Revolutionary Europe, 1789-1815

by H. Morse Stephens

Even yet the Austrians were not finally discouraged. Würmser held out in Mantua; the Pope, incited by the Court of Vienna, did not observe the Armistice of Foligno, and determined to raise the Italian populace against the French; and it was resolved to make a final effort. In the depth of winter Alvinzi advanced down the eastern shore of Lake Garda, but was stopped and utterly defeated at Rivoli on the 14th January 1797. Provera, who had endeavoured to relieve Würmser by the Brenta, while Alvinzi occupied the main French army at Rivoli, was also defeated, and on 2d February 1797 Mantua surrendered. These successive blows destroyed the military power of Austria in Italy, and Bonaparte began to make plans for invading Austria itself. But before he started it was necessary to establish peace behind him. The behaviour of the Pope showed the general that His Holiness could not be trusted, and it was only under the pressure of a French advance upon Rome that Pius VI. signed a treaty of peace with the French at Tolentino on 19th February 1797. By this treaty Bonaparte’s lines of communication were secured; the people of Lombardy were his enthusiastic admirers, and everything promised a speedy and successful advance upon Vienna.

Campaign in Germany, 1796.

As Reubell had stated to the Prussian ambassador, the chief effort of the French armies was directed in the year 1796 against the Austrians in Italy. But the operations in Germany were nevertheless of extreme importance; not on account of what was achieved, but because of their effect on the policy of the Princes of the Empire. Carnot, who was left in entire charge of military affairs by the Directory, combined a skilful plan of campaign. He directed the Army of the Rhine-and-Moselle, now under the command of Moreau, and the Army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, still under the command of Jourdan, to make a simultaneous advance into the heart of Germany, and to unite their forces upon the Danube. The generals were sufficiently able, and the troops sufficiently experienced in war, to carry out this movement; but at the head of the Austrians, for the first time since the outbreak of the war, there appeared a general of real military genius. The Archduke Charles, the third son of the Emperor Leopold, and the brother of the reigning Emperor, Francis II., was only a young man, but he proved himself to be a profound strategist. On the 1st June 1796 he announced to the French generals that the armistice, which had lasted six months, was at an end. Jourdan at once advanced from Düsseldorf, and after taking Frankfort and Würtzburg invaded Franconia. The Archduke Charles immediately opposed him with his whole army, and Jourdan had to fall back after a three weeks’ campaign. Moreau was not able to cross the Rhine until 24–25 June 1796. The operation was one of extreme difficulty, which was chiefly overcome by the skill and gallantry of Desaix. Moreau then proceeded to carry out Carnot’s orders; he advanced with great rapidity; he defeated the Prince de Condé and his army of émigrés at Ettlingen; he occupied Stuttgart, and forced his way into Bavaria, reaching the Danube in the month of August. To oppose him the Archduke Charles marched rapidly to the south, and Jourdan once more left Düsseldorf and invaded Franconia. The Archduke Charles soon understood the intentions of Carnot, and took up a central position between the two French armies at Ingolstadt. He waited until the French generals had penetrated far from their base of operations, and then, leaving but a weak division in front of Moreau, he attacked Jourdan in force. The French Army of the Sambre-and-Meuse was overcome by the weight of numbers; on the 3d of September it was driven from Würtzburg, and on the 20th of September defeated at Altenkirchen, where Marceau, one of the most renowned of the young generals of the republican period, was killed. Having driven back Jourdan, the Archduke Charles turned upon Moreau. That general had imprudently continued to advance into Bavaria, and did not perceive until late in September the critical position in which he had been left by the retreat of Jourdan. When he did perceive it, he extricated himself by one of the most famous retreats known in military history. For forty days he fell back through a hostile country, with bad roads, and offering almost innumerable difficulties from its lofty mountains and dense forests, and harassed by the presence of a victorious Austrian army attempting to cut off his retreat, and eventually he recrossed the Rhine on the 24th of October.

Effects of the Campaign in Germany.

From a military point of view, apart from the intrinsic interest presented by the operations of the armies, the chief importance of the campaign of 1796 in Germany lay in the fact that it occupied a considerable force of Austrian troops, which were thus prevented from being sent as reinforcements to the Austrian army in Italy. From the diplomatic point of view, the campaign had results almost rivalling those achieved by Bonaparte in Italy. The advance of the French threw the states of Southern Germany into the hands of Prussia. They felt a natural sentiment of jealousy at perceiving the states of Northern Germany escaping the horrors of war, owing to the line of demarcation established by the Treaty of Basle. Many of the smaller states, and at least one of the larger states, Saxony, implored the intervention of Prussia. Frederick William II., only too glad to pose as the guardian of the Empire, made use of all his influence to induce the French Directory to consent to the further extension of the line of demarcation. Reubell, the Director who took charge of foreign policy, was possessed by the idea that Prussia and France were natural allies, and induced the Directory to meet the views of Frederick William II.; but in return he demanded that Prussia should enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French Republic. The King of Prussia, in his hatred of Jacobin principles, was inclined to reject this proposal, but his ministers, notably Haugwitz and Alvensleben, persuaded him that it was impossible to refuse entirely. A compromise was arranged, and on 5th August 1796 a secret supplement to the Treaty of Basle was signed between France and Prussia. By this secret convention Prussia definitely promised to recognise the limits of the Rhine for the French Republic, and in return France guaranteed that at a general peace not only the King of Prussia should receive compensation for the territories he surrendered, by the cession of some ecclesiastical states, but also that his brother-in-law, the Prince of Orange, should receive a sovereignty in Germany, to make up for the loss of the Stadtholderate in Holland. It proved impossible to extend the line of demarcation to the southern states of Germany as long as the Austrian army of the Archduke Charles remained there. And therefore the petty rulers endeavoured to make peace with France on their own account. The Duke of Würtemburg and the Margrave of Baden both opened negotiations, and since the Elector of Bavaria had fled into Saxony on the advance of Moreau, the Estates of Bavaria signed a treaty of peace with the French general at Pfaffenhofen on the 7th September 1796. But the successes of the Archduke Charles and the retreat of Moreau put an end to these peaceful dispositions. The Elector of Bavaria refused to ratify the treaty his Estates had made; the Duke of Würtemburg dismissed the minister who had conducted his negotiations; and in spite of all the efforts of Prussia, the predominance of Austria continued in Southern Germany.

