All the suggested methods have been used, and in some cases compasses and maps as well. Effect has been obtained in the open and on enemy’s concentrations at long ranges, and in trench warfare on working parties, ration parties, communications, etc., behind the enemy’s lines. A great deal more could be done in this way if all guns were not almost invariably placed in trenches, instead of a proportion being placed in suitable positions in rear, and long-range fire employed. All this points to the fact that a Machine Gun Officer should be acquainted with all methods of employing indirect fire, in order that he may be in a position to make the best of any opportunities that may occur.
CLOSE CO-OPERATION BY MACHINE GUNS WITH THE FRONT LINES OF ATTACKING INFANTRY.
Very little information has been given on this subject, but co-operation seems to have been very poor; but this co-operation is made very difficult in many cases by:—
1. Inability of the M.G. sections to keep pace with the attacking infantry.
2. The visibility of the methods employed of carrying the gun. This leads to many casualties.
3. Lack of tactical knowledge on the part of many of the more junior M.G.Os.
4. Lack of definite plans as to the role of the M.Gs. before the action commences.
The two following examples serve to illustrate some of the above:—
1. In a recent attack, owing to lack of any previous understanding between M.G.Os., eight M.Gs. converged into one small section of a captured trench. Owing to lack of space only two of these guns were able to come into action.
2. In another instance during an attack, six guns converged into one small house. Owing to lack of space, etc., only two of these guns were able to come into action.