Activity in the west.
In the more western theatre of war, on the contrary, the Boers made some attempt to take advantage of the situation. Recruiting parties were sent across the Orange river, and visited Prieska. The village of Douglas, lying south of the Vaal, a little below its junction with the Riet, and commanding the road from Griqualand West to Belmont, was also occupied by a small commando. The section of Lord Methuen's line of supply from De Aar to Honey Nest Kloof was at this time held by some 11,000 men under the command of Major-General E. Wood.[258] The greater part of this force was distributed in strong posts at Honey Nest Kloof, Enslin, Belmont, Witteputs, Orange River bridge, and De Aar. The garrison of Belmont was under command of Lt.-Colonel T. D. Pilcher, and consisted of two guns of P. battery, R.H.A., a half company of the Munster Fusiliers mounted infantry, 250 Queensland M.I., two companies of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and the Royal Canadian regiment, amounting in all to about 1,600 men. General Wood determined to use a portion of this garrison to brush away the hostile gathering on the left flank. With this object, Colonel Pilcher was directed to move out from Belmont on the afternoon of the 31st December with a flying column, composed of the two guns of P. battery, 42 officers and men of the Munster Fusiliers M.I., 12 officers and 187 men of the Queensland M.I. under command of Lt.-Colonel P. R. Ricardo, and a company of the Canadian regiment, the last-named unit being carried in ten buck wagons with mule transport. The two companies D.C.L.I. formed a supporting column and followed later. In order to deceive the enemy, Pilcher on the previous day had made a feint from Belmont towards the Free State, returning ostensibly on the ground that a mistake had been made as to supply arrangements; the Pilcher's raid on Douglas. real object of the column was Douglas, and it had been arranged to cover Pilcher's right flank, by moving Babington with his mounted brigade and G. battery westward from Modder camp. His left flank was protected by the despatch of the Scots Greys from Orange River station to Mark's Drift, a point close to the junction of the Vaal and Orange rivers. On the night of the 31st December, Colonel Pilcher halted at Thornhill farm, eighteen miles north-west of Belmont, and thence moved on the following morning to Sunnyside, where in a cluster of kopjes a small laager had been formed by an advance party of the enemy. This commando (about 180 strong), was surprised, and defeated, with a loss of fourteen killed and thirty-eight prisoners, after a brief engagement, in which the Canadian and Queensland troops proved their fitness to fight side by side with British regulars. On the 2nd January, the flying column pushing on to Douglas, found the village evacuated by the enemy. Meanwhile, a strong commando, detached by Cronje, had eluded the cavalry brigade and crossed the Riet river near Koodoesberg. Lt.-Colonel Pilcher had already fallen back on Thornhill on 3rd January, and evading the enemy by a night march, regained Belmont unmolested. Ninety loyalist refugees from Douglas accompanied him on his return. Alderson threatens Prieska. Simultaneously with this successful raid, a patrol of about a company of M.I. under Lieut.-Colonel Alderson had been sent to Prieska from De Aar, and on the 3rd January exchanged shots at that place with the enemy across the river, falling back subsequently on De Aar.
Wood seizes Zoutpans Drift.
Lord Methuen now determined, in conjunction with Major-General E. Wood, to demonstrate to the eastward against the enemy's line of communication, which was known to run through Jacobsdal, Koffyfontein, and Fauresmith. On the 7th January Major-General Wood therefore, with a force of all three arms, seized Zoutpans Drift, a ford across the Orange river twenty miles above the railway bridge. The ford had been reconnoitred as early as 13th December. Here General Wood placed a permanent post on favourable ground on a hill, to protect the drift from the Free State side, and to command the road leading thence to Fauresmith. A Boer detachment remained in observation of this post on the adjacent farm of Wolvekraal, but did not attack. Further to the north, reconnaissances into the Free State, made by the cavalry brigade, and by Pilcher's troops at Belmont, ascertained that the enemy was not yet in great strength on the right flank, but that Jacobsdal was occupied. The Field Intelligence department at Cape Town had already (3rd January) received information from a trustworthy source that Cronje had at and near Magersfontein 8,000 to 9,000 men, and that he was relying on being attacked there. The report stated: "An advance on Bloemfontein up the right bank of Riet river by Kaalspruit would draw off the main Boer forces towards Bloemfontein. President O.F.S. is stated in district to have said that he 'could not cope with such a movement.' ... Bloemfontein is undefended except by two forts, the guns of which have been moved to Kimberley."
