Footnote 224: Two Naval 12-prs. had been left at Frere; the remaining two 12-prs. were placed on Shooter's Hill, at a distance of about 6,000 yards from the bridge.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 225: See despatch to the War Office, dated 17th December, 1899.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 226: See maps Nos. [15] and [15(a)], and [freehand sketch].[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 227: Sunrise at Colenso on 15th December is at 5 a.m.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 228: General Buller's telegram to the War Office, dated 15th December, 1899, states: "There are two fordable places in the Tugela ... they are about two miles apart ... General Hart was to attack the left drift, General Hildyard the right."[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 229: It is noteworthy that Major-General Hart is emphatic in asserting that "he did not cross the Doornkop Spruit." It will be understood from the explanation given in the text that he did not cross what was marked for him on the map as the spruit. The map was wrong. He crossed the spruit shown as "Doornkop Spruit" on map [15].[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 230: In consequence of the heavy losses suffered by the commissioned ranks in previous actions all the infantry officers had been ordered to discard their swords, and for the most part carried a rifle and men's equipment.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 231: The other half-battalion of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, under command of Lieut.-Col. J. Reeves, was on baggage guard. Headquarters and four companies of the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers were at Frere.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 232: In addition to the field guns on the Colenso kopjes, a heavy gun, north of them, was observed by the Naval officers of Capt. Jones', R.N., battery.[Back to Main Text]
Footnote 233: The two companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers subsequently ran short of ammunition, but a further supply was brought up to them under a heavy fire by Sergeant-Major J. Shannon, 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers.[Back to Main Text]