Two methods of carrying on the war were supported by Castlereagh and Canning, who were Secretaries of State in the Portland administration from 1807 to 1809. Canning believed in rousing the national feeling of invaded states against the universal conqueror, and for this purpose sent large sums of money to Spain; Castlereagh, on the other hand, thought that as France could no longer meet England at sea, England must meet France on the land. This was the theory which lay at the bottom of the despatch of the first Portuguese and of the Walcheren Expeditions, and in spite of the failure of the latter, it has since been recognised as a correct theory. The victory of Wellington at Talavera, though it had but little actual result on the course of the war in Spain, kept Portugal free from French invasion during the year 1809. But it did more, it inspired the English governing class with the belief that they had at last discovered the right way of fighting Napoleon, and that they had also found a general. Lord Wellesley, the elder brother of Wellington, who was Foreign Secretary from 1809 to 1812, supported the new system with all his might, and under his encouragement Wellington slowly formed the Anglo-Portuguese army by a series of campaigns into a magnificent fighting machine, which, though smaller in numbers than the Grand Army of France, equalled it in discipline and military efficiency.
Campaign of 1810.
Napoleon, after his successes in 1808, despised the Spanish levies and the English army. He therefore declined to go in person to the Peninsula, and sent his greatest marshal, Masséna, to drive the English out of Portugal. A plan of campaign was formed, by which Masséna was to penetrate Portugal from the north-east, while Soult was to advance from Andalusia in the south-east. The two marshals were to meet at Lisbon. Fortunately for Wellington, not only did Soult not agree with Masséna, but the latter marshal found it impossible to control his subordinates, Ney, Junot, and Reynier. Masséna nevertheless marched in the summer of 1810, and Wellington had to fall back before him. On September 27th, Masséna was repulsed in an attack upon the Anglo-Portuguese position at Busaco, but the English general felt it necessary to retreat further, to the lines which he had fortified in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, which are known as the lines of Torres Vedras. As Wellington retired, the Portuguese devastated their country, and when Masséna came to a halt in front of the lines of Torres Vedras, he found it most difficult to maintain himself on account of the scarcity of provisions. Soult did not come to his help as he had expected, but only advanced as far as the city of Badajoz, which he captured. Throughout the winter of 1810–11, Masséna remained in front of Wellington, but, in spite of reinforcements, he was unable to attack the Anglo-Portuguese lines, and in the spring of 1811, had to retreat into Spain.
Campaign of 1811.
Wellington then divided his army; with one portion he followed Masséna, and laid siege to Almeida, the other he despatched under Marshal Beresford to form the siege of Badajoz. In the south of Spain, the only city which held for the Junta was Cadiz, which was defended by an Anglo-Spanish army. Marshal Victor was in charge of the besieging force, which was defeated at Barrosa on the 5th of March 1811. In spite of this diversion, Wellington had to meet fresh advances by the main armies of Soult and Masséna. On the 5th of May 1811, he repulsed Masséna at Fuentes de Onor after a hard-fought battle, which Masséna might have won had he been properly supported by Marshal Bessières. In the south, Soult was repulsed by Beresford at the battle of Albuera on May 16th. After having thus once more freed Portugal from French invasions, Wellington laid siege successively to Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. Though these border fortresses remained in French hands, the valour of the Anglo-Portuguese army surprised Napoleon, who recalled Masséna in disgrace. But in the east of Spain his generals met with some success. Suchet in 1810 and 1811 reduced Arragon and Valencia, took many fortresses, and destroyed the Spanish army in that quarter, under the command of General Blake, at the battle of Albufera. Throughout central Spain, though no regular Spanish armies took the field, the French were harassed by the Spanish guerillas. These patriotic brigands destroyed the morale of the French troops in Spain and sapped the strength of Napoleon. All the benefits conferred by Joseph Bonaparte, the abolition of feudalism and of the Inquisition, religious tolerance and good laws, counted for nothing. The Spaniards would receive no benefits from a French monarch imposed on them by Napoleon, and it was in Spain that Napoleon first felt the effect of a national opposition, which was at a later date in Russia and in Germany to destroy his power.
Conclusion.
The period from the Conference of Erfurt to the invasion of Russia seemed to mark the height of Napoleon’s power, but during it are to be perceived the symptoms of the changes which led to his fall. At Erfurt, Alexander of Russia was still his firm ally. His power was bounded by subject kingdoms, and divided by them from the great states of Europe. In France he was still regarded as the restorer of order and the supporter of religion. By 1812 the situation had changed. The Emperor Alexander was no longer his admirer and faithful ally. The vast extension of the Empire had weakened his power, and the French people were beginning to discover how dearly they were paying in the sacrifice of their individual liberty for the glory of one man. His wanton interference in Spain had raised a new force against him in the shape of the resistance of a nation, and had afforded the English an opportunity to meet him on land. In Germany, too, a national spirit was rising, and Prussia, which he had maltreated, was reorganised, and ready to set itself at the head of Germany. But there was one cause yet more significant which was developed during this period—the character of his soldiers was altered. The Grand Army, which had consisted of veterans trained in the wars of the Revolution, had wasted away at Austerlitz and Jena, Eylau and Friedland, and in the Spanish campaigns. At Wagram he felt how different were the men under his command, and was forced to depend largely on foreign contingents, of whose fidelity he could not be certain; and he was to find in 1812 that the conscripts of the Empire, though full of military ardour and desirous of rivalling the fame of their predecessors, had not the physical strength, the solidity, and the experience of the veterans who had made him Emperor of the French and Master of Europe.
CHAPTER X
1812–1814
Causes of Growing Disagreement between Alexander and Napoleon—Intervention of Castlereagh and Bernadotte—The Attitude and Internal Policy of Prussia—Invasion of Russia by Napoleon—Battle of Borodino—Retreat of the French from Russia—Campaign of 1812 in the Peninsula—Battle of Salamanca—Policy of Bernadotte—Prussia declares War—First Campaign of 1813 in Saxony—Armistice of Pleswitz—Convention of Reichenbach—Congress of Prague—Austria declares War—Second Campaign of 1813 in Saxony—Battle of Dresden—Treaty of Töplitz—Battle of Leipzig—General Insurrection of Germany against Napoleon—Campaign of 1813 in the Peninsula—Battle of Vittoria—Wellington’s Invasion of France—Negotiations for Peace—Proposals of Frankfort—The Allies invade France—Napoleon’s first Defensive Campaign of 1814—Other Movements against Napoleon—Bernadotte—Holland—Battle of Orthez—Italy—Congress of Châtillon—Attitude of France towards Napoleon—Treaty of Chaumont—Napoleon’s Second Defensive Campaign of 1814—Occupation of Paris by the Allies—The Policy of Talleyrand—The Provisional Government—Alexander’s Speech to the French Senate—Napoleon declared to be no longer Emperor—Abdication of Napoleon—Provisional Treaty of Paris—Battle of Toulouse—Arrival of Louis xviii., and his Assumption of the Throne of France—First Treaty of Paris.