[5] E. g. Kant's arbitrary assertion that the operation of counting presupposes the conception of that number which forms the scale of notation adopted as the source of the unity of the synthesis. This is of course refuted among other ways by the fact that a number of units less than the scale of notation can be counted.
[6] Cf. A. 97, Mah. 193, 'Knowledge is a totality of compared and connected representations.
[7] No doubt Kant would allow that at least some categories, e. g. the conception of cause and effect, are principles of synthesis of a manifold which at any rate contains an empirical element, but it includes just one of the difficulties of the passage that it implies that a priori knowledge either is, or involves, a synthesis of pure or a priori elements.
[8] B. 92-4, M. 56-8.
[9] Kant, of course, thinks of this activity of thought, as identical with that which brings particulars under a conception.
[10] Cf. pp. 155-6.
[11] In bringing perceptions under a conception, thought, according to Kant, finds the conception in the perceptions by analysis of them, and in relating two conceptions in judgement, it determines the particular form of judgement by analysis of the conceptions.
[12] The italics are mine.
[13] The italics are mine.
[14] Cf. the description of the imagination as 'blind'.