprehensible; for all business-men are not equally far-sighted, neither are they always strong-minded. The tests to which they were put, were often hard; and if Napoleon had been in a position permanently and absolutely to close all the coasts of Europe, it may well be doubted whether England could have survived. The Continent, on the other hand, would have been able to do so, had Napoleon not abandoned his principle of ruining the States subjugated by him—and notably Prussia—for the benefit of France.
The War of Liberation resulted in the yoke, which Napoleon had imposed on Europe, being thrown off. The European nations were once more free. In those days, when the national spirit, long held in check, rose again unfettered, they knew not that another yoke had been laid upon them, the weight of which they were soon destined to feel—and to feel more and more with each advancing year: namely, the yoke formed by Great Britain’s industry, and by her uncontested command of the seas. The position of England, alike as an European and as a World-Power, was indeed, at the time of the War of Liberation, an unique one. The Continent, to a large extent a mere series of battlefields, had been completely ruined by loss of life, by economic impoverishment, by political anarchy. An extraordinary wave of idealism had permitted the poorest of all continental countries, Prussia, to accomplish the most difficult of all tasks. Prussia fought for liberty, and sacrificed everything for it. The land of the Chosen People had not been profaned by the presence of the enemy. England had suffered scarcely any loss of life during the Napoleonic wars, outside that of some hundreds of men in the naval battles. Very few English had fought on the Continent—but all the more Germans! In Spain, England had made the Spaniards fight, besides the Germans. From a military point of view, in fact, England had done nothing at all. An expedition which she had despatched to Antwerp, failed miserably in its attempt to take the city. But even in this case, the British Government could truly say that everything necessary had been done to save the precious blood of Englishmen.
Napoleon had not, from the outset, menaced the existence of England as an independent Power and as a seafaring nation. His attempts to effect a landing in the island, and subsequently to exhaust the resources of the English by means of the Continental Blockade, were purely defensive measures. England it was who began the attack on France, for reasons which—as is always the case with such English attacks—were based on trading interests. It was in order to consolidate and develop her empire of the seas that England continually fanned the flames of war in Europe during twenty years—and at the end of that time she came proudly forward as the “liberator of Europe”! The simple-minded Germans believed it; and there are some who still believe it to-day. Innumerable historical works prove this, and endeavor to make out that we owe an incalculable debt of thanks to England for having safeguarded the liberty of the nations. There is, in fact, a legend circulated in Germany, to the effect that the English of those days were entirely different to their descendants to-day. Other people, again, are of opinion that the “golden age” of liberty-loving Britain came to an end with the wars of the Revolution; but they are firmly convinced that such an age existed prior to that date. The one view is as erroneous as the other. The methods and aims of the English nation have remained exactly the same, from the day when England, as an “island,” was definitely differentiated from the “Continent”—when, in consequence, the egotistical interests of the former entered into conflict with the interests of Europe.
CHAPTER VII
ENGLAND DIGESTS HER BOOTY—THE CONTINENT GRADUALLY BECOMES UNRULY
1815–1890
England did not wish to leave the Continent any time to organise resistance to her commercial policy. Once Napoleon had been rendered harmless—in fact from the very moment when the battle of Waterloo developed into a great Prussian victory—we find her alongside of France. England restored to France the latter’s King, who had resided on English soil; she concluded the long-foreseen agreement with Talleyrand; and thus, in conjunction with Russia, did she re-arrange the map of Europe. It was customary in Prussia in those days, and it is still customary to-day, to criticise the incapacity of the Prussian representatives at the Congress of Vienna, and to repeat the words of Blücher: “the pen has gone and lost everything which the sword had won.” In itself, the criticism is perfectly justified; but the responsibility for what took place at the Congress of Vienna cannot be ascribed solely to the Prussian diplomatists. The fact of the matter was that the Great Powers wished neither a strong Prussia nor a strong Germany to arise. The letter written, before the War of Liberation, by Baron Stein to the Earl of Munster (the British statesman), appears to us to-day almost touching in its simplicity: “My desire is to see Germany great and strong, so that she may regain her nationality and her independence, and maintain them in her position between France and Russia.” But that was just what no single European Power desired, least of all England. For the latter knew that a strong, united Germany would constitute an important factor in the world’s industry, and would no longer be at the mercy of English manufacturers and merchants. It must be noted, further, that the spectacle of another nation growing in strength and prosperity has always been extremely distasteful to the Englishman. At first the English diplomatists let the Sovereigns of Europe amuse themselves with discussions concerning Legitimacy; for in this way could the nations be deceived as to their real interests. “Legitimacy” proved itself to be something excellently adapted to the interests of France—and of France only; thanks to the wonderfully skilful use made of this new rallying-cry by Talleyrand, the land of Napoleon was able, despite its