Infantry training, 1905

by Great Britain. War Office

3. The attitude originally assumed by either, or both, of the opposing forces, may be reversed during an engagement. A vigorous counter-attack by an army offering battle in a defensive position may throw the adversary on the defensive; or an assailant may fight a delaying or retaining action in one part of the field, while in another part his action may be essentially offensive; but these and other variations in a combat resolve themselves in every case into attack and defence.

4. Since the conditions of modern warfare render decentralisation of command in action an absolute necessity, no good results are to be expected unless the subordinate leaders have been trained to use their intelligence, and unless they have been given ample opportunities of acting on their own judgment in attack and defence, and have constantly, in peace practices, been called upon to consider the necessity of departing from their original orders.

Nor can the results be good if commanding officers fail to realise the very limited extent to which they are able to exert their powers of command under fire, and if, in peace, they attempt to exercise a personal control which would be impossible in action. They should be most careful, therefore, to act in peace practices exactly as they would in war, and abstain from all interference which would be impracticable under fire.

5. During the combat, as at all other times, the commander of every body of troops is responsible for the local protection of his command against surprise.

6. Ample information, both before and during an engagement, is so exceedingly important that methodical and complete arrangements should be made to obtain it. Nothing should be left to chance. All available means should be employed. In every command some simple method of collecting and transmitting reports should be established and the system should have been practised beforehand.

125. Position and Duties of Leaders in Action.

1. The difficulties of command are much increased by the fact that the leader can no longer personally control and direct all ranks by word of mouth, and that even under long range fire the mounted officers must often dismount.

2. During the fight, the commander of a considerable body of infantry can only influence the course of the action by the employment of his reserve. Nevertheless, the influence of the commander, if exerted in the proper manner, viz., by means of clear, comprehensive, and concise orders, framed after careful reconnaissance, made known to all the subordinate leaders, and providing for the combined and simultaneous action of his whole force, will be very great.

3. The commander’s position will, as a rule, be selected so that he can obtain an extensive view. It should be sufficiently central to facilitate the receipt of reports and the issue of orders. The subordinate leaders will take post where they can best exercise supervision over their commands, watch the enemy, and receive and transmit orders.

4. Keeping in view the paramount importance of decentralisation of command, it is essential that superior officers, including battalion commanders, should never trespass on the proper sphere of action of their subordinates. Personal example has undoubtedly an extraordinary influence, especially under heavy fire, and there are times when every other consideration must be sacrificed to leading or steadying the troops. But any attempt to exercise personal control over all portions of the force must inevitably lead to the neglect of other duties, such as feeding the firing line at the right place and time, protecting the flanks, meeting counter-attacks, reporting to, or communicating with, the superior commander, and maintaining connection with adjoining units. Moreover, all unnecessary changes of position by an officer commanding any considerable body of troops are to be deprecated, as interfering with the timely reception and transmission of reports and orders.