"30. With the despatch of the 8th division, the last organised and mobilised regular formation left this country, and the work of the Mobilisation sub-division, in connection with the despatch of reinforcements to South Africa, came to an end."
The executive work of organising, equipping, and despatching drafts of Militia, Volunteers, and Imperial Yeomanry was carried out entirely by the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, and Director-General of Ordnance.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 8: Some difficulty was experienced in finding certain specialists, such as farriers, &c.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 9: Of this original force from England, all cavalry and artillery units and eleven infantry battalions went out with a "war establishment, plus excess numbers," which were calculated at 10 per cent. to make good casualties for the first three months. It was decided to adopt this standard in all cases.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 10: The reserve of the artillery fell short almost at once, whereas the entire reserves of the cavalry were not called out until the end of February, 1901.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 11: For one battalion alone, the 2nd battalion Royal Irish Rifles, 1,831 duly qualified soldiers left England in six months, without having to draw on any reserves outside its own corps.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 12: Memorandum on Drafts prepared in the Adjutant-General's department, 30th September, 1902. See Appendix volume, Royal Commission, p. 86.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 13: The experiences of a particular battery, Royal Field artillery, afford an illustration of the consequences detailed above. From this battery, by the end of November, 1899, there had been drafted off to staff, service batteries, ammunition columns, or excess numbers, the captain, the senior subaltern (the only one who had had four months' service in field artillery), five sergeants, one corporal, one bombardier, four shoeing smiths, two trumpeters, the wheeler, six gunners and five drivers. In December, 1899, the battery commander, with the whole of one sub-division, was taken away as the nucleus of a new battery to be formed. Ten days after this the mobilisation of the battery was ordered. Rather more than 50 per cent. of the battery when mobilised were men of Section D. of the Reserve, of whom about half had seen the gun which they were to work, while none had seen it fired.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 14: Statement of the Mobilisation sub-division.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 15: The effect of this, as regards the cavalry, was that some 2,000 reservists, over and above immediate requirements, were prematurely placed at the disposal of the department.[Back to Main Text]