At half-past four a.m. the first column, advancing in dead silence, surprised an outpost of the enemy's at Echevanne, but it was unavoidable that its rifle fire should make the French in Chenebier aware of the danger by which they were menaced. In the wood north of the village, the Germans met with serious resistance; and the danger that in the darkness and the dense undergrowth the troops might fall on each other obliged their withdrawal to the outer edge of the wood.
The other column, advancing in the valley of the Lisaine, had quickened its pace from Moulin Colin as soon as the first shots were heard. The 2nd battalion of the 4th Baden Regiment rushed with cheers into the southern part of Chenebier, where a great confusion ensued. But daybreak showed that the heights on the west of the village were strongly occupied, and that columns of all arms were approaching from Etobon. At 8.30 Colonel Payen had to resolve on retirement from the half-conquered village, carrying with him 400 prisoners, and on taking up a position at the Bois de Féry, to cover the road to Belfort through Chalonvillars.
At the same time the right column, strengthened by a battalion from the reserve, renewed the attack on the wood, and after a struggle which lasted for two hours with heavy losses on both sides, at last took possession of it. But the attempt to penetrate into the barricaded and strongly-defended village was vain. A destructive fire met every attack; a single round of mitrailleuse fire, for instance, struck down twenty-one men of the Baden assailants. At three o'clock in the afternoon General Keller therefore assembled his troops at Frahier, where they were supported by four batteries.
With such inferior strength, and after failing in this attempt, it was useless to think of driving back the enemy beyond Chenebier; the only course to pursue was to hinder his further advance on Belfort. And this object was fully accomplished; the French did not pursue. Instead of out-flanking the German right, they seemed chiefly concerned for their own left. They defended Chenebier stoutly, but gave up all further offensive movements.
While awaiting the expected success of the out-flanking movement, General Bourbaki's intention seems to have been merely to occupy the enemy along his front and to hold him fast where he stood. Even during the night the Germans were alarmed at Béthoncourt and before Héricourt, while they, on their part, disturbed the French at Bussurel and in the Bois de La Thure. The infantry fire went on for hours, and numerous detachments had to spend the bitter winter's night under arms. In the morning two Divisions of the XVIIIth French Corps advanced on Chagey and Luze, but their batteries, although supported by the artillery of the Army Reserve, they could not advance against those of the Germans, and repeated attacks on those villages were unsuccessful. After one o'clock a cannonade only was maintained here. In front of Héricourt also there was an exchange of shell fire, and Bussurel, held by the French, was set on fire.
To drive the French out of Montbéliard, the town was fired on from La Grange Dame and from the Château, but ceased when the inhabitants begged forbearance on the assurance that the place was evacuated, which subsequently proved not quite true. Ten battalions of the French XVth Corps advanced from the woods in the forenoon, and tried to push on past Montbéliard, but suffered severely from the flanking fire of the heavy guns at La Grange Dame, and only a handful got into the valley of the Lisaine. The western exits from Montbéliard, and the heights immediately behind it, remained in French possession, but the offensive movements ceased at about two in the afternoon.
Further to the south, General von Debschitz's posts in front of Allaine had easily repulsed the French assailants.
On the German side there was now the conviction that no further attack would be attempted.
The condition of the French troops, not yet inured to war, was, in fact, very critical. They had been obliged to bivouac in the bitterly cold nights, sometimes under arms, and for the most part without food. Their losses were not inconsiderable, and the superior officers whom the commanding General assembled at three in the afternoon, in the neighbourhood of Chagey, expressed their objections to a yet more extensive outflanking attempt to the left, since supplies would be utterly impossible, and the risk would be entailed of the Germans seizing the line of the communications of the army through Montbéliard. Then came the news that the heads of General von Manteuffel's Corps had already reached Fontaine-Française, and were also approaching Gray.
In these circumstances General Bourbaki considered he must resolve on a retreat. He telegraphed to the Government that by the advice of his generals, and to his deep regret, he had been compelled to take up a position further in the rear, and only hoped that the enemy might follow him. Hence this experienced general could have felt no doubt that his army, its attack on the Lisaine, once gone to wreck, could only escape from a very critical position by an immediate retreat.