If they secure peace it will be a socialistic one, and the Emperor will have to pay out of his own pocket; I am sure too, dear friend, that if it is not possible to end the war, the Emperor will have to pay still more; you may be sure of that.
Or, as may be expected, if they do not secure peace, then my prediction was all the more correct, for then I shall have proved to them that it is not the inefficiency of the Diplomatic Service but the conditions surrounding it that must be blamed for the war not coming to an end.
If I had refused to grant permission for them to travel, they would have continued to the last declaring that, if they had been allowed to proceed, they would have secured peace.
Everyone is indignant with me here, particularly in the Herrenhaus. They even go so far that they imagine I had tried to "buy" the Socialists by promising to lower the Customs dues if they returned with peace. I do not want the dues, as you know, but that has no connection with Stockholm, "Sozie" and peace.
I was at an Austrian Cabinet Council lately and gave the death-blow to the Customs dues—but I felt rather like Daniel in the lions' den when I did it; N. and E. in particular were very indignant. The only one who entirely shares my standpoint beside Trnka is the Prime Minister Clam.
Consequently, this contention that they have been deprived of the octroi owing to my love for the "Sozies" angers them still more, but the contention is false.
You, my dear friend, are doubly wrong. In the first place, we shall be forced to have Socialist policy after the war whether it is welcome or not, and I consider it extremely important to prepare the Social Democrats for it. Socialist policy is the valve we are bound to open in order to let off the superfluous steam, otherwise the boiler will burst. In the second place, none of us Ministers can take upon ourselves the false pretence of using sabotage with regard to peace. The nations may perhaps tolerate the tortures of war for a while, but only if they understand and have the conviction that it cannot be otherwise—that a vis major predominates; in other words, that peace can fail owing to circumstances, but not owing to the ill will or stupidity of the Ministers.
The German-Bohemian Deputy, K.H. Wolf, made a scene when the speech from the throne was read in the "Burg"; he declared that we were mad and would have to account for it to the delegation, and made many other equally pleasant remarks, but he had also come to a wrong conclusion about the Customs dues and Stockholm.
You are quite right in saying that it is no concern of Germany's what we do in the interior. But they have not attempted the slightest interference with the dues. If they are afraid of an anti-German rate of exchange and, therefore, are in favour of the dues, we are to a certain extent to blame. The Berlin people are always afraid of treachery. When a vessel answers the starboard helm it means she turns to the right, and in order to check this movement the steersman must put the helm to larboard as the only way to keep a straight course—he must hold out. Such is the case of statecraft in Vienna—it is always carried out of the course of the Alliance.
It is possible to turn and steer the Entente course if thought feasible; but then courage would be needed to make the turn fully. Nothing is more stupid than trifling with treachery and not carrying it out; we lose all ground in Berlin and gain nothing either in London or Paris. But why should I write all this—you share my opinions; I do not need to convert you. We will talk about Stockholm again.—In true friendship, your old