Revolutionary Europe, 1789-1815

by H. Morse Stephens

The exchange of Madame Royale was a manifest evidence of the desire of the Directors to conclude peace. The Prussian ambassador at Paris reported to his government on 28th December 1795, ‘The general cry in Paris is, “Make peace and you will have money and bread.”’[10] Peace, indeed, was the desire not only of the people of Paris, but of the people of all France, of the majority in the new Legislature, and of the Directory. It was hoped that the Treaties of Basle were but the preliminaries of a general peace throughout Europe. But the two remaining enemies of the French Republic, England and Austria, did not see their way to meeting the Directory halfway. Pitt and Grenville argued that a peace made with the Directory would be only of the nature of a truce. They were ready enough to make peace, but considered it inadvisable to negotiate with a government which seemed to them in its essence unstable. Owing either to the intrigues of the émigrés, or to their own knowledge of politics, they grasped the fact that the new government of France was constructed on a faulty basis, and that a peace concluded with it would not be lasting. The attitude of Austria was somewhat different. Thugut, the Austrian minister, believed that France was exhausted, and that by a continuance of war substantial concessions could be wrung from her. Reubell, the Director who took charge of the conduct of Foreign Affairs, expressed himself as follows to the Prussian ambassador at Paris: ‘The war with Austria troubles us less than the war with England. Our means for supporting the former are ready, but not without having exhausted all the resources of the Republic. It will be probably the last effort of the two belligerent powers.... Our plan of campaign is almost settled; the war will be defensive in Germany and offensive in Italy. It is important to us to detach Austria from England and Sardinia from Austria.’[11] Contrary to their wish, therefore, the Directors found themselves obliged to continue the war with England and Austria.

France and Prussia.

While continuing the war with these two powers, the French Directory, like the Thermidorians, hoped to obtain not only the neutrality of Prussia and Spain, which had been secured by the Treaties of Basle, but their active co-operation. One of its first diplomatic endeavours was to enter into close relations with Prussia. Some of the ministers of Frederick William II., notably Alvensleben, were in favour of an alliance with France; but the King himself, though he had been forced by the emptiness of his treasury, and his projects on Poland to make peace with the French republicans, looked on the idea of making an alliance with them with horror. In this attitude he was supported by his two ablest ministers, Haugwitz and Hardenberg. By the terms of the Treaty of Basle Hardenberg had secured the preponderance of Prussia in northern Germany. A line of demarcation or neutrality was drawn across Germany, and the northern states, which were thus freed from the fear of a French invasion, looked to Prussia as their leader and saviour. An excuse for not forming an offensive and defensive alliance with France was found in the occupation by the French troops of the Prussian territories on the left bank of the Rhine. Prussia would only negotiate on the basis of the restoration of the status quo ante bellum, and the French Directory, like its predecessors, the Thermidorian Committee of Public Safety and the Great Committee of Public Safety, insisted on the cession to France of all territory up to the Rhine. The Directors, had they wished, could not have opposed the universal feeling in France in favour of making the Rhine the frontier, and proposed that Prussia should take compensation for its cessions on the left bank of the Rhine, by secularising the bishoprics and abbeys of northern Germany and annexing their territories. This proposal, which would bring in its train the overthrow of the Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, could not be sponsored by Prussia. The policy of Frederick the Great had been to assume that Prussia, not Austria, was the true defender of the rights of the Empire, and his nephew, in spite of Alvensleben’s representations, feared to break with the hereditary policy. The arrangement with regard to the line of demarcation had placed Prussia in the position of the guardian of the Empire; the acceptance of the French propositions would have made her seem its destroyer. The attempts of the Directory, and afterwards of the Consulate, to secure an alliance with Prussia, were therefore foredoomed to failure.

France and the Smaller States.

