Armenia, Travels and Studies (Volume 2 of 2) / The Turkish Provinces

by H. F. B. Lynch

I. I must repeat with tedious persistency that what is most required is a knowledge and appreciation of the geographical conditions. These I have endeavoured in a lengthy analysis to elucidate. Collective Notes and schemes of reform are of very little value, if it be attempted to apply their provisions indifferently to regions presenting features so distinct and dissimilar as the tableland of Armenia and the mountains of Kurdistan. No solution of the Armenian Question in Turkey would be calculated to contain the elements of permanence which should not be concerned in the first instance with delimitation, and with redistribution of the existing Governmental areas.

The principles upon which such redistribution should proceed are the common-sense principles of grouping together districts which naturally belong together, and of rendering the Governments as far as possible homogeneous. I think it would be found that obedience to these principles would at the same time assist a practical solution of the Kurdish Question. They would point to the formation of three great Governments. One would be constituted by the mountainous districts between the tableland of Armenia and the Black Sea, and might be called the Black Sea Government. It would coincide to some extent with the existing area of the vilayet of Trebizond; but it might seem advisable to include within it regions at present belonging to the vilayet of Erzerum, such as Tortum and the districts on the side of Olti. The second Government would embrace the tableland itself, and its demarcation should be conducted as far as possible in consonance with the natural frontiers, such as they have been determined in the present work. The third Government would be the Government of Kurdistan. It would comprehend a considerable area, from Kirkuk and Sulimanieh on the south-east to Diarbekr and the confines of Kharput on the north-west. Mosul, Jezireh and Diarbekr would be the bases of the administration, these cities on the lowlands being situated in convenient positions to serve as centres from which to control the necessary winter migrations of the Kurdish tribes from their mountains to the agricultural regions bordering on the left or eastern bank of the Tigris. Strong military posts might be established within the mountainous area in the principal towns of Kurdistan.

Of these three Governments that of the tableland should be administered from a suitable centre, which centre would be neither Erzerum nor Van. Akhlat, Melazkert or Khinis would seem to be naturally designated to fulfil the requirements of the case. None of these towns are very far removed from the frontier line of the Kurdish mountains, on which side alone would the new Government be exposed to incursions of the lawless Kurdish element. All of them are favourably placed for intercommunication with the principal Armenian districts. Passage of the tribes from Kurdistan proper into the Governmental area should be rigorously interdicted. It could be prevented by no more formidable measures than the enrolment of a corps of gendarmerie. Such a corps would also suffice to police the districts on the tableland at present inhabited by tribal Kurds.

Reforms or changes of this nature are well within the capacity of the Government at Constantinople. They would not, I think, prejudice their general military administration; it might even be found that they would be in harmony with purely military interests. But the Turks should never forget that they are much more likely to succumb as an empire owing to defects in the civil rather than in the military arm. Europe, with all her want of squeamishness, cannot permanently tolerate civil misgovernment on so great a scale. One after another the friends or allies of the Ottoman Empire in Europe will be compelled to stand aside. Sooner or later the young German Empire will be forced by circumstances to adopt the same attitude as her elder sister of Great Britain. Meanwhile there is growing up with alarming rapidity a situation in the provinces immediately adjoining Russian territory which already invites and may soon require Russian intervention. Russian statesmen are only awaiting the favourable moment in the world movements of the time. Russian troops are already placed within striking distance of the fortress of Erzerum, immediately commanding the roads to the interior of Asia Minor and to the capital. It does not require a long memory to recall the pretexts—nay, the causes—upon which Russia justified her previous aggressions upon Turkish territory. Who shall assert that the present situation on the tableland of Armenia is less aggravated than that which prevailed in the European provinces when the Russian armies crossed the Pruth in 1877?

