The separation of the two armies, which was for the present intentionally maintained, allowed of either plan being followed; but mine was the serious responsibility of advising his Majesty which should be chosen.
To keep both alternatives open for the present, General von Herwarth was ordered to occupy Pardubitz, and the Crown Prince to remain on the left bank of the Elbe, to reconnoitre that river as well as the Aupa and the Metau, and to remove all obstacles which might oppose a crossing in one or the other direction. At length, on July 2nd, Prince Frederick Charles was ordered, in the event of his finding a large force in front of the Elbe, to attack it at once. But, on the evening of that day, it came to the knowledge of the Prince that the whole Austrian Army had marched to and was in position on the Bistritz; and in obedience to instructions received, he at once ordered the Ist Army and the Army of the Elbe to assemble close in front of the enemy by daybreak next morning.
General von Voigts-Rhetz brought the news at eleven o'clock in the evening to the King at Gitschin, and his Majesty sent him over to me.
This information dispelled all doubts and lifted a weight from my heart. With a "Thank God!" I sprang out of bed, and hastened across to the King, who was lodged on the other side of the Market Place.
His Majesty also had gone to rest in his little camp-bed. After a brief explanation on my part, he said he fully understood the situation, decided on giving battle next day with all three armies in co-operation, and desired me to transmit the necessary orders to the Crown Prince, who was at once to cross the Elbe.
The whole interview with his Majesty lasted barely ten minutes. No one else was present.
This was the "Council of War" before Königgrätz.
General von Podbielski and Major Count Wartensleben shared my quarters. The orders to the IInd Army were drawn up forthwith and despatched in duplicate by two different routes by midnight. One, carried by General von Voigts-Rhetz, informed Prince Frederick Charles of all the dispositions; the other was sent direct to Königinhof.
In the course of his night-ride of above twenty-eight miles, Lieutenant-Colonel Count Finckenstein had to pass the rayon of the Ist Army Corps, which was furthest to the rear. He handed to the officer on duty a special letter to be forwarded immediately to the general in command, ordering an immediate assemblage of his troops and an independent advance, even before orders should reach him from Königinhof.
The position of the Austrians on July 3rd had a front of not more than 4-3/4 miles. Our three armies advanced on it in an encompassing arc of about twenty-four miles in extent. But while in the centre the Ist and IInd Corps of the Ist Army stood before daylight close in front of the enemy, on the right wing General von Herwarth had to advance on the Bistritz from Smidar in the dark, by very bad roads, above nine miles; and on the left, the orders from the Royal head-quarter could not even reach the Crown Prince before four in the morning. It was therefore decided that the centre would have to maintain a detaining engagement for several hours. Above all, a possible offensive on the part of the enemy must here be met, and for this the whole IIIrd Corps and the cavalry corps stood ready; but the battle could only be decided by the double flank attack by both the flanking armies.[84]