| PART I. | |
| PAGE | |
| Preparations for War | [2] |
| Combat of Weissenburg (4th August) | [12] |
| Battle of Wörth (6th August) | [14] |
| Battle of Spicheren (6th August) | [19] |
| Right-wheel of the German Army | [26] |
| Battle of Colombey-Nouilly (14th August) | [29] |
| Battle of Vionville—Mars la Tour (16th August) | [34] |
| Battle of Gravelotte—St. Privat (18th August) | [49] |
| New Distribution of the Army | [64] |
| The Army of Châlons | [66] |
| Battle of Beaumont (30th August) | [76] |
| Battle of Sedan (1st September) | [87] |
| PART II. | |
| Sortie from Metz (26th August) | [102] |
| Battle of Noisseville (31st August) | [106] |
| Change of Government in Paris | [114] |
| Retreat of General Vinoy | [116] |
| March on Paris of IIIrd Army and the Army of the Meuse | [119] |
| Investment of Paris (19th September) | [124] |
| First Negotiations for Peace | [129] |
| Reduction of Toul (23rd September) | [130] |
| Reduction of Strasburg (28th September) | [131] |
| Operations round Paris to 15th October | [139] |
| Action of Artenay (10th October) | [145] |
| Engagement at Orleans (11th October) | [146] |
| Reduction of Soissons (15th October) | [149] |
| Storming of Châteaudun (18th October) | [151] |
| Sortie against Malmaison (21st October) | [153] |
| Storming of Le Bourget (30th October) | [156] |
| Sortie from Metz against Bellevue (7th October) | [162] |
| Capitulation of Metz (27th October) | [165] |
| New Distribution of the Army | [166] |
| Operations of the XIVth Corps in the South-East (October) | [166] |
| Reduction of Schlettstadt (24th October) | [172] |
| Reduction of Breisach (10th November) | [174] |
| Reduction of Verdun (9th November) | [175] |
| Advance of Ist and IInd Armies (up to mid-November) | [177] |
| Engagement at Coulmiers (9th November) | [181] |
| Operations of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg | [187] |
| Situation of IInd Army (second half of November) | [189] |
| Battle of Beaune la Rolande (28th November) | [192] |
| Advance of the Army of the Loire to the relief of Paris | [197] |
| Battle of Loigny—Poupry (2nd December) | [199] |
| Paris in November | [204] |
| Attempt of the Army of Paris to break out (30th November and 2nd December) | [207] |
| Advance of the Ist Army in November | [216] |
| Battle of Amiens (17th November) | [217] |
| Reduction of La Fère (27th November) | [221] |
| Reduction of Thionville (24th November) | [222] |
| Investment of Belfort in November | [223] |
| Battle of Orleans (3rd and 4th December) | [224] |
| Offensive Operations South, East, and West | [233] |
| Fighting of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg (7th—10th December) | [235] |
| Interruption of important offensive operations in December | [245] |
| The XIVth Corps in December | [250] |
| The Ist Army in December | [252] |
| Reduction of Mézières (1st January, 1871) | [257] |
| Paris in December | [259] |
| Combat of Le Bourget (21st December) | [261] |
| Bombardment of Mont-Avron (27th December) | [264] |
| The Army of the East under General Bourbaki | [266] |
| Advance of the IInd Army to Le Mans | [269] |
| Battle in front of Le Mans (10th—12th January) | [284] |
| Occurrences northward of Paris during January | [303] |
| Battle of Bapaume (3rd January) | [305] |
| Fighting on the Lower Seine (4th January) | [308] |
| Reduction of Péronne (9th January) | [310] |
| Battle of St. Quentin (19th January) | [316] |
| Occurrences in the South-Eastern Seat of War up to 17th January | [324] |
| Siege of Belfort | [324] |
| Transfer of the French Army of the East to the South-Eastern Seat of War (end of December) | [328] |
| Action of Villersexel (9th January) | [331] |
| Battle on the Lisaine (15th—17th January) | [338] |
| The Artillery Attack on Paris (January, 1871) | [349] |
| Battle of Mont Valérien (19th January) | [355] |
| Prosecution of the Artillery Attack on Paris to the Armistice | [361] |
| Operations of the Army of the South under General von Manteuffel | [366] |
| General Hann von Weyhern's March on Dijon | [390] |
| Occupation of the Departments of the Doubs, Jura, and Côte d'Or | [391] |
| Prosecution of the Siege of Belfort | [393] |
| The Armistice | [399] |
| The Homeward March of the German Army | [406] |
| APPENDIX. | |
| On the pretended Council of War in the Wars of King William I. | [413] |
| "Orders of Battle" of the French and German Armies in the first period of the war | [419] |
THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.
PART I.
The days are gone by when, for dynastical ends, small armies of professional soldiers went to war to conquer a city, or a province, and then sought winter quarters or made peace. The wars of the present day call whole nations to arms; there is scarcely a family that has not had to bewail lost ones. The entire financial resources of the State are appropriated to military purposes, and the seasons of the year have no influence on the unceasing progress of hostilities. As long as nations exist distinct one from the other there will be quarrels that can only be settled by force of arms; but, in the interests of humanity, it is to be hoped that wars will become the less frequent, as they become the more terrible.
Generally speaking, it is no longer the ambition of monarchs which endangers peace; but the impulses of a nation, its dissatisfaction with its internal conditions, the strife of parties and the intrigues of their leaders. A declaration of war, so serious in its consequences, is more easily carried by a large assembly, of which no one of the members bears the sole responsibility, than by a single individual, however lofty his position; and a peace-loving sovereign is less rare than a parliament composed of wise men. The great wars of recent times have been declared against the wish and will of the reigning powers. Now-a-days the Bourse possesses so great influence that it is able to have armies called into the field merely to protect its interests. Mexico and Egypt have had European armies of occupation inflicted upon them simply to satisfy the demands of the haute finance. To-day the question is not so much whether a nation is strong enough to make war, as whether its Government is powerful enough to prevent war. For example, united Germany has hitherto used her strength only to maintain European peace; while the weakness of a neighbouring Government continues to involve the gravest risk of war.
It was, indeed, from such a condition of relations that the war of 1870—71 originated. A Napoleon on the throne of France was bound to justify his pretensions by political and military successes. Only temporarily was the French nation contented by the victories of its arms in remote fields of war; the triumphs of the Prussian armies excited jealousy, they were regarded as arrogant, as a challenge; and the French demanded revenge for Sadowa. The liberal spirit of the epoch set itself against the autocratic Government of the Emperor; he was forced to make concessions, his internal authority was weakened, and one day the nation was informed by its representatives that it desired war with Germany.