[35] Cf. pp. 168-9.
[36] In view of Kant's subsequent account of the function of the categories it should be noticed that, according to the present passage, the conception involved in an act of knowledge is the conception not of an 'object in general', but of 'an object of the particular kind which constitutes the individual whole produced by the combination a whole of the particular kind that it is of', and that, in accordance with this, the self-consciousness involved is not the mere consciousness that our combining activity is identical throughout, but the consciousness that it is an identical activity of a particular kind, e. g. that of counting five units. Cf. pp. 184 fin.-186, 190-2, and 206-7.
[37] Vorstellung in the present passage is perhaps better rendered 'idea', but representation has been retained for the sake of uniformity.
[38] Erkenntnisse.
[39] A. 104, Mah. 199.
[40] Cf. A. 105, Mah. 199.
[41] Cf. A. 106, Mah. 200.
[42] It may be noticed that possession of the unity of a system does not really distinguish 'an object' from any other whole of parts, nor in particular from 'a representation'. Any whole of parts must be a systematic unity.
[43] Cf. pp. 230-3.
[44] Erkenntnisse.