The Vampire of the Continent

by Graf E. Reventlow

The way in which the Russo-Japanese War was prepared, begun, and carried out, furnishes another typical example of British methods. England did not need to have recourse, in the case of Japan, to arguments—for Japan was already convinced. England only needed to pour oil on the fire, to add to her ally’s strength where this was necessary, to take the political and diplomatic reins into her own hands—and then, when war had broken out, to point with unmistakable clearness to her all-powerful fleet which ruled the seas. Under these circumstances, who else could venture to say a word? Japan fought England’s battles on sea and on land. The Russian fleet was annihilated at Tsushima and in the harbor of Port Arthur; the Russian armies were driven with terrible loss from Liaotung and Manchuria. Port Arthur fell into the hands of the Japanese. The satisfaction in London would certainly have been greater if the Japanese triumph had not been so overwhelming. England wished the Russian fleet to be entirely destroyed, but she would also liked to have seen three-quarters of the Japanese fleet at the bottom of the sea. Instead of that Japan became, thanks to her navy, the predominant Power in the Far East. This solution was not, from the English point of view, an ideal one; but it was not an unprofitable one either—or at any rate any disadvantages it might have, did not seem likely to manifest themselves for a very long time to come. It was England who, cleverly screened behind the United States, prevented Japan from obtaining a war indemnity in Portsmouth. In this way did the two Anglo-Saxon nations inflict far greater damage on Japan, than was ever inflicted by the intervention of the Continental Powers in 1895. Japan’s army and navy have thereby suffered considerably in their development up till the present day; the Japanese finances have ever since been in a critical condition; and the population as a whole has been reduced to a state of poverty resulting from overtaxation, such as no country has ever witnessed after a victorious war. About the same time, England caused the Alliance between herself and her impoverished friend to be consolidated, and the duties resulting from it for either Power to be extended. On the whole, the danger in the Far East had been suppressed; Japan had been bound to Great Britain and rendered economically dependent on the latter. Japan’s resources were exhausted, and she had been placed in the impossibility of recovering her strength for many years to come. England sought, at the same time, to widen as much as possible the gulf, already then perceptible, between America and Japan. It was in England’s interest that the gulf in question should not be bridged over—but, on the other hand, the quarrel must not be allowed to lead to war. The London Cabinet has had, nevertheless, considerable difficulty at times in preventing war from breaking out.

Russia, on the other hand, had been immensely weakened by her defeats and by the revolution; and for a long time she could undertake nothing. But England was desirous of obtaining still more. Even as Fashoda had proved the beginning of the Anglo-French entente; so also were Tsushima and Mukden destined to form the bridge between St. Petersburg and London.

CHAPTER X
DELENDA GERMANIA
THE BEGINNING OF KING EDWARD’S REIGN

When King Edward ascended the throne of England, he at once took decisive steps to bring the Boer War to an end. He likewise without delay set about drawing the consequences which arose from the Fashoda incident, and from the Anglo-French colonial agreement of 1899. He had evidently first of all carefully prepared the way, in the course of discussions with French and English diplomatists. In May 1903 King Edward went to Paris, and soon afterwards President Loubet, accompanied by M. Delcassé, returned the visit in London. In the autumn of the same year a treaty of arbitration was concluded between the two countries; and on April 8th 1904, the celebrated Anglo-French convention was published. This convention formed the basis of the Entente Cordiale, which has existed since 1905. The understanding between France and England was an event of the highest importance in the history of the world, for it marked the first great step taken on the road leading up to the war of 1914, which England so carefully organised and prepared and set in motion.

The convention of 1904 put an end, once and for all, to all the colonial quarrels between England and France. The work of liquidation, begun in 1899, was finished five years later. Bismarck had understood, by a skilful handling of African colonial problems, how to prevent a rapprochement between the two Western Powers; especially had he understood the art of keeping the Egyptian question—that chief bone of contention—alive. Fourteen years after Bismarck’s departure, the last seeds of dissension sowed by this policy of his were dug up and destroyed. With the exception of a few unimportant reservations, France renounced all her claims to intervene in Egyptian matters. England promised, partly in public, and partly in secret, agreements, to assist her French friends in obtaining Morocco. There is no need to go here into details. The most important point was the fact of the union of the two Western Powers. Two months only had passed since the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, when the Anglo-French Convention was published; England hereby showed the world that not only Japan, but also an European Power, was at her disposal—and this European Power was none other than the Ally of Japan’s adversary.

British statesmanship had not succeeded in reducing the German Empire to the position of England’s humble servant. Consequently was Germany henceforth England’s enemy; with the support, and sometimes under the leadership, of King Edward, the British Government was from this time forth to have recourse to all those methods of which experience had shown the value, and which we have encountered in the course of our historical survey in the present book. Already some years before the Anglo-French Convention, English influence could be observed at work in shaping the relations between France and Germany. French distrust of Germany, due to the alleged desire of conquest and oppression of the German Government, constantly increased; the co-operation of French and English in the Mediterranean, with the aim of detaching Italy from the Triple Alliance, grew ever more and more active. Since 1903 the English hand was busy all over the political chessboard—especially in the Near East. Public opinion in Great Britain had already attained to such a pitch of hostility that, in the autumn of 1904, after Russia’s Baltic fleet had sailed for the Far East, important English newspapers publicly declared that the moment had now come for placing Germany in front of the alternative of either ceasing the construction of her fleet, or of having the latter destroyed by British warships. In Germany such articles were not taken seriously; it was said that they were the work of loud-mouthed jingoes, and without any importance. As a matter of fact, such an ultimatum to Germany was, at that time, under serious consideration in London.