defeat, to take up a relatively strong position. England, whilst pretending to be wholly disinterested, kept Malta and Gibraltar; but she gave back a few colonies to France. All the more energetically did England insist upon the territories which border the North Sea and the Channel being distributed in the manner most agreeable to her. Prussia was compelled to hand over her ancient province East Frisia to Hanover, the latter being, we must remember, a sort of English fief on the Continent. Prussia was thus without a single port on the North Sea. England further succeeded in persuading the Congress of Vienna, through the agency of the Duke of Wellington, to unite Holland and Belgium—under the pretext that Belgium, left to herself, would be crushed by France. The British Prince Regent hoped in this way to bring both countries entirely under England’s influence. The fact that the Belgian provinces had formerly belonged to the German Empire was, of course, wholly ignored; and much less still did it occur to anyone to revise the Treaty of Westphalia. Under England’s influence—which remained, however, as unobtrusive as possible—the Congress succeeded in shutting Prussia off completely from the North Sea, albeit without Prussia Napoleon would never have been crushed. Prussia was placed, as a result of the decisions of the Congress, in so unfavorable a geographical position, that she was nearly rent asunder into two separate parts; the task of defending her frontiers in West and East was thus rendered as difficult as could be. Denmark kept Schleswig-Holstein, and basked once more in the sun of England’s favor; for she henceforth held Prussia in check, seeing that she commanded the entry to the straits. Each of the States forming the German Staatenbund was granted the widest possible autonomy, in the well-founded belief that this was the most efficacious way of preventing the formation of a United Germany.
For all these misfortunes, the Prussian diplomatists were less responsible than the European Powers under England’s leadership, all of which were interested in preventing the development of a strong Prussia and of a united Germany. The shutting off of Prussia from the North Sea was a far-sighted and highly important manœuvre on the part of England. The unification of Holland and Belgium under England’s “guardianship” held out the prospect of still more important consequences. We have followed up the development of England’s policy towards both those countries ever since the Dutch war of independence against Spain; and we have noted England’s uninterrupted efforts to prevent them from getting on intimate terms with any of the seafaring Continental Powers, the reason being that the Dutch and Belgian coasts are washed by the North Sea and the Channel. In the Treaty of Vienna England tried to go another big step forward, and to convert the Independent United Netherlands into an outer fortification of the British Isles. It would be more correct to say that Belgium, and especially Antwerp, was to become a basis of operations on the Continental side of the Channel for a British invading force. Had this plan proved itself, in the course of time, susceptible of realisation, Great Britain would have had, not only as an insular but also as a continental Power, an incomparably strong position. Guardian of the United Netherlands, she would have been far less vulnerable than she was in the days of yore, when she conquered Northern France. For in the case of the Netherlands there would have been no question of conquest; the Netherlands would have become England’s vassal, whilst retaining their independence.
However friendly she might be with France, England took her precautions in the South of Europe. The Sardinian question was settled in accordance with English wishes, and the Republic of Genoa was united with the Kingdom. In this way did England succeed in erecting a barrier against France on the one hand, and against Austria on the other; a barrier was likewise erected at the same time between France and Austria. Sardinia was obliged to rely always on British help, and the port of Genoa constituted the link between the Kingdom and Great Britain. In addition to all this, England’s power in the Mediterranean was well assured by the possession of Malta.
Great Britain’s world-position was greater, stronger, and more influential, than ever, after the Napoleonic wars. Her warships ruled the seas, and no other nation could even think of challenging British maritime supremacy. The British fleet was regarded as not only invincible, but as irresistible. Europe had been persuaded that her “liberation” was due to that fleet. For the first time for many centuries, England had no “enemy” on the Continent, for the simple reason that she needed none. The weakened and exhausted Continent lay at the mercy of John Bull, and the latter did not hesitate to exploit it. Especially was this the case with the German States, which were separated from each other by a wall of prohibitive tariffs, but whose markets were unreservedly open to foreign countries. France was clever and experienced enough to continue protecting her industry even after the fall of Napoleon. In this way did the break-up of the Continental Blockade have a destructive effect on the industry of several German States, during many years; all the more so as the English Government and English merchants alike had recourse, with their usual absence of scruples, to corruption and other dishonorable means for crushing German industrial competition ab ovo. The superstitious veneration which was entertained in Germany up till a comparatively recent date for all “genuinely English” products, dates back, for the main part, to that time.
The era of great battles on the plains of Europe was over. But a time of political unrest in the interior of the various European States set in; this unrest reached its culminating point in the explosions of 1848. Such unrest was a source of particular satisfaction to England, for it weakened and disorganised all her Continental rivals.