Three guns, I/C R.H.A. 13/ 9th R.A. (40–pounders). 9th Regiment. 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade. 14th Native Infantry.[[111]] 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

The Bori Valley is separated from the plain to the south of the Mackeson-Sham Shatu road by a rocky range of hills, as already described in the account of the operations against the Bori villages in 1853. This range is crossed by a comparatively low pass at Kandao, and by a second, more direct pass, known as the Sarghasha, over a higher part of the ridge. The plan of operations was to occupy the crest of the ridge with artillery and infantry, and from this position—completely commanding the Bori Valley—to take such measures as should be found most suitable for attacking the villages and destroying their towers and other defences.

The first brigade advanced via Kandao with orders to proceed to the top of the ridge, turning the Sarghasha Pass, while the other brigade made a direct attack upon it. By these arrangements the crest of the pass became untenable, and the enemy abandoned the position and retired firing, partly towards the Bori Valley and partly along the ridge towards Khui. The whole force bivouacked on the ridge. For the next few days the troops were employed in destroying the towers and villages in the Bori Valley under a brisk but ineffective fire from the tribesmen. While these operations were in progress, the force under command of Brigadier-General Keyes had advanced upon and destroyed the towers of the village of Ghariba, a place which had long been considered the Alsatia of Jawaki thieves, and, from the difficult nature of its approaches, secure from attack. This operation was effected by a rapid and combined movement of two columns of attack, without any casualties on our side.

The Country Traversed

Although the chief places of the Jawakis had now been occupied and destroyed, and the blockade satisfactorily maintained by our forces, yet the enemy showed no signs of surrender. A further advance, therefore, by both forces in combination, into the Pustawani Valley was decided upon. The strategic value of this valley to any force operating against the Adam Khel Afridis had long been recognised, and it was known that this part of the country was considered impregnable by the Jawakis, while its careful survey was very desirable. On the Peshawar side, the road from the Bori Valley to Pustawani leads through the Bori China Pass, which a reconnaissance, conducted on the 25th December, proved to be just practicable for mules. The actual advance to Pustawani was to have been made on the 27th, but heavy rain, with the probable consequent floods in the pass, delayed forward movement until the 31st, and it was hoped that the troops of both the Peshawar and Kohat columns would arrive on the same day in the Pustawani Valley.

Both forces effected their purposes successfully and with but small loss. Brigadier-General Ross moved almost entirely unopposed through the Bori China Pass to Pustawani, and thence to Walai, where he met Brigadier-General Keyes. The Peshawar force bivouacked unmolested in or about Pustawani, which was destroyed on the 2nd January, when General Ross retraced his steps, and, meeting with but very slight opposition, regained the Bori Valley early that afternoon, and reached the Sarghasha camp without any casualties.

Early on the 31st December Brigadier-General Keyes left his camp in front of Bagh, debouched on the Paia Plain, and having reached Ghariba, moved to the left up the spur of the Dargai Sar, and sent troops through the Dargai Pass. Thence the General rode on to Walai, where he met General Ross, and it was agreed that nothing was to be gained by further operations or a prolonged occupation of the Pustawani Valley. On the next day the whole force commenced its retirement, the rear guard being followed up by the enemy, who had collected in some strength. The retirement was, however, admirably covered by the Pathan company of the 5th Punjab Infantry, and from Paia the troops marched back unmolested to camp.

The remaining operations carried out by the troops under Generals Keyes and Ross were mainly of topographical importance. On the morning of the 15th January both columns occupied the positions they had held on the 31st December, and thence they moved towards Jamu for the purpose of exploring the Nara Khula defile and the valley to the west of it, now the only remaining strongholds of the Jawakis. Despite a certain amount of opposition, this country was traversed by our troops, and by the 23rd January the bulk of the force employed had been withdrawn to Peshawar and Kohat, a small body of the three arms only remaining temporarily on the Sarghasha ridge as a force of observation. During the whole operations, from November 1877 to January 1878, our casualties had amounted to eleven killed and fifty-one wounded.

Submission of the Jawakis

Almost immediately upon the withdrawal of our troops the Jawakis had begun to show signs of submission, and after negotiations, protracted until March, a settlement was effected, the tribesmen agreeing to make complete submission in full durbar at Peshawar, to pay a fine of Rs. 5000, to expel certain ringleaders of recent raids, to surrender a number of English rifles and native matchlocks, and to give hostages for future good conduct.