Action at Shakot

On the 18th the force moved on to Shakot, situated between a very deep and narrow nullah on the east and some hills on the west, and here it was seen that the enemy were in strength, holding a position about a mile and a half long on the edge of the nullah. The Horse Artillery guns shelled the centre of the position with great accuracy, but the enemy stood firmly, availing themselves of the broken ground for cover. The Guides and Gurkhas now stormed the nullah, covered by the guns and supported by the 1st Punjab Infantry and the Light Company of the 32nd. A heavy fire and stern resistance were encountered, the tribesmen charging into the midst of the Gurkhas and fighting hand-to-hand. The guns were advanced closer, and the enemy at last broke, some ascending the hills in rear of Shakot and others making for the Malakand Pass. In their retreat the enemy lost heavily, both from the fire of the guns and the sabres of the cavalry. Our casualties only amounted to eleven killed and twenty-nine wounded.

In addition to the armed villagers, about 4000 infantry and 500 mounted men, all from Swat, had opposed us, while the King and the Akhund had watched the fight from the crest of the Malakand Pass.

Shakot and Dargai were now completely destroyed, and the troops returned to Sherghar on the following day. On the 20th the whole of the Ranizai Valley was traversed, and eight villages and much grain were destroyed, no opposition being met with. On the 22nd a strong force of all arms visited and burnt the village of Hiro Shah, nine miles distant, being followed, on retirement, by a matchlock fire until quite clear of the hills and ravines, but no casualties were sustained. The force then marched back through Lundkhwar to Gujar Garhi, where it was broken up, and before the end of the next month the Ranizais had tendered unconditional submission.

Heirs of the Akhund

It was very evident that Swat was the fountainhead of all this offending, and there were at this time some thoughts of despatching an expedition thither via the Malakand Pass. The idea was, however, eventually abandoned, and the necessity for an expedition did not again arise, for the Swatis seemed to realise how heavy had been the punishment inflicted on the Ranizais, and dreaded similar operations in their own valley. They abstained, therefore, from annoyance, and for some time at least the Peshawar districts enjoyed immunity from marauding, either instigated or perpetrated by men from Swat. Strangely enough, the troubles of the Mutiny year were not taken advantage of by the leaders in Swat. The King died on the very day that the first news of the outbreak at Meerut reached Peshawar, and the Akhund took no action inimical to British authority—on the contrary, as has been already stated, he deported the mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry who sought an asylum in Swat. In 1863, however, he adopted a different line; but thereafter he invariably advised his people to behave as good neighbours, to meet our just demands, and comply with our terms. When he died he left two rival factions in his country; one was headed by Sherdil Khan, chief of the Ranizais; the other by Abdul Manan, alias Mian Gul, the eldest son of the Akhund.

With the death of the Akhund in 1877 the Ranizais again began to give trouble on our border, and the villagers of Shakot acquired a bad name for harbouring outlaws and disregarding the orders of our frontier officials. This state of things could not be permitted to continue, and on the 13th March, 1878, Colonel R. Campbell left Mardan to punish the men of Shakot, accompanied by the Hazara Mountain Battery, 249 sabres and 428 bayonets of the Corps of Guides, arriving unsuspected, within two miles of Shakot, at 2 a.m. on the 14th. Two companies of infantry were sent to seize a small detached hill commanding the village on the north-west, and when, at daybreak, the remainder of the force advanced, the headmen of Shakot, seeing the hopelessness of resistance, came forward and made an unconditional surrender, no shot having been fired on either side. All our demands were at once agreed to without demur, thirty-three hostages were selected, and no attempt to assist Shakot was made by any of the neighbouring villages, whose headmen now arrived to pay their respects. The troops remained in occupation of the village until 10 a.m., when the retirement commenced, and Mardan was reached the same evening, the men having marched nearly fifty miles in twenty-four hours.

In this same year the two sons of the late Akhund endeavoured to preach a jehad, but the movement was an utter failure. In 1880 Sherdil Khan died, and the chief political power in Swat passed to Rahmatulla Khan, the chief of Dir, who remained passive when, during the Afghan War, the Mohmand mullahs tried to stir up the tribes of Dir and Swat to attack our communications near Jalalabad. In 1883 a desultory contest was carried on between Mian Gul and the Khan of Dir for supremacy in Swat, but in March 1884 these two came to terms. During the next six years, however, the Swat Valley was greatly disturbed, and its people divided into factions, by the ambitions of Umra Khan of Jandol, of whom more will be said later. Abdul Manan, otherwise Mian Gul, the Akhund’s eldest son, died in 1887, and was succeeded by his brother, Abdul Khalik, and the political trouble was increased by the fact that Mian Gul had left two young sons, who had also supporters. In all these questions the Indian Government did not meddle, but since the easiest way to our outposts in Chitral led by Swat, it was impossible to permit any other Power to acquire an influence over these countries, and by the Durand Mission our claims to include Swat, Dir and Bajaur within our sphere of influence were pressed, and in some degree admitted.

Appearance of Umra Khan

In 1890 Umra Khan expelled and dispossessed the Khan of Dir, and in 1893 he attacked the Dusha Khel and drove out the Khan of Aladand, putting in a nominee of his own. In the same year the last surviving son of the Akhund died, and the succession, though temporarily in abeyance, was recognised in a son, Saiyid Badshah, of the elder Mian Gul. Then, for the next two years, there was continual internal fighting in Swat, but, so far as the Indian Government was concerned, it appeared that while the Khans were anxious to be loyal, the priesthood was persistently preaching against us.