Administrative changes of the nature I have indicated are, of course, only feasible as a whole through spontaneous action on the part of the Government at Constantinople. Their professed friends but real enemies may try to play upon their suspicions; and will, no doubt, urge that they are being offered in a thinly veiled form the substance of an independent Armenia. But such a consummation, were it even possible in a remote future, need not alarm the well-known solicitude of Oriental rulers for the interests of posterity. If the millions of Mussulmans attached by religion and common interests to the rule of the Sultans were ever insufficient to keep within bounds Armenian ambitions, the presence of such a strong nation upon the high road of the Russian advance would surely be a blessing in disguise. It can scarcely be doubted that in that case the weight of Armenian sympathies would be on the side of the weak Ottoman Empire. But this talk about a revival of the Armenian kingdom is windy and frivolous in the extreme. The Armenians have neither leaders nor a class of leaders; and how long would it take to develop such a class? In the ninth century, when they broke loose from the expiring body of the caliphate, they had their princes and nobles of greater and lesser degree. These families have disappeared without leaving a trace. And is it certain or even probable that, if the old ideal could be again realised, the Armenians in the twentieth century would be prepared to revive a polity which would narrow their activities from the whole wide area of an empire to the confined stage of a petty state?

The example of Bulgaria, sometimes quoted with a shiver of fear in this connection, is not an example in point. There the Christians composed the bulk of the population; and they had no links, such as are present in the case of the Armenians, with the rest of the Ottoman Empire. But, even if the apprehensions of the most nervous could be justified by solid arguments, what is the alternative which they are able to suggest? If they settle the Kurdish Question they are in so far assisting the Armenians; while, if they allow it to settle itself, they are face to face with the ruin of these provinces, which Russia, in the interests of the security of her own frontier, will be constrained and will be invited by Europe to occupy.

But the regulation of Turkish Armenia is not a matter which alone concerns the rulers on the Bosphorus. Europe has always recognised her intimate interest in the affairs of Turkey, and she is specially pledged to secure good government for the Armenians. But her intervention, should it be necessary, would, I hope, be based on the broadest grounds, not in favour of the Armenians alone, but also of the Mussulmans. The constitution of a single new province on the tableland would not be tantamount to controlling the administration of Asiatic Turkey; it is a measure which can be reasonably demanded and readily executed. Moreover, if Europe were again to take up the question, she would be well advised not to recognise any limitations in respect of the qualifications of the new Governor-General. He would, of course, not be an Armenian, and he might very well be a Mussulman and a subject of the Sultan. Or a European might be appointed to the post. In a financial and administrative sense the province would be dissevered from the Central Government; and, in the present state of the country, a loan to the provincial treasury would be necessary to supply the funds for the organisation of the gendarmerie. The new Governor would rule over a somewhat heterogeneous Mussulman majority and a compact Armenian minority, very much their inferior in numbers. But his efforts would be assisted by the homogeneous nature of the provincial area; and his jurisdiction would embrace, not a tract of difficult mountain country, but some of the finest agricultural districts in the world.

The needs of the Armenians living in the capital and in the towns of Asiatic Turkey could be met by the revival of the so-called constitution granted to their nation by Sultan Abd-al-Aziz in 1863. I have thought it worth while to include a translation of this lengthy document, and it will be found in my first appendix. It has the nature of a regulating statute, like the Polojenye in Russia, rather than of what we should understand by a constitution. But, unlike the Polojenye, it is mainly addressed to the development among the Armenians of systematic management of the affairs of their communities. Those communities have always enjoyed the privilege of administering their own institutions, such as monasteries, churches, hospitals and schools. The statute of 1863 provides a complete and democratic machinery for the better organisation and control of such institutions. It wisely avoids, except in the last resort, any interference by Government in these purely internal affairs. I cannot conceive any better training for the Armenian people than that which they would receive by the application of their great intelligence to such practical and concrete ideals. The pitfall which they should avoid, were the statute ever revived, is the attempt to convert it into a political weapon.

II. Europe as a whole is concerned with the future of these Asiatic provinces on the score of her great and growing trade. The particular Powers are also interested on political grounds—to preserve the balance of power. The territory of Turkish Armenia is of first-rate importance whether from the one or the other point of view. As regards trade, it is not only the trade with Armenia that is at stake, but that with the whole of Northern Persia. The great highway of commerce between the ports on the Black Sea and the interior of Persia passes along the avenue of the Armenian plains. The possession of Erzerum by a protectionist Power would effectually stifle this important trade-route, and would cut off Persia from the Black Sea.

Not less far-reaching would be the results in a political sense of such an occupation. The strategical value of the country is difficult to overrate. Turkish Armenia is the sign-post of the Nearer Asia, commanding the roads west, south and east. These issue upon the one side at the Mediterranean seaboards, and, on the other, at the Persian Gulf. The contemporary littleness of the land has served in no small measure to blind our eyes to these facts.