From the Black Mountain to Waziristan / Being an account of the border countries and the more turbulent of the tribes controlled by the north-west frontier province, and of our military relations with them in the past

by H. C. Wylly

The “Eagle’s Nest”

These troops proceeded to the vicinity of the “Eagle’s Nest” picquet, situated a full mile from the camp, and occupying the top of a very steep, rocky knoll rising out of the southern face of the mountain, and forming the apex of that portion overlooking the left side of the camp. This picquet had hitherto only been held during the day. Colonel Vaughan now placed the thirty marksmen with eighty men of the 20th Punjab Infantry in the “Eagle’s Nest”—as many as it was capable of holding—and stationed another 120 men of the 3rd[^[47]] and 20th Punjab Infantry among some large rocks at the base of the knoll. The rest of the force with Colonel Vaughan was disposed about a small underfeature, 400 yards west of the picquet.

On the crest of the hill opposite to and distant 500 yards from our picquet, was a breastwork occupied by about 2000 of the enemy, and shortly after noon these made two fierce assaults upon the “Eagle’s Nest,” and also attacked the rest of the troops immediately under Colonel Vaughan. All these attacks were gallantly repulsed, but our casualties were heavy, amounting to twenty-nine killed and ninety-two wounded; the enemy also lost seriously, and though no further attack was made, a heavy fire was kept up during the rest of the day. The picquet was not, as usual, withdrawn at sunset, and Colonel Vaughan’s party maintained its positions all night; next day it was determined to hold permanently the “Eagle’s Nest” with forty British and 300 Native soldiers, and another post on an adjoining height, called “Vaughan’s Picquet,” with the Hazara Mountain Battery, fifty British and 300 Native soldiers. Of the enemy’s killed and wounded many were Hindustanis, and some were apparently ex-soldiers of the late 55th Native Infantry.

News was now received that the Akhund of Swat, the Border Pope, had thrown in his lot with the Bunerwals, and had summoned also the people of Bajaur and Dir; Chamla sent its quota; the Utman Khels, Afridis from Lundkhwar, also took the field; and it was evident that there was now a general combination against us of almost all the tribes from the Indus to the boundary of Afghanistan. Old feuds seemed to be forgotten, for tribes and chiefs, usually bitter enemies, were now ready to fight side by side against us; and it was clear how greatly the situation had changed for the worse since the force had first entered the Ambela Pass. Then the troops had merely to deal with the tribes on the Mahaban Mountain, to expel the Hindustanis from that tract, and march to its borders through a friendly, or at least a not actively hostile, country. General Chamberlain recognised that it would be inadvisable to make any advance, such as had been contemplated, with his present force against so large a combination. He therefore decided to remain on the defensive in the position he now occupied, which was secure, where at any rate his communications were safeguarded, and where supplies and reinforcements could easily reach him, trusting that the discouragement of repeated unsuccessful attacks would gradually weaken the enemy’s numbers and break up the coalition.

Between the 27th and 29th the force was strengthened by the arrival of two guns of the 3rd Punjab Light Field Battery,[^[48]] the 14th Sikhs, and the 4th Gurkhas, but it was known that the tribesmen too had received reinforcements, and that an attack was shortly to be made upon the camp defences.

The “Crag Picquet”

On the night of the 29th–30th the advanced picquets of the right defence were furnished by the 1st Punjab Infantry and a company of the Guides, under Major Keyes. Above the main picquets and commanding them was “the Crag”—a high rock, the ascent to which was most precipitous, and the summit of which was incapable of containing more than a very few men. Shortly before daybreak this position was heavily attacked, and it soon became apparent that its garrison was hard pressed. Reinforcements were at once sent forward from the lower picquets, but, before “the Crag” could be reached, the small garrison was overpowered and driven off the rock, though the men held the ground lower down. Major Keyes decided to hold his ground until daylight among the rocks immediately below the summit and sent for help. As day broke the picquets were here reinforced by the 20th Punjab Infantry under Major Brownlow, and this officer advanced by a ridge which ran to the right of “the Crag” and threatened the enemy in rear, while Major Keyes attacked in front. The assault thus carried out and supported was entirely successful; a hand-to-hand fight ensued when the summit of the rock was reached, but the enemy were driven out at the point of the bayonet and the position was recovered. No sooner had “the Crag” been recaptured than the right attack fell to pieces and the tribesmen fled in panic. Lieutenants Fosbery, 104th Fusiliers, and Pitcher, 1st Punjab Infantry, were awarded the Victoria Cross for gallantry on this occasion.

While this attack on the right was in progress, another by men from Swat was delivered on the front of the camp, but this was easily repulsed; a demonstration was also made against the upper left flank picquets. Our losses on this day amounted to fifty-five killed and wounded, but those of the enemy had been so heavy, and the effect of the defeat so great, that many of the tribesmen returned to their homes.

The General commanding now decided to arrange for a new line of communications which should not be exposed to attack from the direction of the Guru Mountain. A line of road was therefore selected between the villages of Khanpur and Sherdara, and the base of operations was changed from Rustam to Parmalao. On the 28th October and 5th November the 7th Fusiliers, 93rd Highlanders, 23rd[^[49]] and 24th[^[50]] Punjab Native Infantry were ordered up to this frontier; a body of 275 police, horse and foot, was sent up to Nawa Kala to assist in the protection of the rearward communications; and later on 4200 camels and 2100 mules were collected at Nowshera, in view of the demand for pack transport which might have to be met when the force eventually moved forward. Working parties were also employed in making a road, to facilitate the forward march on Ambela, along the western slopes of the right ridge, and thus covered from any fire from the Guru Mountain. On the 6th November the operations on this road caused us considerable loss. The working parties had been sent forward as usual, covered by picquets beyond and above them, and all had gone well until the time came to withdraw. The working parties were successfully retired, but the forward covering parties seem to have, for some unknown reason, remained too long on their ground, and were surrounded by the enemy, who moved up in large numbers. The light was failing, and the enemy seem to have broken in between some of the picquets: many of the covering party fought their way back to camp, but our losses this day amounted to seventy-eight of all ranks killed and wounded; the bodies of some of the former had temporarily to be left behind, but were recovered next day.

On the 8th the new road to the rear was taken into use, and a commencement was made in removing supplies, etc., to the south side of the pass, where it was proposed to form a new camp, thereby saving much picquet duty and affording an actually stronger position.