Cipher Telegram

"Washington, 16th December, 1916.

"Lansing tells me the following statement, which I could not send by wireless to-day, comes from Wilson personally.

"President Wilson has decided that the Notes of the Central Powers, proposing a discussion of peace to the Entente Allies, will be sent forward by the American Government acting as intermediary without any accompanying offer of his own. He has not determined whether any action on behalf of peace will be taken later by the United States on its own account, but is holding himself in readiness to serve in any possible way towards bringing the warring nations together."

"From Lansing's remarks I gather that he is convinced that our enemies will agree to a conference and that then the American Government will have an opportunity to speak in favor of peace. As the Press here is also in general of the opinion that our enemies cannot refuse a conference without turning public opinion against themselves, I have grounds for assuming that the American Embassy in London, in spite of the official statement mentioned above, will assert this view."

As I expected, the President did not allow himself to be turned from his purpose, and on the 18th December dispatched the Note which had long been ready, with certain alterations, to the belligerent Powers. He certainly would not have taken this step if he had not reckoned on certain success. Mr. Wilson's Note could not help but bear out our peace plans, and was therefore regarded throughout America as "pro-German." For this very reason it caused a sensation. On the New York Exchange it was followed by a slump in war industry values. A few anti-German newspapers, which began to suspect that I was the only diplomatist in Washington who knew anything of the President's intentions, declared that I had made millions by speculating on this probability. I had already been accused of every other imaginable crime by the Jingo and Entente Press. Mr. Wilson's son-in-law, Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, was also suspected of having abused his political information to speculate on the Exchange. Soon afterwards, when I was dining with the President, he asked me in jest what I had to say to the accusation of the American Press that I had made millions in this way. I replied that I had gradually got used to such attacks, and they only amused me. Mr. Wilson replied: "That is right. My son-in-law takes the matter much too seriously. I tell him 'If you get so angry, people will think the story is true.'"

The American Press was thrown into the greatest excitement by the President's Note and stormed the State Department. Mr. Lansing was surrounded by questioners and remarked that the United States had the greatest interest in bringing the war to an end, because otherwise she would be drawn in herself. As of late, as has already been mentioned, several doubtful submarine incidents had occurred, the Press took this remark to mean that the United States would enter the war against us if the intervention move came to nothing. Mr. Wilson immediately, realized that such an interpretation of Mr. Lansing's words would seriously jeopardize his peace move. If the Entente could hope for American participation in the war, there would be no prospect of their consenting to a "peace without victory." In that case the direction of their policy was defined beforehand. They only required to reject the offer of mediation to reach the goal of their long-cherished hopes. The President therefore at once requested Mr. Lansing to contradict the statements of the Press. This was done, with the observation that there was no probability of the United States entering the war. The harm could not, however, be completely wiped out, as denials are always regarded with doubt.

The vital parts of Mr. Wilson's Note read as follows:

"The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future, as would make it possible frankly to compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve, or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment, in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. One way will be as acceptable to him as another if only the great object he has in mind be attained.

"In the measures taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and the Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war.