22. It would be impossible to fix a rent which would content both parties.
23. As tenants vary in ability, character, and energy, it would be impossible to legislate so that the rent the tenant had to pay would be that which he is able to pay.
24. A fixed rent, even if fair at first, would soon weigh heavily on one or other of the parties.
25. All future enhancements of rent, based on whatever ground, would be strenuously resisted.
26. While the landlord would be bound to accept the valuation, the tenant could refuse to pay it and quit his holding.
27. If the Government, by valuation or arbitration, were to fix the rent, the landlord would consider that he had been guaranteed his rent by the State; while the tenant (in bad seasons) would look to the State to assist him to pay it.
28. If fixity of tenure were conceded, the next demand would be for the abolition of the rent charge, more especially on the ground of increased absenteeism, which would itself have been encouraged by the change.
29. At all events, in bad seasons, a demand would be made for abatement of rent, on the ground that otherwise the value of the tenant-right would be injuriously affected.
30. The power conceded to the landlord of selling the “tenant-right” on breach of contract, would be rendered nugatory by the combination of tenants to prevent a purchase; and so the landlord would be deprived of all means of obtaining his rent, or of preventing subletting or subdivision.