The victories of the French Republic were received with more than toleration in the smaller states of Europe, which feared the aggressions of Austria, Prussia, and Russia far more than any invasion by the French. Switzerland had profited greatly by the strict neutrality it had maintained. The wealth of France had poured freely into the cantons for the purchase of provisions and other necessaries; the residence of the diplomatists of Europe at Berne, the headquarters of Wickham, and at Basle, the headquarters of the French minister Barthélemy, had also been profitable to the country, while the Swiss, ready as ever to accept money from all sides, were enabled to make very considerable gains. Of the Princes of Italy, Ferdinand, Grand Duke of Tuscany, and brother of the Emperor, had, to the disgust of the Court of Vienna, made a separate peace with the French Republic in February 1795; Ferdinand of Naples had followed his example, and the King of Sardinia alone remained in armed opposition to France. With Portugal the Directory and the Committee of Public Safety, refused to treat, for, like the French statesmen throughout the eighteenth century, the Directors regarded Portugal as merely a province of England. With the smaller northern powers the Directory established the most friendly relations. Christian VII. of Denmark had always maintained his neutrality, and through the French minister, resident at his Court, many important secret negotiations had passed with Prussia. In Sweden, Charles, Duke of Sudermania, the guardian of the young King Gustavus IV., abandoned the policy of Gustavus III., and now made a treaty of friendship and a commercial treaty with the French Republic. The only other state to be mentioned is Turkey. The Turks looked upon the events which were passing in the West of Europe with unconcern; still they were inclined to be friendly with the French Republic, because it was engaged in fighting with Austria, and thus distracted the attention of one of the hereditary enemies of the Sublime Porte.

Russia.

Catherine of Russia, now at the close of her long reign, still regarded the French Revolution as affording a happy opportunity for her to pursue her schemes on Poland without active interference from Prussia or Austria. Her one desire was that France should continue the war, and for this reason she cordially received at her court the Comte d’Artois, and encouraged the presence of French émigrés. The Treaties of Basle had greatly offended her, for Prussia was thus left free to interfere in Poland, but Catherine was too wise to attempt to do more than intrigue with the affairs of Western Europe. She had no idea of intervening actively.

Campaign of 1795.

The campaign of 1795 on the Rhine frontier is chiefly important in regard to the treason of Pichegru. The Elector of Bavaria, who was at the same time the Elector Palatine, had, as has already been said, been uniformly friendly to the French. It was by his connivance that two of the most important fortresses upon the Rhine, Mannheim and Düsseldorf, were surrendered to Pichegru and Jourdan respectively. Meanwhile Marceau besieged the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, and Kléber the city of Mayence. There can be little doubt, though it is not absolutely proved by documents, that it was because of the negotiations he had commenced with the Prince de Condé that Pichegru did not advance into Germany. Jourdan, who did advance with the Army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, therefore found himself unprotected on his right, and was forced to retire with considerable loss. Marceau succeeded in taking Ehrenbreitstein, but the same treacherous inaction of Pichegru allowed the Austrian General Clerfayt to force Kléber to raise the siege of Mayence. It was on 20th October 1795 that Jourdan recrossed the Rhine; on the 29th Kléber was driven from before Mayence; and on the 30th Pichegru was defeated and driven behind the Queich. The first operations of the French armies under the Directory were, thus, owing to Pichegru’s treachery, unsuccessful, and on the 21st December an armistice was made between the French and the Austrians on the Rhine. In the north, owing to the Treaties of Basle, there were no military operations of importance during the autumn of 1795, and the French army maintained its position on the frontier of Holland. In the south considerable alterations were made. The treaty of peace with Spain enabled the experienced and warlike soldiers of the two armies of the Pyrenees to be despatched to reinforce the Army of Italy, which was also joined by the bulk of the troops of the Army of the Alps. General Schérer, who commanded the Army of Italy, pushed forward, and by a victory at Loano on the 24th November 1795, opened up a direct communication with Genoa and cut off the Sardinians from the sea. In the four armies of the Directory which had thus taken the place of the thirteen armies of the Republic, there were under arms at the close of 1795 about 300,000 men under experienced generals, excluding what was known as the Army of the Interior, which guarded Paris and garrisoned the chief cities of France.

Campaign in Italy, 1796. First Stage.