Revolutionary Europe, 1789-1815

by H. Morse Stephens

The loss of Portugal was the first serious reverse which Napoleon had met with from a trained and disciplined army. But at the same time he was made to feel the difficulty of overcoming even an unorganised national rising, with the very best of troops. It has been mentioned that the King of Spain and the Queen’s favourite, Godoy, were partners to the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which arranged for the dismemberment of Portugal. Spain had been the consistent ally of France ever since the Treaty of Basle in 1795, and in the cause of France had lost not only the islands of Minorca and Trinidad, but two gallant fleets in the naval battles of Cape St. Vincent and Trafalgar. Nevertheless, Napoleon deliberately determined to dethrone his faithful ally Charles IV. It is said that after the expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples, Godoy had made overtures for joining the coalition against France, but after the victory of Jena the Court of Madrid, if it had ever thought of opposing the will of Napoleon, became more obsequious than ever. Court intrigues gave the French Emperor the opportunity he desired for interfering with the affairs of Spain. The heir to the throne, Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, hated his mother’s lover, Godoy, and for sharing in a plot against the favourite was thrown into prison. He appealed for help to Napoleon, and Charles IV., his father, on his side also appealed to the French emperor. Napoleon began to move his troops across the Pyrenees, and a French army under the command of Murat approached Madrid. The King of Spain was rumoured to be about to follow the example of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to leave the country. The population of Madrid rose in insurrection and maltreated Godoy, who fell into their hands. Charles IV. then abdicated in favour of his son, who proceeded to France to obtain the support of Napoleon. Charles IV. and his Queen followed Ferdinand, and when the Spanish royal family was assembled at Bayonne, Charles IV. was induced to cede the crown of Spain to Napoleon, who conferred it on his brother Joseph Bonaparte, King of Naples, on the 6th of June 1808. But it was one thing to proclaim Joseph King of Spain and the Indies; it was another to place him in power. The patriotism of the Spanish people was stirred to its depths, and the Spaniards declined to accept a new monarch supported by French troops. In every quarter insurrections broke out and juntos were formed. Appeals were made to England for help, and money, arms, ammunition and English officers were disembarked at all the chief ports of Spain. In the month of May the mob of Madrid drove out the French soldiers of Murat, who had to retire behind the Ebro. But mobs and undisciplined militia can never stand against regular troops. Marshal Bessières defeated the best Spanish army under the command of General Cuesta at Medina del Rio Seco on the 14th of July 1808, and on the 20th of July Joseph entered Madrid. Before his arrival at his new capital, flying columns had been sent in every direction, and one of these on its way to Cadiz met with a serious disaster. This was the famous Capitulation of Baylen. The French division of General Dupont was surrounded at that place and forced to capitulate. By the terms of the Capitulation, Dupont engaged that not only the soldiers under his immediate command, but also that two fresh divisions which were coming up should surrender. The Capitulation of Baylen deprived Napoleon of the services of 18,000 men, but the loss of prestige could not be estimated by numbers. The Spanish insurgents were greatly encouraged and rose in every quarter; a guerilla warfare was begun, which was in the end more fatal to the French army than regular defeats, and Napoleon had for the first time to fight a nation in arms. This was an exact reversal of the situation of affairs in the wars of the French Revolution; at that time it was the French nation in arms which defeated the disciplined soldiers of the Continental monarchs; now it was the Spanish nation in arms which counteracted the schemes of Napoleon. It is almost impossible to estimate the losses experienced by the French during the war in the Iberian Peninsula; the defeats inflicted on them by the Anglo-Portuguese army accounted for but a small portion of this loss; it was the harassing duty of maintaining garrisons in every town and almost in every posting-house which exhausted the French army.

Napoleon in Spain.

It need hardly be said that Napoleon was far from expecting such disasters as the Capitulation of Baylen and the Convention of Cintra. He had been so accustomed to victory that he could not understand the change in his affairs. He looked upon these two events as having only a temporary importance, and proceeded to the Congress at Erfurt with a light heart. Though checked in Spain, he was none the less the master in Germany, and the monarchs of Central Europe did not know that he had reached his zenith and was about to decline. The Emperor Alexander alone seems to have had some suspicion of the truth, for he entered into fresh relations with England by means of the strong English party at his Court, which was headed by the Empress-mother. As soon as the Congress of Erfurt was over, Napoleon proceeded to Spain in person, accompanied by his Guard and his most experienced troops, and surrounded by his most famous generals. After the Capitulation of Baylen, Joseph Bonaparte had left Madrid, and with the bulk of the French army had retreated behind the Ebro. He was there joined by Napoleon, who had under his command no less than 135,000 men. He rapidly advanced upon Madrid; Marshal Soult defeated the Spanish Army of the Centre at Burgos on the 10th of November; Marshal Victor the Spanish Army of the Left at Espinosa on the 11th of November; and Marshal Lannes the Army of the Right at Tudela on the 3d of November. In spite of the snow, the Emperor in person forced the pass of the Somo Sierra, and on the 13th of December received the capitulation of Madrid. The victories of his lieutenants and his own rapid and successful advance on the capital, convinced Napoleon that the difficulties of the Spanish war had been exaggerated, and the result of this impression was that he neglected in after years to strengthen his armies in Spain sufficiently, and attributed all failures to the incompetence of his generals, instead of to the obstinate tenacity of his opponents.

