I first want to call your attention to the fact that the battle commenced about fifteen minutes after 12 o'clock, and that the Sixteenth Army Corps fought a long time before the Seventeenth Corps was attacked. You can verify this statement by reading General Strong's account of the battle, which is given in our Army of the Tennessee records, volume 11 to 13, page 242.
It was just 12 o'clock exactly when I reached Fuller's headquarters. Having gone to the front to select my position, Fuller asked me to stop and take luncheon, and I got down from my horse and went into his tent. I had sat down at the table when I heard skirmish firing in the rear. Fuller said it was a lot of the boys out there killing hogs. The stillness had been oppressive as we went clear to the left and front of Blair's line to select my new position. We inquired from the pickets and found that nobody had seen anything of the enemy. It made an impression on us all; so the moment I heard this firing I jumped up, as if by instinct, and told Fuller to get into line, and sent a staff officer towards Sweeney; but before he hardly got out of the tent Sweeney was in line and fighting, so you can see how sudden the attack was.
In volume 11 to 13 of the Army of the Tennessee records, page 243, Strong, in his address on the Battle of Atlanta, has this to say fixing the time of the commencement of the battle, speaking of the time when an officer was sent with an order to me from McPherson:
The officer had hardly disappeared from sight, when a shot was heard to the left and rear of us, then another, followed quickly by a rattling volley of small arms, and at almost the same instant a shell came crashing through the tree-tops near us, followed by a rapid and incessant firing from Dodge's Corps. At the first shots every officer sprang to his feet and called for his horse. The time, I should think, was ten or fifteen minutes past 12 o'clock.
Then after speaking of the fighting of this Division, comes this, on page 243:
After the two attempts to break the Sixteenth Corps had failed, General McPherson sent me to General Blair to ascertain the condition of affairs along his line, and instructed me to say to General Giles A. Smith to hold his position; that he would order up troops to occupy the gap between the Seventeenth and Sixteenth Corps; and also saying as I left him that he would remain with his orderly where he then was (a commanding position on Dodge's right) until I returned. I rode rapidly through the woods towards the Seventeenth Corps and found General Blair with General Giles A. Smith near the extreme left of the Fourth Division (Hall's Brigade).
This conclusively shows that Blair was not attacked until after two attacks had been made upon me, although Hall's report gives the attack upon Blair as at 12 o'clock, that time being before the Sixteenth Corps was attacked. Fuller gives the time of attack upon him as 12:30. By reading all of page 243 you will get a full and clear idea of time and everything. The time was also taken by my staff and record made of it, and that agrees with Strong. This only shows how far apart officers can get as to time in a great battle, and on many things, unless correct data is made of record on the spot.
On page 484, of volume 14 to 16 of Society of the Army of the Tennessee records, General Leggett says:
Both divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps immediately became hotly engaged.... Just at this time I espied General McPherson upon the high ground in the immediate rear of General Fuller's command, and sent Captain John B. Raymond of my staff to inquire of General McPherson the expediency of having General Giles A. Smith and myself change our line so as to face south, and at the same time I sent Captain George W. Porter to ascertain whether or not the left of General Smith and the right of General Fuller were sufficiently near together to antagonize any force seeking entrance there.... The enemy in front of the Sixteenth Corps rallied in the woods (this is after the first attack) and renewed their attack with increased vigor and bitterness.... The conflict continued for some time, with no appearance on either side of any disposition to yield the ground, when the enemy gave way, and fell back in confusion, followed by the Sixteenth Corps.... The second assault (upon the Sixteenth Corps) was simultaneous with the attack upon General Giles A. Smith's Division, which was the left of the Seventeenth Corps.
You will note from my address that the moment I was attacked I sent an aide, and afterwards a signal officer named Sheffly (I think), who was detailed with me that day, or happened to be with me. These officers had gone to General Giles A. Smith, who commanded Blair's left, Fourth Division, Seventeenth Corps, to get him to refuse his left and join my right. I think the first officer I sent was Captain Jonas of my staff, who returned immediately to me, and General Giles A. Smith sent me word that he would refuse. That was a long time before Cleburn's Division got between us; but, as my paper and your article show, McPherson had sent word to Giles A. Smith without knowing the condition in his front, to hold his position, stating that he would send reinforcements to fill the gap between Fuller and himself. Of course, had McPherson been there earlier and seen what I saw, he would have had Smith's left join my right immediately, which would have put Cleburn in front of us instead of between us. That is one of the things that occur in battle that the person on the ground knows better than the one distant. It was on the third attack on my line that the enemy struck Blair, as Strong did not go to Blair until after the repulse of the second attack. Cleburn's force got right in behind Blair's left and picked up that portion of his line that was refused, and swept back his force so that Blair's left, even before Waglin of the Fifteenth Corps got there, was pretty nearly an extension of but a quarter of a mile away from Fuller's right, and after I got through fighting I had to withdraw my entire right quite a distance to connect with Waglin and Blair, as Cleburn's force had pressed clear beyond me and before he was halted was way in the rear of my right.