Internal Policy of the Directory, 1796.

The successes of Bonaparte in Italy, and the operations of the French armies in Germany which, though they had ended in retreat, had not been discreditable to the generals or soldiers, reacted very favourably upon the position of the Directory. The French, as a nation, have always been dazzled by military glory, and since the armies of the Directory were victorious, they were inclined to look upon the government of the Directory as excellent. But military successes did not merely add to the reputation of the Directors; by means of them their financial difficulties were relieved. The doctrine that invading armies should live upon the resources of the invaded countries was a most convenient one. Not only did the armies in Italy and Germany maintain themselves free of cost to the Directory, but the generals sent large sums of money to Paris. It was therefore unnecessary to impose fresh taxes or issue more paper money. But the relief of financial distress was not the only result of the government of the Directory in 1796; it restored internal peace. Hoche, after his defeat of the émigrés at Quiberon Bay in 1795, devoted himself to the pacification of Brittany and La Vendée. The chief credit due to the Directors is that they gave the young general a free hand. While putting down armed insurrection, and defeating the Vendéan chiefs whenever they appeared, Hoche used the most conciliatory measures towards individuals. His policy, as he himself declared in one of his proclamations, was to make the Republic loved. While punishing brigandage severely, he conveniently forgot all past offences as long as the offenders occupied themselves peacefully; and on the 15th of July 1796 the Directory was able to announce to the Legislature that the whole of France was at peace. In truth, all political disturbances were at an end. The majority of the French people frankly accepted the Republic, and seemed to care very little what was the actual form of the republican government. But though political disturbances were over, the troubled times through which France had passed had left only too much scope for private animosity. In the south armed bands, resembling the Companies of Jehu of 1795, pretended to be acting for the defence of religion, when they were really moved by desire of plunder and booty. In the centre the pretext of religion was not alleged, but armed bands of brigands collected in the forests and the mountains, and, like the banditti in Italy, pillaged travellers on the high roads, and held whole villages to ransom. These evils steadily diminished with the consistent enforcement of the law, but it was some years before France became absolutely safe for travellers. Of less importance were the insurrections fomented by the extreme democratic party. Democracy was discredited by the recollection of the Reign of Terror, and the plot of Babeuf in May, and an attack on the camp at Grenelle in November 1796, were easily suppressed.

First changes in the Directory and the Legislature, 1797.

Changes in the Ministry.

By the terms of the Constitution of the Year III. no change in the Directory or the Legislature was to be made until February 1797. By this arrangement a period of consistent government was secured. The Directors, on the whole, acted harmoniously together. The pre-eminence of Reubell and Carnot was generally recognised; Barras occupied himself chiefly with his pleasures; Revellière-Lépeaux was engaged in establishing his new religion of Theo-philanthropy, which made some converts in the towns, but found no followers in the villages; and Letourneur simply acted as Carnot’s lieutenant. In the Legislature the chief leaders, such as Sieyès, Cambacérès, and Boissy-d’Anglas, showed occasionally their jealousy of their former colleagues in the Convention; but, on the whole, they did not try to interfere with their measures. The only heated debates which took place in the Council of Five Hundred were on the nature of the disturbances in the south of France. These were roundly asserted by the opposing parties to be caused by intrigues of priests, or by intrigues of Jacobins. Fréron, who had been sent by the Directory to settle these troubles, was very violently attacked, and with difficulty exculpated himself from the charge of political partisanship. But, on the whole, the debates in both branches of the Legislature were very tame. Nevertheless there appeared, during 1796, the germ of what in 1797 was known as the Clichian party, so called from its meeting at the Club de Clichy. This party was not openly royalist, but the chiefs of the French émigrés, supported by the funds supplied by Wickham, believed they could use it to serve their own purposes, as they had made use of the agitators in the Paris Sections in 1795. In the ministry no changes of great importance were made in 1796; Ramel, the former colleague of Cambon in the Financial Committee of the Convention, replaced Faypoult as Minister of the Finances; and Pétiet, a former commissary-general, was appointed Minister of War in succession to Aubert-Dubayet. Of more importance was the creation of a seventh ministry, of General Police, in January 1796, for it was an evidence of a new spirit, and the first symptom of the elaborate scheme for muzzling public opinion, which was developed to its height by Fouché at a later date. Merlin of Douai left the Ministry of the Interior for three months to organise the new department, and was succeeded in April 1796 by Cochon de Lapparent, a former member of the Convention.