Capture of Ismail. 20th Dec. 1790.

Treaty of Jassy. 9th Jan. 1792.

While resisting the Swedes, Catherine made her chief effort against the Turks. In this quarter the defection of Leopold and the Armistice of Giurgevo seriously compromised her position. The war had resolved itself into the siege of the strong city of Ismail, where the Turks defended themselves with the utmost tenacity. The Russian attacks were foiled again and again, and Potemkin resigned the conduct of the siege in despair. His place was taken by Suvórov, whose brilliant victory on the Rymnik in 1789 had marked him as the greatest Russian general of his time. His valour and constancy equalled those qualities in the Turks; and Ismail was stormed on 20th December 1790, after a scene of carnage which cost the lives of 10,000 Russians and 30,000 Turks. In the following year the Russians pressed onwards towards Constantinople, and on 9th July 1791 the Russian General Repnin, under whom served Suvórov and Kutuzov, defeated the Grand Vizier at Matchin. But the Empress Catherine was not inclined to follow up these military advantages. The policy of Leopold had isolated her; the Treaty of Sistova had deprived her of an auxiliary army against the Turks; the state of affairs in Poland demanded her most serious attention; and she had to observe the action of Europe on the French Revolution and of the French Revolution on Europe, in the hope of deriving some advantage for Russia from the complications. She, therefore, signed a treaty of peace with the Turks at Jassy on 9th January 1792, by which Russia retained only Oczakoff and the coast-line between the mouths of the Bug and the Dniester. By making this peace, Catherine only deferred the prosecution of the schemes of Russia against the Ottoman Empire, and certain clauses with regard to the Danubian Principalities, affording a pretext for future wars, were skilfully included in the Treaty of Jassy.

Position of Leopold.

The success of the policy of the Emperor Leopold entirely altered the situation of the European states and their attitude towards each other. He was in 1791 not only master in his own dominions, but the recognised representative of the Empire, in fact as well as in name. He had broken down the combination against Austria and the solidarity of the Triple Alliance. England was far more favourably inclined to him than she had ever been to Joseph II.; Frederick William II. of Prussia was his ally not his enemy. He was, therefore, able in 1791 to turn his thoughts to the situation of France, and to see what advantages could be drawn from the position of affairs there for the benefit of Austria. The political effacement of France in foreign affairs was due to the assumption of all real authority by the Constituent Assembly, while leaving the responsibility to the King’s ministers, and Leopold did not doubt that the result of an entire victory of the popular party would be a recurrence to the classical policy of opposition to Austria and the rupture of the Treaty of 1756. It was to his interest to prevent this, and he had therefore political, as well as personal, ends to secure in endeavouring to restore the authority of the King of France. The capture of the Bastille and the transference of the royal family to Paris were great events in the history of France, but they only affected Leopold as weakening the authority of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, the faithful allies of Austria. The behaviour of the Constituent Assembly gave him pretexts for interfering in France, in spite of the diplomatic ability of Mirabeau, and he was earnestly besought by the French émigrés, or opponents of the new state of things in France, who had gone into voluntary exile with the King’s younger brother, the Comte d’Artois, at their head, to intervene on behalf of the French monarchy.

The state of France, 1791.

The conduct of the Constituent Assembly in disorganising every branch of the executive in France had its natural effect by the commencement of 1791. The army, in spite of the effort of General Bouillé to restore discipline by making an example of some Swiss mutineers at Nancy in 1790, was rendered inefficient by the disaffection of the soldiers and the exaggerated royalism of most of the officers; the navy was in a still worse condition; the Civil Constitution of the Clergy had caused a schism, which disturbed the minds of men in all parts of France, and created an army of opponents to the work of the Assembly, who had peculiar influence over the rural communities; the issue of assignats on the security of the confiscated domains of the Church had inflated the currency, and, while giving an appearance of fictitious prosperity, had really given a feeling of insecurity to all trade and commerce; the old internal administrations of the provinces had been replaced by the new administrations of the departments, which were filled by inexperienced men, utterly unable to cope with the difficulties of a time of unrest and revolution. The practical disorganisation of the executive was meanwhile being consecrated by the measures of the Constituent Assembly, which, in the Constitution it was drawing up, in its fear of the power of the monarchy, so hampered the authority of the executive as to destroy the necessary foundations of good government.

Death of Mirabeau.

In its ardour for the Rights of Man and the principle of election, the Constituent Assembly forgot the need for enforcing the authority of the law, and the necessity for providing a strong arm to carry it into effect. Mirabeau had clearly perceived that France was drifting into a state of anarchy. In his secret notes for the Court he insisted on the importance of restoring its proper power to the executive, and he advised the King to leave Paris and call the partisans of order to his side. Civil war, he contended, was preferable to anarchy, cloaked by fine words; it would openly divide France into the adherents of order and of disorder, and result in the maintenance of the popular rights sanctioned by the royal power. The King was to acknowledge the right of the people to legislate, and tax themselves through their representatives, but was to point out the importance of maintaining a strong government to secure the happiness of the governed. Against foreign war, however, Mirabeau strongly protested; foreign interference would rouse the spirit of national patriotism, and if the King was suspected of favouring the foreigners, it would result in the overthrow of the monarchy, and in a long struggle before the country could agree on a new form of government. However, on 2d April 1791, Mirabeau died, and France was deprived of its most sagacious, if not its only, statesman. In truth, Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette had no wish to take Mirabeau’s advice; the King regarded civil war as a horrible calamity, and to be shunned in every way and at any sacrifice; the Queen longed for the interference of her brother, the Emperor, and begged him to intervene to restore the royal authority. The King’s religious convictions were wounded by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy; the Queen was roused to wrath by the feeling that she was a prisoner, by daily insults in the press, and by the degradation of the power of the monarchy. On 18th April 1791 the royal prisoners were prevented by the Parisians from going to Saint-Cloud for Easter, and on 18th May the Emperor Leopold issued a circular to all crowned heads calling attention to the position of the King of France in his capital. On 20th May he had an interview with the Comte de Durfort, a secret emissary from the Tuileries, at Mantua, and charged him to tell the King and Queen of France that ‘he was going to concern himself with their affairs, not in words, but in acts.’

The Flight to Varennes. 21st June 1791.