"Upon property so detained the declaration of war is said to have a retroactive effect, and to render it liable to be considered as the property of enemies taken in time of war. The property is seized provisionally—an act hostile enough in the mere execution, but equivocal as to its effects, and liable to be varied by subsequent events, and by the conduct of the government, the property of whose subjects is so detained. Where the first seizure is equivocal, if the matter in dispute terminates in reconciliation, the seizure is converted into a mere civil embargo. This would be the retroactive effect of that course of circumstances. On the contrary, if the transactions end in hostility, the retroactive effect is directly the other way. It impresses a hostile character upon the original seizure. It is declared to be embargo; it is no longer an equivocal act, subject to two interpretations; there is a declaration of the animus by which it was done, that it was done hostili animo, and is to be considered a hostile measure ab initio. The property taken is liable to be used as the property of persons, trespassers ab initio, and guilty of injuries which they have refused to redeem by any amicable alteration of their measures. This is the necessary course, if no particular compact intervenes for the restitution of such property taken before a formal declaration of hostilities."[202]
The modern rule seems to be, that tangible property, belonging to an enemy, ought not to be immediately confiscated. It may be considered as the opinion of all who have written on the jus belli, that war gives the right to confiscate, but does not of itself confiscate the property of an enemy.
Chancellor Kent expressly terms this species of hostility—a reprisal.[203] And Lord Mansfield says, that though foreign ports or harbours are not the high sea any more than the shore, yet numberless captures made there have been condemned as prize,[204] i.e. can be the subject of reprisal.
NOTE B.—War Bill Act.
During the last war, the War Bill Act, 34 Geo. 3. c. 9, was passed as a measure of retaliation. It was passed in order to prevent the effect intended to be produced by an order of the French Government, compelling all merchants, bankers, and others, possessed of money, funded property, and effects, in different parts Europe, to declare all such property, that it might be taken by violence, and applied to the purposes of the war then carried on by the government of France against the greater part of Europe.
The principal sections relating to bills, prohibited any British subject, from and after March 1, 1794, from wilfully and knowingly in any manner paying or satisfying any bill of exchange, note, draught, obligation, or order for money, in part or in whole, which, since January 1, 1794, had been or at any time during the said war should be drawn, accepted, or indorsed, or in any manner sent from any part of the dominions of France, &c.; every person so offending to forfeit double the value, and the payment not to be effectual against any person who might otherwise have demanded the same; but the demands of all persons to remain, notwithstanding such payment, and notwithstanding such bills shall have been delivered up.
NOTE C.—Rule of 1756.
During the war of 1756, the French Government, finding the trade with their colonies cut off by the maritime superiority of Great Britain, relaxed the monopoly of that trade, and allowed the Dutch, then neutral, to carry on the commerce between the mother country and her colonies, under special licences or passes, granted for this particular purpose, excluding at the same time, all other neutrals from the same trade. Many of their vessels were captured by the British cruizers.
The policy under which they were captured is called the "Rule of 1756;" and as, in the present war, its justice and propriety has already begun to be doubted, it may not be uninteresting to read the reasons upon which it was founded.
1. They were considered as part of the French navigation, having adopted this otherwise exclusive commerce, and acting in the character of French enemy in identifying themselves with that interest, in direct opposition to the belligerent interests and purposes of Great Britain.