Sir John Moore’s advance.

Battle of Corunna. Jan. 16, 1809.

After occupying Madrid, the Emperor next determined to turn his strength against the English forces in the Peninsula. Sir John Moore, who was in command of the English army in Portugal, could not believe that the Spanish armies were too weak to face the French; but when he heard that Napoleon was at Madrid, he resolved to make a diversion in order to prevent him from conquering Andalusia, and to give time for the Junta of Seville to organise the defence of that province. Leaving a small division to protect Portugal under Sir John Cradock, Moore, with the bulk of the English army, invaded north-west Spain and advanced as far as Salamanca and Toro. Napoleon, as Moore had expected, put off the invasion of Andalusia and turned against the English. Moore having thus effected his purpose, then fell back into Galicia. In the midst of most terrible weather he effected one of the most famous retreats in history, turning occasionally to face his pursuers, and fighting several brilliant rear-guard actions. Napoleon conducted the pursuit in person for some time, but hearing that Austria was preparing for war, he handed over the command to Soult and suddenly returned to France. Soult did not come up with the English army until it had reached Corunna, and was waiting there to embark. A battle was fought to protect the embarkation of the English, in which Sir John Moore was killed, and Soult, whose losses during the rapid pursuit had been very great, turned southwards to occupy Oporto.

Austria. 1805–1809.

The Treaty of Pressburg had made a very painful impression, not only upon the mind of Francis I. of Austria, but also on the Austrian people. The indignation aroused by the cession of Dalmatia and the loss of Venice, which had been given to the House of Austria as compensation for the Milanese, had exasperated the Austrian people. But, on the other hand, the Hungarians were inclined, like the Poles, to look to Napoleon as the possible restorer of their national independence. The policy of the Emperor Francis had been to treat the Hungarians, whom he had placed under the rule of his brother, the Archduke Joseph, as semi-independent, and to make as little change as possible in the Hungarian Constitution. He regarded his German provinces as the really important portion of his dominions, and gave them his undivided attention. After the Treaty of Pressburg, the Emperor dismissed his chancellor and prime minister Cobenzl, and replaced him by Count Philip Stadion. The new Chancellor was a thorough German, though descended from a Grisons family, and the main point of his policy was to rouse the patriotism of the Germans as a nationality against the French. In fact, from 1805 until the outbreak of war in 1809, Stadion endeavoured to arouse the national spirit which afterwards made Germany successful in the final war of liberation against Napoleon. He circulated patriotic literature, and formulated the idea of German unity, which he saw must take the place of the extinct notion of the Holy Roman Empire. He was successful in rousing the German popular feeling to the greatest height in the German provinces of Austria; but the time was not yet ripe for the expression of a similar sentiment throughout the whole of Germany. The weight of the Continental Blockade was not experienced in its fullest form until after 1809. And the patriotic feeling which was to have so full a development could not be stirred up in a moment. But in the German territories of Austria Stadion was completely successful. The Emperor Francis himself was a thorough German, and during the progress which he made through his states in 1808, with his beautiful second wife, the Empress Ludovica, a princess of Modena, roused the utmost enthusiasm. Ever since the Peace of Pressburg the Archduke Charles, as Commander-in-Chief, had been organising the military power of Austria; regiments of volunteers were formed in Vienna and all the large cities; and the militia for the first time were disciplined and trained for offensive war, and not maintained merely for the preservation of the peace. While the smaller princes of Germany were obsequiously doing honour to Napoleon at Erfurt, the Emperor of Austria was preparing for war. The successful insurrection of the Spaniards, and the Capitulation of Baylen, encouraged Stadion in his belief that if a national feeling could be roused against the French domination, it would be as successful in Germany as in Spain. The English Ministry encouraged the attitude of the Austrian Emperor, and promised not only large subsidies if an Austrian army would take the field, but also that a powerful diversion should be made in the Netherlands by an English army. Napoleon heard of this disposition of Austria in 1808, but at first paid very little heed to it. During his winter campaign in the Peninsula, however, it became obvious that the Austrians were in a hurry to come to conclusions with him, and he therefore hastened back from Spain to make his preparations for this new war, instead of pursuing the English to Corunna.

Campaign of Wagram. 1809.

From both the political and the military point of view, Napoleon was justified in believing in 1809 that he had little to fear from the intervention of Austria. The South German princes, like the Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, had been too much favoured by him to desire to oppose him, and willingly sent their contingents to serve in his ranks. From the population of his new creation, the kingdom of Westphalia, he looked for assistance, not opposition, and what remained of Prussia was occupied by French armies. The Emperor Alexander of Russia, still under the glamour of the interview at Erfurt, and the grand promises for the division of the world repeated to him there, showed no inclination to assist Austria. Indeed, the feeling of opposition between Austria and Russia, which had shown itself in 1799 and 1800, had been augmented by the unfortunate campaign of Austerlitz. Each ally blamed the other for that disaster; the Austrian officers openly declared that they hated a Russian more than a Frenchman, and the Russians reciprocated this feeling. Austria’s only ally, therefore, was England. From a military point of view, the Austrian army had not yet been sufficiently reorganised, in spite of the efforts of Stadion and the Archduke Charles, to make a successful resistance to the French; but, as the event of the campaign showed, it was able to make a better stand than it had ever made before.