The Dakka troops destroyed the towers in the vicinity of their bivouac, marching later to Nikai, which was also burnt. It being then too late to arrive at the Sisobi Pass on the return march before nightfall, the General (Tytler) halted, owing to difficulties as to water, in the Thabai Pass, with the intention of retiring on Dakka by this route. During the night the tribesmen assembled in strength about the camp, and when the march was resumed at daybreak it was seen that the enemy meant disputing every foot of it. The Afridis notoriously attack the baggage guard in preference to any other part of a force, and it was therefore determined to change the usual order of march. Orders were consequently issued for each corps to take its own baggage with it; the artillery and sappers, being most encumbered with mules, followed close to the advanced guard; while a very strong rearguard was left behind, which, being wholly relieved from the charge of baggage, was able to resist the pressure from the rear.
The road was winding, steep, and very difficult for mules, and from the moment the force started a lively but ineffective fusillade was opened on the column. The heights were taken and held by flanking parties; the rearguard was hotly engaged; the enemy seized the positions of the rearguard and of the flanking parties as soon as they were abandoned; and Dakka was not reached by the whole column until 11.30 p.m., when the force had marched 22 miles, and had lost two men killed and twenty wounded.
Expedition of 1879
Second Expedition against the Zakha Khels of the Bazar Valley, January 1879.—After the expedition of December 1878, the Khyber Pass Afridis continuing to give trouble, every effort was made to break up the tribal combination, and the Kuki Khels and Kambar Khels came in and tendered their submission. The attitude of the Zakha Khels was, however, so unsatisfactory that the political officer, Major Cavagnari, recommended a temporary occupation of the Bazar Valley, coupled with visits to all the recusant villages in that and the Bara Valley. In consequence, Lieutenant-General Maude, commanding the 2nd Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force, applied on the 16th January for sanction for the proposed operations, in concert with a force furnished from the 1st Division. Sanction was accorded by the Commander-in-Chief, but a time-limit of ten days was laid down within which the operations were to be concluded. The following troops were placed at the disposal of Lieutenant-General Maude:
JAMRUD COLUMN.
2 guns, D/A Royal Horse Artillery. 2 guns, 11/9th Royal Field Artillery. 315 bayonets, 5th Fusiliers. 316 bayonets, 25th Foot. 145 sabres, 13th Bengal Lancers. 55 bayonets, Madras Sappers and Miners. 356 bayonets, 24th Punjab Native Infantry.
BASAWAL COLUMN.
2 guns, 11/9th Royal Artillery. 361 bayonets, 1/17th Foot. 210 bayonets, 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade. 32 sabres, Guides Cavalry. 43 bayonets, Bengal Sappers and Miners. 201 bayonets, 4th Gurkhas.
ALI MUSJID COLUMN.
2 guns, 11/9th Royal Artillery. 213 bayonets, 51st Foot. 31 bayonets, Madras Sappers and Miners. 312 bayonets, 2nd Gurkhas. 320 bayonets, Mhairwara Battalion. 311 bayonets, 6th Native Infantry.[[115]]