The British Government had well chosen the time for the Anglo-French Convention. While Japan was fighting England’s battles against Russia in the Far East, King Edward and his statesmen extended the hand of friendship to France—the ally of the same Russia whom Japan was fighting by England’s order. France found herself before that date in an uncomfortable position. She could not help her ally, and she did not even venture to send warships in any considerable number to the Far East. On the one hand, France feared for her East Asiatic colonial possessions; on the other, she feared Russia’s displeasure at the absence of all assistance from her ally. In addition to this, there was the risk of France finding herself isolated with regard to Germany. Under these circumstances England appeared as a savior, and as a prop to lean on. At the same time French diplomacy, always very skilful, seized the opportunity in order to prepare the way for a future rapprochement between Russia and England. The idea of such a rapprochement had already been entertained by Sir Edward Grey in 1903. From the beginning, Sir Edward Grey had been an opponent of Chamberlain’s policy of alliances. Thus did the efforts of French diplomacy meet with a favorable reception in London; to British statesmen a rapprochement with Russia now appeared just as desirable as the rapprochement with France had appeared after Fashoda. A weakened Russia was a very welcome friend indeed.

CHAPTER XI
EDWARD VII PREPARES THE HUMILIATION AND DESTRUCTION OF GERMANY
1905–1908

The first European crisis engendered by the new British policy broke out in 1905. On account of her geographical situation on the shores of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with her Northern coast bordering the Straits of Gibraltar, Morocco is a country of much importance; England wished her now obedient vassal France to take possession of it. Spain, it is true, was to receive a strip of territory as hinterland to Ceuta, while Tangier was to remain “international.” It was forbidden, in the interests of England, to fortify the coast near the Straits of Gibraltar. With these reservations Morocco was handed over by Great Britain to France. Germany was intentionally ignored, and the convention of 1904 was not even brought officially to the knowledge of the German Government. The latter waited a whole year, but when the French Government commenced taking steps with a view to placing Morocco under its protectorate, Germany protested; the final result of her protest was the resignation of M. Delcassé. The policy of this statesman had been to refuse systematically all German demands, even at the risk of war. He was convinced that Germany would retreat the moment she knew that Great Britain had decided to stand by France and to back up the latter energetically. The attitude of the Premier, M. Maurice Rouvier, and the declaration made by the Ministers of War and Marine to the effect that France was unprepared for war, brought about the departure of M. Delcassé quicker than England had expected it. The “inner” history of the crisis of 1905 is not yet fully known; but the course taken by events shows sufficiently clearly that the London Cabinet subsequently took the reins into its own hands. The attitude of the French Government, which had at first been conciliatory, changed within a very short time, and became either dilatory or hostile; and when the German Government made the great mistake of proposing an international conference to settle the Moroccan question, Germany found herself alone in front of an overwhelming hostile majority. Here is not the place to discuss the aims which our Moroccan policy set itself in those days. The basis of Prince Bülow’s policy was invariably the open door, the principles of which he and his successors always consistently upheld. The German Government was further of opinion that war should not be waged on account of Morocco, unless a question of national honor were involved. Prince Bülow believed this to be no longer the case after the departure of M. Delcassé. On the other hand, the public and secret agreements between France and England aimed at creating a condition of affairs, the inevitable result of which could not but be the destruction alike of the open door, of the integrity of Morocco, and of the sovereignty of the Sultan. To speak, under these circumstances, of the open door, was to maintain a fiction in which no one could believe. The fact that the German Government consistently kept up this fiction, necessarily awakened in England and France the impression that Germany only wished to “save her face” in the eyes of the world, and that she would on no account wage war. This was certainly the weakest spot in the armor of German diplomacy, at a moment when the latter was face to face with very resolute adversaries. For Great Britain was resolved to prove to the world that she and her new ally France were in absolute opposition to the German Empire; she wished further to prove that a war could only be prevented by a German retreat. All the demands of the German representatives at the Algeciras Conference were rejected, and not a single Power was to be found to back up Germany energetically. German’s isolation was so complete, that she was thankful to Austria-Hungary when the latter’s representatives declared themselves ready, in one particularly knotty question, to build a bridge over which the Germans could effect an honorable retreat. The Algeciras Act, a very voluminous document, was from beginning to end a complete farce. Those who knew the conditions did not for a moment doubt that it could never be put into practice. The secret agreements between France and England were alone sufficient to deprive the Act of all value. As a matter of fact it was never enforced, and France never allowed herself for one minute to be influenced—much less bound—by it. To a certain extent did the Conference keep up appearances, as far as Germany was concerned; but in reality the whole thing was a failure from beginning to end. The new European policy of England had stood its first test. In 1905 it was clear to all the nations of Europe, with the exception of the Germans, that henceforth international politics would be dominated by the Anglo-German rivalry.

Before and during the Algeciras Conference, preparations were going on in view of an Anglo-Russian understanding. Russia had been vanquished in the Far East, and British diplomacy drew the logical conclusion from her defeat. The idea found active and enthusiastic supporters in France, who were also anxious to create a Triple Alliance directed against Germany. A number of opportunities for working together were furnished by the Algeciras Conference. On the other hand, Germany experienced a disagreeable surprise on seeing Russia, who had apparently entirely forgotten the invaluable services rendered her by Germany in her hour of need, combat all the latter’s demands at the Conference. Italy had already entered previously to the Conference into certain obligations towards France and England; she had, in return, been granted by these Powers a right of priority in Tripoli. The Italians were also to be found at Algeciras among Germany’s adversaries; the same was the case with nearly all the smaller European States, and with the United States of America. This was a phenomenon, the importance of which completely overshadowed that of the Moroccan question taken by itself. With extraordinary skill, rapidity, and energy, England’s statesmen had understood how suddenly to represent the German Empire as the disturber of European peace, as a danger to France, and as jealous of Great Britain.