It would now seem to be the general impression, that nothing effectual can be done to bring Mexico to terms without taking Vera Cruz, and marching to the capital; and this appears to be the opinion of General Taylor at least, that if the march be resolved upon, then Vera Cruz, is the proper point to start from and not from Saltillo. A short time will determine.
We have, thus far, been operating at vast expense, with an army of fifteen thousand men, about one half regulars, and the other half, volunteers, on the remote, thinly inhabited, northern frontier of Mexico; and we talk of marching through a densely peopled country with numerous defiles! If there be any thing like the resistance made by us during the revolutionary war, thirty thousand men, at least, will be required for the march from Vera Cruz to Mexico. A part of the force under General Taylor may now be spared, but not so as to weaken and disable him from repelling a part of the army of Santa Anna, if he should think proper to detach it, for the purpose of attacking Saltillo. It would be presumptuous in me to venture an opinion on military movements; but considering the formidable army now organized by Santa Anna, and the uncertainty as to the point which he means to attack, I should think, that it would not be safe to draw off any very considerable portion of General Taylor’s force from the defence of the lines they at present occupy.
It is in our power to seize all her ports, and cut off all the trade of Mexico; and then, holding the lines we now occupy, it will be strange, if she persists in refusing to make peace. The fear of the loss of the interior and northern provinces, and the interruption in her trade, thus shut up in her shell, may have that effect, if any thing can. We have for the present, given stability to her Government by outward pressure. Our only security is to retain the hold we have; and perhaps, it may be necessary to attempt something on a still larger scale; but for this, we are not yet prepared. General Scott may take Vera Cruz, and then block up the road to Mexico, but I have seen no force yet, even on paper, sufficient to undertake the march to that capital. If, by withdrawing a large portion of General Taylor’s force, the line he now occupies be too much weakened, Santa Anna, will at once, take advantage of it, and regain the country on that side of the Rio Grande. In doing this, he will compel the army which may be landed at Vera Cruz, to return in all haste to Tampico, or Point Isabel. The crisis is now fast approaching, when it will become a question of national prowess—shall we cry, “hold, enough!” or make a mighty effort to obtain the victory? I wish to see my country do right, and justice to all nations; at the same time, I should be sorry to see our flag humbled, under any circumstances, and in a war with any nation on the Globe! I wish to see that flag wave proudly, and respected, wherever it may be carried, not tarnished and humbled, by defeat—insulted, scorned, treated with contempt, instead of affording a shelter and protection to our citizens, wherever they may be. But, firmly convinced, as I am, that our country is in the right, and our enemy in the wrong, I should feel the mortification ten fold, if we failed to obtain a just and honorable peace by the only means left us, after our enemy has repeatedly spurned the olive branch.
Letter 10.
Annexation of Texas—The suspension of diplomatic relations, the immediate causes of the war.
February, 1847.
Sir: In these letters, I have endeavored to repress all party feeling, thinking it a duty, in a contest with a foreign nation, in time of actual war, to take the side of my country, unless so grossly and palpably in the wrong, as to admit of no justification or defence. I repeat, that it is my sincere conviction, that justice is on our side, and this after as full, and dispassionate an examination of the subject as I am able to bestow. The contrary, is generally assumed, or taken for granted, by the party to which I belong; and yet the speech of Mr. Webster, at Philadelphia, which expresses the same opinion, is highly applauded. He condemns the administration of Mr. Polk, (not the cause of the country,) solely on the ground of bringing on a state of actual hostilities, without the previous approbation of Congress, while he admits, that Mexico is in the wrong in the causes which led to it the annexation of Texas. But the act of the President, is a domestic question between him and American people. The causes previously existing, and which would have justified Congress in making war, constitute a different question from that of expediency, or of the distribution of powers, under the Constitution. He concedes, that if the constituted authorities of the Union had thought proper to resort to this course, there was ample cause to justify it. To this, I assent, and will endeavor to give the reasons on which my opinion is founded, according to my view of the subject; professing, at the same time, a sincere respect for the opinion of those who may differ from me. I admit that the march from the Nueces to the Rio Grande, had the effect of hastening hostilities; but, in my opinion, it did do more than hasten, for the appeal of arms was inevitable on the annexation of Texas, unless Mexico receded entirely from the ground she had taken; of which, I did not see the slightest probability, unless compelled to do so, by the consequences of war, whether begun by her or by us.
Mexico denounces the war as being aggressive on our part, but in all the official State Papers of the high functionaries of that Republic, (I do not refer to subordinate officers or generals,) in all their manifestos, that aggression is distinctly declared to be the annexation of Texas. It was on this ground, that she put an end to all diplomatic intercourse, after having previously announced that she would consider annexation as equivalent to a declaration of war, on our part. It was on this ground, that she refused to resume a diplomatic intercourse, and enter into negotiation for a peaceful adjustment of existing differences, until satisfaction should first be made for the alleged wrong. She has not limited her complaints of alleged aggression to the march of our troops to the Rio Grande; her complaint is, the being deprived of her province of Texas, which she will never renounce; and she declares her determination never to listen to overtures of peace, until that province shall be evacuated by us. Has she, on any occasion, shown a willingness to accept any other boundary than the Sabine? I have seen no intimation of this kind, emanating from her President or Congress. The contrary is unchangeably persisted in.[[4]] In fact, it could not occur while she persists in her right to the whole of Texas. The annexation is the casus belli on the part of Mexico—the paramount consideration—every thing else, is but incidental, or subordinate. The very idea of fixing any other boundary, would imply a relinquishment of her claim.
[4]. There is no distinct assertion of boundary in any of her official papers down to the war proclamation of the 23d of April, 1846.