They had lost, by their own account, about 600 men. The troops of the Prussian Guard Corps lost 400, but 360 prisoners remained in their hands. In the evening the outposts resumed their previous positions.
The various feigned attacks of the Parisian garrison were without effect, and produced no alteration in the dispositions made on the German side. An advance from St. Denis against Stains was repulsed, and two gunboats on the Seine had to go about in consequence of the fire of four field batteries on Orgemont. The trivial sortie on Chatou was scarcely heeded. General Vinoy indeed led forward a large force along the right bank of the Marne, but that was not till the afternoon, when the fight at Le Bourget was over. The Saxon outposts retired into the fighting position near Le Chenay. One of the battalions massed there drove the enemy out of Maison Blanche that same evening, another made a grasp at Ville Evrart, where fighting went on till midnight; it lost seventy men, but brought in 600 prisoners. Next morning the French abandoned Ville Evrart, under heavy fire from the German artillery on the heights on the opposite side of the river.
Paris had now been invested for three months. The always distasteful expedient of a bombardment of a place so extensive could not of itself bring about a decisive result; and on the German side there was the full conviction that only a regular siege could accomplish the wished-for end. But the operations of the engineers had to be delayed till the artillery should be in a position to co-operate with them.
It has already been shown that the siege-artillery had been first employed against those fortified places which interrupted the rearward communications of the army. There were indeed 235 heavy pieces standing ready at Villacoublay; but it had proved impossible as yet to bring up the necessary ammunition for the attack which, once begun, must on no account be interrupted.
By the end of November, railway communication had been restored up to Chelles, but the greater part of the ammunition had meanwhile been deposited at Lagny, and from thence would now have to be carried forward by the country roads. The ordinary two-wheeled country carts proved totally unfit for the transport of shells, and only 2000 four-wheeled waggons had been collected by requisitions made over a wide area. There were brought up from Metz 960 more with horses sent from Germany, and even the teams of the IIIrd Army were taken into the service, though they were almost indispensable just then to contribute towards the efficiency of the army fighting on the Loire. Finally, all the draught horses of the pontoon columns, of the field-bridge trains, and of the trench-tool columns were brought into the ammunition-transport service. A new difficulty arose when the breaking-up of the ice necessitated the removal of the pontoon bridges over the Seine. The roads were so bad that it took the waggons nine days to get from Nanteuil to Villacoublay and back. Many broke down under their loads, and the drivers constantly took to flight. And moreover, at the instance of the Chief of the Staff there was now laid upon the artillery yet an additional task to be carried out forthwith.
Though the besieged had not hitherto succeeded in forcing their way through the enemy's lines, they now set about widening their elbow room, with intent that by their counter-approaches the ring of investment should be further and yet further pushed back, until at last it should reach the breaking point. On the south side the French entrenchments already extended beyond Vitry and Villejuif to the Seine; and on the north, between Drancy and Fort de l'Est, there was an extensive system of trenches and batteries reaching to within 1100 yards of Le Bourget, which in part might in a manner be dignified with the title of a regular engineer-attack. The hard frost had indeed hindered the further progress of these works, but they were armed with artillery and occupied by the IInd Army. And further, a singularly favourable point of support for a sortie to the east as well as to the north, was afforded to the French in the commanding eminence of Mont Avron, which, armed with seventy heavy guns, projected into the Marne valley like a wedge between the northern and southern investing lines.
(Bombardment of Mont Avron, December 27th.)—In order to expel the French from this position fifty heavy guns from Germany, and twenty-six from before La Fère were brought up under the command of Colonel Bartsch. By the exertions of a whole battalion as a working party, two groups of battery emplacements were erected in spite of the severe frost on the western slope of the heights behind Raincy and Gagny, and on the left upland of the Marne Valley near Noisy le Grand, thus encompassing Mont Avron on two sides at a distance of from 2160 to 3250 feet.
At half-past eight on the morning of 27th December those seventy-six guns opened fire. A heavy snowstorm interfered with accurate aim, and prevented any observation of the execution done. Mont Avron and Forts Nogent and Rosny replied rapidly and heavily.
The German batteries lost two officers and twenty-five gunners, several gun-carriages broke down under their own fire, and everything pointed to the prospect that no definite result would be obtained on that day.
But the batteries had fired more effectually than had been supposed. The clear weather of the 28th allowed of greater precision; the Prussian fire proved most telling, making fearful havoc in the numerous and exposed French infantry garrison. Mont Avron was silenced, and only the forts kept up a feeble fire. General Trochu, who was present in person, ordered the abandonment of the position, which was so effectually accomplished in the night by the energetic commander, Colonel Stoffel, that only one disabled gun was left behind.