Infantry training, 1905

by Great Britain. War Office

3. To extend whole companies in the firing-line at the outset, the supports being formed from other companies, is a proceeding which can seldom be justified; leading as it must to a premature admixture of tactical units, and to the surrender, at an unnecessarily early period, of the control of the firing-line. The rule that all reinforcements should be furnished as long as possible by the same unit should never be infringed.

4. When the battalion is acting in concert with other units, the frontage assigned to it, if the attack is intended to be decisive, must be in proportion to its strength.

5. Battalions should be constantly exercised in forming for the attack from a position of assembly, the frontage being always varied, and a different number of companies told off to the firing-line and the reserve. It is only by practice that a commanding officer can acquire the facility of recognising at once how many companies should be extended in firing-line, and how many allotted to the reserve.

154. The firing-line and supports.

The formation of the firing-line and supports, and the distance of the latter from the firing-line, will be determined by the company commanders. There is no necessity that these should be the same in every company so long as the general principles laid down for the attack are intelligently applied.

155. The reserve.

1. Next to the conception of a sound plan of attack, and the issue of clear and comprehensive orders to the company commanders, the most important duty of the officer commanding a battalion is the handling of his reserve. It is by means of the reserve that he makes his influence felt in action, and by reinforcing the firing-line at the right time and at the right place keeps the attack moving and eventually attains the superiority of fire. But judicious feeding of the firing-line is not all that is required. Not only must its flanks be protected, and its advance covered by long-range fire; but if the enemy is well-trained, counter-attack is always to be apprehended; and—what is also dangerous—a sudden reinforcement of the defence, when the struggle for fire-superiority is at its height may take place. It should be the aim, then, of the officer commanding, so to husband his reserve, that while prosecuting the attack with vigour by means of timely reinforcements, he may still have a sufficient force at his disposal to meet emergencies. From first to last, therefore, he should retain at least a portion of the reserve in his own hand, for even a half-company may be of the greatest service in repelling a sudden counter-attack, or in forming a rallying point if the attack is repulsed.

2. If heavy losses are to be expected before a strong firing-line can be established within decisive range of the enemy’s position, the reserve should be stronger than the firing-line and supports. If, on the other hand, the opposition is weak, or decisive range can be reached under cover, the reserve may be of the same strength as the firing-line and supports. It is to be observed, however, that the firing-line and supports here alluded to are those engaged in the decisive attack; companies engaged in a holding attack, or in a feigned or false attack, are not to be counted when calculating the strength of the reserve.

3. It may be advisable to divide the reserve into two distinct bodies, one following the flank attack, the other the frontal attack.

4. When the flanks (or flank) of the battalion are exposed, a portion of the reserve will be told off as a protection against counter-attack and for extended patrolling.