According to theory, the pursuit should invariably clinch the victory—a postulate assented to by all, and particularly by civilians; and yet in practice it is seldom observed. Military history furnishes but few instances, such as the famous one of Belle Alliance. It requires a very strong and pitiless will to impose fresh exertions and dangers upon troops who have marched, fought and fasted for ten or twelve hours, in place of the longed-for rest and food. But even given the possession of this will, the question of pursuit will yet depend on the circumstances under which the victory has been won. It will be difficult of execution when all the bodies on the field of battle, as at Königgrätz, have become so intermixed that hours are required to re-form them into tactical cohesion; or when, as at St. Quentin, all, even the troops last thrown into the action, have become so entangled that not one single tactically complete body of infantry remains at disposition. Without the support of such a body, cavalry at night will be seriously detained before every obstacle and each petty post of the enemy, and thus alone its exertions will rarely be repaid.[75]

General von Goeben did not pursue the defeated enemy till the following day. His advanced cavalry ranged up to the suburb of Cambrai and the glacis of Landrecies, without meeting with any resistance, and merely brought in some hundreds of stragglers. The Infantry Divisions followed to within four miles of Cambrai. Against this fortress nothing could be undertaken through want of siege material, and there was no military advantage to be derived in extending further north. Among the news to hand it was reported that a considerable portion of the French Army of the North had retired upon Lille, Douai and Valenciennes. As fresh enterprises on its part were consequently not to be expected, General von Goeben brought his force back to the Somme, where towards the end of the month it took up rest quarters between Amiens and St. Quentin.

On the Lower Seine, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg entered Rouen with the XIIIth Corps on the 25th, after having encountered on the march only a few franctireurs. Although General Loysel had increased his force to a strength of nearly 30,000 by reinforcements from Cherbourg, he had remained entirely inactive.

General von Goeben had in view the transfer to the Army of the Somme of that portion of the Ist Corps still about Rouen; but this was disapproved of by telegram from the supreme Head-quarter, which on political grounds ordered its continued retention there.

FOOTNOTES:

[74] Companies of the Crown Prince's Grenadier Regiment (the 1st of the Prussian line), and of the East Prussian Infantry Regiment No. 44, belonging respectively to the 1st and 3rd Brigades, 1st Division, Ist Army Corps.

[75] Moltke, although not quite inexperienced in the practical conduct of war on a large scale, would scarcely have ventured to express himself as above, if he had studied the teachings of The Soldier's Pocket-Book. The distinguished author of that profound and accurate treatise writes of pursuits in quite a different tone. "You have won a great battle," writes Lord Wolseley, "and the enemy are in full retreat; run after him; hammer him with guns; charge him with cavalry; harass him with mounted infantry; pass round his flanks, and keep pushing him and hitting him from morning until night. Caution is out of place when you have a beaten army before you. Wellington never delivered any crushing blow, because he failed to pursue."


Occurrences in the South-Eastern Seat of War up to 17th of January.