But this would be a great failure in Policy and Interest: Whence it was, that when Innocent beheld his Cousin Olympia anxious and troubled lest the Ecclesiastical State should become involv’d in a War, and lest many Cardinals should engage in it on behalf of the Duke of Parma, out of spight to the Pamphilian Family, the Pope comforted her with these words; Cousin, fear nothing, the Cardinals will be for us in spight of their own teeth, and will defend the Ecclesiastical State in consideration of their own Interest, though we should go about to ruine it for ours.
The Grandeur of the Scarlet Gown depends upon the Majesty of the Triple Crown, and the Cardinals are proportionably Great as the Pope is so; whence it is that they strive with all possible ardour to promote the Advantage of the Church, and the Honour of the Pope; which failing, their own Reputation and Glory must partake in the Eclipse.
Great undoubtedly is the Magnificence of the Colledge of Cardinals; and greater it would be, if it had not been perverted both from the first Institution thereof, and retrench’d of the Prerogatives wherewith it hath been augmented by divers Popes, for the maintenance of its Grandeur and Honour.
But the Popes have corrupted and spoil’d all; inasmuch as into that Colledge, into which the greatest Princes of the World think it a glory to enter, they have introduc’d some, who have received their Original from the vilest Dunghil of the World; and ’tis not many years ago, that one was created Cardinal, who was the Son of a base Catchpole.
Hence it comes to pass, that the Popes seeing the Scarlet Robe upon the Shoulders of so vile and unworthy Persons, they despise it likewise when it is worn on the backs of Great Princes. And ’tis more than true, That good Popes honour the Cardinals, when such Honour brings profit to themselves; otherwise they make a mock both of their Persons, and their Order.
And hence it is, that Princes Ministers find themselves in a wrong Box, when they put any trust even in those Cardinals who seem the greatest Zealots for their Interests.
Thus I have made a Relation of the manner how things are wont to be negotiated at Rome, and shew’d how the great Polititians of Europe may salve their Reputations; as also the Grounds and Causes of those Mischiefs, which break the sleep and make the heads ake of as many Publick Ministers as reside in Rome.
When the Pope perceives that Negotiations tend to his own Advantage, he doth things like an absolute Monarch: but when he knows that they are likely to cause any prejudice to him, he lays the cause of not succeeding upon the Congregations of the Cardinals, of which there are infinite at Rome.
In this manner he shews himself rather as Head of a Commonwealth, than an absolute Prince: and indeed those Congregations serve more for a pretext and help to the Pope and the Nephews, than for any benefit to the State.
From such a Government little Fruit, and no Satisfaction can be drawn by the Ministers that negotiate at Rome; but rather, as accordingly it falls out, disgusts, affronts, and dissatisfactions.