[Footnote 1: Rom. 3: 7, 8.]
[Footnote 2: See Dr. Schaff's "Prologemena to The Life and Works of
St. Chrysostom," in The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first Series
(Am. ed.), IX., 8.]
Chrysostom, like Gregory of Nyssa, having done that which was wrong in itself, with a laudable end in view, naturally attempts its defense by the use of arguments based on a confusion in his own mind of things which are unjustifiable, with things which are allowable. He does not seem to distinguish between deliberate deception as a mode of lying, and concealment of that which one has a right to conceal. Like many another defender of the right to lie in behalf of a worthy cause, in all the centuries, Chrysostom essays no definition of the "lie," and indicates no distinction between culpable concealment, and concealment that is right and proper. Yet Chrysostom was a man of loving heart and of unwavering purpose of life. In an age of evil-doing, he stood firm for the right. And in spite of any lack of logical perceptions on his part in a matter like this, it can be said of him with truth that "perhaps few have ever exercised a more powerful influence over the hearts and affections of the most exalted natures."[1]
[Footnote 1: Smith and Wace's Dictionary of Christian Biography, I., 532.]
Augustine, on the other hand, looks at this question, in accordance with the qualities of his logical mind, in its relation to an absolute standard; and he is ready to accept the consequences of an adherence to that standard, whether they be in themselves desirable or deplorable. He is not afraid to define a lie, and to stand by his definition in his argument. He sees and notes the difference between justifiable concealment, and concealment that is for the purpose of deception. "It is lawful then," he says on this point, "to conceal at fitting time whatever seems fit to be concealed: but to tell a lie is never lawful, therefore neither to conceal by telling a lie."[1] In his treatise "On Lying" (De Mendacid),[2] and in his treatise "Against Lying" (Contra Mendaciuni)[3] as well as in his treatise on "Faith, Hope, and Love" (Enchiridion),[4] and again in his Letters to Jerome,[5] Augustine states the principle involved in this vexed question of the ages, and goes over all the arguments for and against the so-called "lie of necessity." He sees a lie to be a sin per se, and therefore never admissible for any purpose whatsoever. He sees truthfulness to be a duty growing out of man's primal relation to God, and therefore binding on man while man is in God's sight. He strikes through the specious arguments based on any temporary advantages to be secured through lying, and rejects utterly the suggestion that man may do evil that good may come.
[Footnote 1: The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, first series (Am. ed.), IX., 466.]
[Footnote 2: Ibid., III., 455-477.]
[Footnote 3: Ibid., pp. 479-500.]
[Footnote 4: Ibid., pp. 230-276.]
[Footnote 5: Ibid., I., "Letters of St. Augustine.">[