From the Black Mountain to Waziristan / Being an account of the border countries and the more turbulent of the tribes controlled by the north-west frontier province, and of our military relations with them in the past

by H. C. Wylly

The Malakand Pass

On the 1st April the First Brigade moved to Lundkwar, the Second and Third to Jalala, the General intending to advance into Swat by the Shakot and Malakand Passes. During this day, however, the report of the friendly or neutral intentions of the border tribes was seriously discounted by the receipt of information that large bodies of tribesmen were holding not only these two passes, but also the Morah, which, by reason of its propinquity to Buner, there had been no intention of using. It appearing that of the three the Malakand was the least strongly occupied, Sir Robert Low decided to force the Malakand, making a feint with his cavalry towards the Shakot. He therefore concentrated all three brigades at Dargai, at the southern foot of the Malakand, early on the morning of the 2nd April.

Leaving Dargai, the track took for some way a north-easterly direction up the gradually narrowing valley; it then turned north-west and, leaving the bed of the valley, zigzagged up to the crest, whence two paths led into the Swat Valley. The kotal itself is some 2850 feet above sea-level, but on the left of the position precipitous hills rise to a height of over 400 feet, while on the right the crest of the range slopes steeply up to three tall peaks. The whole of the ridge, with the heights on either flank, formed a position not less than two miles long and was held in strength.

The Second Brigade was sent forward early on the 3rd to force the pass, it being the intention of the general commanding that the position once taken, the First Brigade, which alone was entirely supplied with mule transport, should then be pushed on to the Swat River. Of the Second Brigade, the 4th Sikhs and Guides Infantry ascended parallel spurs on the west of the valley, intending to turn the position from this flank; while the remaining battalions, covered by the fire of three mountain batteries, advanced directly upon the Pass. The infantry on the flank were, however, very stubbornly opposed, while the actual ascent was most difficult, and the general commanding the Second Brigade, seeing that the advance would be greatly delayed, sent forward his remaining battalions to the frontal attack, which the First Brigade was now called upon to support. The infantry, during their advance, captured sangar after sangar, and moving forward very steadily, the position was finally carried, after some five hours’ fighting, at the point of the bayonet, the 4th Sikhs and Guides running in on the enemy’s right at the same time. Two regiments of the First Brigade pressed the pursuit of the retreating enemy as far as Khar, where they bivouacked; the 4th Sikhs occupied the vicinity of the crest; and the remainder of the Second Brigade withdrew to Dargai.

It was estimated that we had been opposed by about 12,000 men, of whom probably a third possessed firearms; their losses, mainly by reason of their holding the position to the last, were heavy; our casualties were 11 killed and 51 wounded.

During the advance, our troops fortunately came upon the remains of an old disused Buddhist road, well built and skilfully aligned, and which two days’ work rendered fit for camel transport, thus greatly facilitating the passage of supplies.

Advance into Swat

Early on the afternoon of the 4th, the First Brigade advanced into the Swat Valley, the Second Brigade taking its place on the Malakand, and the Third remaining at Dargai. The leading brigade was opposed, and even attacked, with great boldness, by large numbers of tribesmen falling back from the Shakot and Morah Passes, but these lost severely from the fire of our infantry and the sabres of the Guides Cavalry, who made a fine charge over bad ground.

The First Brigade halted at Khar, where that of General Waterfield joined it, and whence reconnaissances moved up the Swat Valley. Opportunity was further taken of the halt to open communications with the headmen of many of the neighbouring villages, and also with the former Khan of Dir, whom Umra Khan had dispossessed of his country; and by these measures our troops were assured an unopposed passage through the Baraul and Dir Valleys, and of the neutrality of some of the more powerful of the clans of Upper Swat and Bajaur.

On the 6th, it being reported that a large body of Umra Khan’s personal followers, under command of his brother, had occupied Chakdara and the fort and village of Ramora, about two miles further up the Swat River, five squadrons of cavalry, supported by other arms from the Second Brigade, were ordered to cross the Swat River early next morning and reconnoitre towards Uch, opportunity being at the same time taken to destroy the fort at Ramora. These parties, and another sent out to search for a suitable site for a bridge over the Swat River, were opposed by some 4500 men who lost very severely, especially at the hands of the cavalry, who pursued as far as the Katgola Pass, about 7½ miles distant. Chakdara was then occupied and a bridge constructed.