In 1904, however, an even more extended offer of annexation was made to the Government of India, under circumstances differing from those of 1895. In the summer of 1903 a fakir from Ghazni created disturbances in the Orakzai country, preached a jehad, and made an organised attack against the Shiahs. The fakir’s Sunni forces were, however, twice defeated, the fakir left the country, and hostilities came to an end. But even while the fighting was still in progress, the Chappar Mishtis, a Sunni division, applied to be taken over by the British Government, but were informed that we could not interfere in a purely religious war, and that no petition from them could be entertained until peace was restored. When the war had come to an end, all the four Shiah divisions of the Muhammad Khel clan—the Mani Khel, Bar Muhammad Khel, Sipaia and Abdul Aziz Khel—with the Ibrahimzai and the Chappar Mishtis, at once made overtures to be taken over, expressing their desire to come under Government control somewhat on the same lines as the Kurram clans. The fighting strength of these tribes represented approximately 2710 men, the tract occupied by them containing some seventy villages, and being about thirty miles in length with a maximum breadth of some fourteen miles. The territory formed a complete block, bounded on the north by the Mastura river, running down on the south to the broken and undulating country within the limits of Kachai and Marai in British territory; on the east it extended to within four miles of Kohat; while on the west the boundary stopped just short of the point where the road, made during the expedition of 1897, crosses the Sampagha Pass. The strategical advantages conferred by the possession of this tract of country are especially great in the event of the Afridi tribe being ever again arrayed against us. These Shiah clans command one of the shortest routes from the Kohat side to the centre of Tirah by the Landuki Pass; there is access to the Bara Valley by the Maturi or the Uchpal Pass, and by Waran to the Khyber Afridi settlements in Rajgal and Maidan. They also overlook the territory of three of the hamsaya clans, and are in rear of the country of some of the Ismailzai divisions.

On the 28th October, 1904, the Secretary of State for India expressed himself as unwilling to take any steps which he was of opinion might add appreciably to our frontier responsibilities, and therefore declined to authorise any serious departure from the general policy laid down by his predecessor in January 1898, or to incur the risk attaching to the suggested extension of the tribal area under our control.

CHAPTER XV.
ORAKZAIS: OPERATIONS.[[128]]

Up to the year 1855 the Orakzais, though occasionally committing petty depredations on the border, and known to be capable of mischief if so inclined, gave no positive trouble to the British authorities; but in the spring of that year many of the tribe were concerned in the demonstrations and attacks upon posts and parties in the Miranzai Valley, mention of which will be found in Chapter XVI. Divisions of the Ismailzai clan had been especially aggressive; the Akhel division had attacked a village (Baliamin) in British territory and carried off 156 head of cattle; and on the 30th April of that year the Orakzais, made up by Afridis and Zaimukhts to a strength of between 1500 and 2000 men, attacked our camp, but were driven off with heavy loss.

After the withdrawal of the troops, the Orakzais continued to commit depredations upon the Bangash living in the Kohat district, making no fewer than fifteen raids, carrying off many hundred head of cattle and killing several British subjects. In these affairs the tribesmen of the two hamsaya clans, the Sheikhan and the Mishti, were concerned, but the Rabia Khel division of the Ismailzai was also conspicuous; and finally, a feud having commenced between the Orakzais and the people of Hangu, a village in the neighbourhood was raided and 660 head of cattle were carried off. At this Major J. Coke, commanding the 1st Punjab Infantry, and also Deputy-Commissioner of Kohat, reinforced Hangu with two guns and 300 bayonets, and, the raids continuing, reported that he proposed to attack the Rabia Khel village of Nasin,[[129]] assisted by Bangash and other levies. Coke’s proposals were, however, vetoed both by the Brigadier-General commanding the Punjab Frontier Force, and by Mr. John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner—chiefly on the ground of the difficulty and danger of moving troops at that season of the year—July—and defensive measures only were for the present sanctioned. During the next few weeks the tribesmen became more unsettled; the Rabia Khel, Mamazai and Ali Khel held a jirgah, at which it was agreed that, provided the Ali Khel and Akhel would join, the combined four divisions should make an attack upon British territory somewhere about the date of the Eed (the 25th August). There was, moreover, no doubt that the rest of the hill clans were in a most excited state, and were trying to foment a jehad. Brigadier Chamberlain, commanding the Frontier Force, had by this time arrived at Kohat, reinforcements were called up, the border villages were put in a state of defence, communications were improved, supplies collected, and friendly chiefs were called upon to collect armed levies.

Expedition of 1855

Expedition against the Rabia Khel (Ismailzai), 1855.—By the 25th August a force of nine guns, one regiment of cavalry, and three battalions of Punjab Infantry had been assembled at Hangu, and on the 1st September arrangements were made to attack early the following morning the villages of Nasin and Sangar, the one on the summit, the other on the slopes of the Samana Range, and that of Katsa on the northern side of the Samana and on the left bank of the Khanki River. The two first-named villages were so situated, both in regard to position and approach, that any attack, during daylight and with the tribesmen prepared to meet our troops, would have entailed serious loss of life. Success depended almost entirely upon the simultaneous surprise of both Nasin and Sangar; and since any preliminary approach would have excited suspicion, it was necessary to start from Hangu, thus involving a march of fourteen miles before the commencement of the ascent of the Samana; while even if the range were ascended opposite camp, the same distance would have to be marched along the ridge before reaching Sangar. It was determined to attack the villages both from above and below, and the following dispositions were made. The 1st Punjab Infantry and three companies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry were detailed, under Major Coke, to attack the village of Sangar, leaving camp at 10 p.m., climbing the range near Hangu, and, moving along the crest, to reach and rush Sangar before daybreak.

The second column, composed of three companies of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, was to move at 9 p.m. on Nasin, taking up such a position above and near the village as to command it. If in difficulties, this column was to be reinforced by Major Coke, who was further, after capturing and destroying Sangar, to move the whole of his party down the hill to aid in the attack on Nasin. Katsa, with its rice crops and mills, and which was reported to be almost undefended, was to be attacked and destroyed by a party of levies, who were to move in rear of Major Coke’s column. The remainder of the force, under the Brigadier, was to leave camp shortly after 10 p.m. and, climbing the same spur as the second party, was to move on Nasin in readiness to support any one of the three columns. A reserve, with field guns, came behind the main body, timed to reach the foot of the spur by dawn, so as to cover the retirement.

The troops were warned only one hour before starting.

Each of the three columns effected its purpose without loss, the enemy being completely surprised and making no stand; a large number of sheep and cattle was seized, the towers of the villages were blown up and the crops destroyed; but, on the retirement commencing, the enemy followed up with great determination, and, as the skirmishers of the 2nd Punjab Infantry evacuated a commanding position, they were attacked and driven back by a sudden rush of swordsmen, when a native doctor and seven men were hacked to pieces. The enemy did not leave the hill in pursuit, and the whole force reached the camp, one mile south-west of Hangu, by sunset, having suffered a loss of eleven men killed and four wounded. The enemy sustained casualties to the number of twenty-four killed and wounded, among the former being four maliks. The troops had been under arms for over seventeen hours, had marched some twenty-eight miles, and had ascended and descended a rugged mountain nearly 4000 feet in height.