Il nipotismo di Roma, or, The History of the Popes Nephews / from the time of Sixtus IV. to the death of the last Pope, Alexander VII

by Gregorio Leti

For they that were disgraced did immediately reveal to Princes all the secrets of his Court, and they who came in their room could never penetrate into the hidden designs of Forreign Courts; for the Princes of those Kingdoms and States durst not trust them with any thing, as being alwayes afraid, lest they should be turned off as the first.

And in effect, as soon as the news of the adoption of Cardinal Astalli was spread abroad, there were many that laid great wagers, that he would not conserve himself in his post long; and the grounds they went upon, was the unconstant humour of the Pope, which no body could trust to.

Cardinal Mazarine himself being weary of so many extravagant changes in the Nipotismo of Innocentius, and seeing Astalli fallen out of his favour, and the Barberins in his place, said to one of his Confidents, in the presence of a French Protestant, these words, I have never relyed much upon the Cardinal Astalli; and I shall now scarce rely upon the Pope himself. Many Princes both of Italy and Germany were of Cardinal Mazarine’s minde in this, and became very cautious in all their negotiations; avoiding all occasions of treating with his Holiness, as knowing that nothing could be well managed in such divisions, and changes.

Thus we see, that not only the Popes must have near them those that have the title of Nephews; but they must be really such, as by consanguinity may be obliged to the same interest with the Pope, if he means that others should trust them. This is the only way to make the Popes appear Sovereigns, as really they desire to be; and any other way they will seem rather to be the Heads of a Commonwealth than absolute Princes.

It is fit therefore, that they should be allowed a Nipotismo for their own and others safety; but it is not just that they should so indulge this Nipotismo, as to set it above themselves, and become its slaves. Let them treat with Princes, but let them not become so themselves, and usurp the Pope’s Authority, so far as to use it without his knowledge, and often contrary to the Interests of the Church and State.

Let them not do as Gregory the 15th. who had given to the Cardinal Ludovisio his Nephew, so great an Authority of doing and saying what he pleased, without so much as consulting his Uncle, that he was really become Pope, and the Pope as if he had been the Nephew; and if ever he come and give him part of any secret negotiation, it was because the thing was so intricate, that he either could not, or durst not undertake to come to execution, without being first fortified with his Uncle’s advice and approbation.

But the best was, that the Pope himself did not dare to ask him any questions about business, or inform himself otherwise; but sometimes would be whole weeks together without so much as seeing the face of an Ambassadour, or publick Minister: his Nephew in the mean time giving Audience, and concluding all business with them.

And the Pope was so customed to this usage, that it never came into his minde to be offended at it; but would very contentedly make amends for those faults which his Nephew did often commit in his administration: and whensoever he did see his Nephew come into his presence, he would say, Nephew, I am sure ’tis some very hard and intricate business that brings you hither, for else we should scarce be repaired to for counsel. And he had a great deal of reason to say so, for his Nephew did never communicate to him any negotiation, except he had first spoiled it, and brought himself to a non-plus; and then the Pope would oblige the Congregations of the Cardinals to take the business into their care, and set right again that which had been spoiled by his inability.

The second reason for the Nipotismo is, that the Popes may be able to govern with more care and affection. There is nothing that forces more a Prince to answer the ends of Government, and to oblige his people, than when he considers that the Government is to descend to his Heirs; for a Prince without a Successor does often dissipate and spoil that which he would preserve, if he had any body to leave it to.

The State of Venice which never established any Law without having first deliberated upon it, and sifted it in their Council of Pregadi, does think fit to oblige the kindred of the dead Duke to answer for their Kinsman’s misdemeanours and miscarriages; fining them in great summes of money for a reparation of his faults: so that often they are fain to endure for the dead Duke those punishments, which his Dignity when he was alive, and his death, have preserved him from.