PUMPKIN BUTTES
Prominent land-mark near where Colonels Cole and Walker fought the Indians in September, 1865, on Powder River.
The wagon-road train that started from Sioux City under Colonel Sawyer's engineering party, with two companies of the Fifth United States Volunteer Infantry under the command of Captain George N. Williford, that were to open a wagon-road from Sioux City up the Niobrara River by a short route to the north end of the Black Hills, intended to cross to Powder River and then to the south end of the Big Horn Mountains, making a direct emigrant route into Montana. As soon as I heard of the instructions given this expedition I got word to Colonel Sawyer that it was impossible for him to travel on that route; that he must keep to the south end of the Black Hills and follow up the North Platte until he struck what was known as the Bozeman trail, that was laid out in 1864 by some emigrants going into Montana. This was the trail that Connor had taken on his route to Tongue River. It was feasible all the way from the Platte to Montana. Colonel Sawyer paid no attention to this information, but kept on his original route until he got into the brakes of the Powder River, not very far from where Cole struck them. When within twenty miles of the River, he ascertained by his own guide that it was impossible to advance any farther in that direction; consequently, he had to retrace his steps. On the second day they were attacked by a large band of Indians; evidently the Cheyennes and Sioux that afterwards attacked Colonels Cole and Walker. These Indians kept them corralled nearly four days and nights, fighting through the day and withdrawing at night, only to begin their hostilities at dawn; but finding that their efforts only resulted in many being killed, they abandoned the siege and left, going south, striking Cole's trail on August 22d, which they followed, and on the 23d Colonel Sawyer marched into Port Connor. While Captain Williford does not say that he took charge of this train, that is a fact. He took charge of it and kept it until he got to Fort Connor. He was a splendid officer and it was through his good judgment and his ability as a soldier that he saved the whole outfit. The Bent Boys, who were at the head of the Cheyennes, would communicate with Sawyer and get him to send out persons for the purpose of trading with them, and whoever was sent inside their lines was held prisoner, the idea being to wear Sawyer's force out by this means. But they struck the wrong man in Captain Williford, who, comprehending the situation, attacked the Indians. I knew Williford in the Civil War, and he was a very efficient officer. At Fort Connor I relieved Williford, his men being mostly barefooted, and put Colonel Kidd of the Michigan Cavalry, in command, with a suitable escort, and instructed him to follow the Connor trail until they struck Tongue River, and then to swing towards the Yellowstone and strike the trail up that river to Bozeman. This train, when they got nearly opposite to where General Connor fought, was again attacked by the Indians; but Colonel Kidd managed to get news to General Connor and he sent two or three companies of his command to the rescue. They were absent while he fought his battle on Tongue River. They drove off the Indians, and relieved the train, which reached Montana in safety.
Early in September I reached Fort Connor—before General Cole and Colonel Walker had concentrated there—and gave instructions under the direction of the authorities at Washington, forwarded to me by General Pope, to withdraw all the troops to Fort Laramie, and stop all their operations against the Indians, and endeavor to bring them in for a consultation, and, if possible, to make an agreement as to the cessation of all hostilities. This was a fatal mistake. When I received this dispatch from General Pope, on August 31st, I sent the following message to him:
Headquarters U. S. Forces.
Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, August 31, 1865.
Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo.:
I consider the Indian matters here of so much importance, and knowing no one can judge of them so well as when he is on the ground, that I desire to make a proposition to the Government. If the Government will allow me to keep General Connor in the field with not to exceed 2,000 men of his present force, leaving the forces you have designated to garrison posts on the plains. I will settle these Indian difficulties before spring satisfactorily to the Government, and bring about a peace that will be lasting. I may do it in a month or two; or it may be longer. The additional expense to the Government will be the pay of that number of troops for the time detained. All the stores, forage, etc., to support them are here and en route. As soon as we settle with them we can send these troops in and take 2,000 more from our posts in addition and muster them out. General Connor left Powder River with sixty days' supplies, and I am satisfied if we will allow him he will settle the matter before he returns. Should he come back by our orders without settling the matter, the entire Indian tribes will be down on our lines, and we will have our hands full, and more too. The forces for Utah I will soon have on the road, and when Connor gets back he can go right there.
G. M. Dodge,
Major-General.