CHAPTER XXIV.
OPERATIONS ROUND COLESBERG—DECEMBER 16th, 1899, TO FEBRUARY 6TH, 1900.[259]
French's operations during Lord Roberts' voyage.
Whilst Lord Roberts was on his voyage to the seat of war, the three portions of the army which had sustained severe checks were chiefly employed in recuperating and receiving reinforcements. General French, on the other hand, was continuing his successful operations. These, therefore, with the exceptions mentioned in the last chapter, alone represent the active work in the field in South Africa between the time of the decision of the Cabinet appointing the new Commander-in-Chief and his arrival at Cape Town. The task of General French at Arundel was now as important as the strength of his command seemed inadequate to perform it. The enemy on his front formed one of four invading columns, three of which had already been victorious. Schoeman had, therefore, strong reasons for wishing to emulate the prowess of Cronje at Magersfontein, of Botha at Colenso, and of the fortunate trio at Stormberg. French had to deal with an opponent whose confidence must now be presumed to be at its height. Moreover, reinforcements might reach the Boer leader at any moment. It had become more than ever necessary to paralyse him before he could initiate even the semblance of an organised incursion into territory where disloyalty might largely increase his numbers in a night. Only by incessant activity could French hope to attain this object, and fortunately the force under his command, if small, was suitable both in composition and spirit to that most difficult of military operations, the surveillance and protection of a large area by mobility alone. His dispositions, detailed in [Chapter XVII.], whilst they denied a front of nearly forty miles to the enemy, effectually covered the Hanover Road-Naauwpoort-Rosmead line of railway. The area occupied by the Boers round Rensburg was, like that of the British, bisected by the railway. It was roughly as follows:—On the west of the line lay some 800 Transvaalers with a long-range gun; on the east about 2,000 Free Staters, with two guns, were partly entrenched, whilst 600 burghers guarded the Boer Headquarters at Colesberg and their line of retreat. Against the enemy, thus distributed, French now began a series of reconnaissances and rapid movements in force, which, directed against Schoeman's flanks and rear, and often against his convoys, left him no peace. Some of these expeditions, notably an attack by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and a battery R.H.A. on December 18th against the Boer left rear, led to brisk skirmishing; but the British losses were always trifling, and Schoeman, continually forced to show his hand, eventually wearied of his insecurity. He worries Schoeman out of Rensburg. On the 29th he abandoned Rensburg, and fell back by night upon Colesberg. At daybreak on the 30th, French followed in pursuit with the Carabiniers, New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and two guns R.H.A. and, reaching Rensburg at 7 a.m., soon regained touch with the enemy upon the ridges south-west of Colesberg. A demonstration by the artillery disclosed a strong position, strongly held. Colesberg town lies in a hollow in the midst of a rough square of high, steep kopjes, many of them of that singular geometrical form described in [Chapter III.] Smaller kopjes project within rifle range from the angles of the square, whilst 2,000 yards west of its western face a tall peak, called Coles Kop, rises abruptly from the encircling plain, and dominates the entire terrain. The isolation of this hill was doubtless the reason why it was not occupied by the Boers. and pursues him to Colesberg. They were in strength everywhere along the hilly ramparts around Colesberg. French, therefore, perceiving the formidable nature of this "natural fortress,"[260] contented himself with seizing a group of hills (Porter's Hill) 2,000 yards south-west of the south-western angle. Here he planted artillery, and, leaving Porter with the above mounted troops in observation, himself returned to Rensburg siding, which he made his Headquarters, calling up the main body from Arundel.
French decides to attempt Colesberg.