“After continuous trekking since the 17th October, including the enveloping manœuvres, which resulted in the evacuation by the Turks of the Jeb-el-Hamrin on the left bank of the Diala river, and of Kizil Robart, we reached Sadiyah on the Tigris on Friday, October 26th, and encamped on the right bank about a mile from the remainder of the Division. Owing to smallpox—contracted by men who had been assisting the L.P.O. at Mandali—having broken out in the Brigade, we were segregated, and we were looking forward to a well-earned and much-needed rest, to making up our equipment and to getting our winter clothing.

“But on Sunday the 28th we received orders to proceed by night marches to Samarra. We were joined by the Division at Istabulat on the 31st, and marched that night for Samarra and bivouacked for the day in the old Izakhi Canal.

“On the night of the 1st-2nd November we marched to a position west of Daur, co-operating with the 7th Division in driving the enemy out of this place, and bivouacked that night at Daur.

“Daur is a very strong natural position, being protected by the broken and undulating ground rising to the plateau some 50 feet high to the westward, and having, owing to the same ground, a covered way of retreat to Tekrit, some ten miles to the north.

“At 7 A.M. on the morning of the 3rd the Division marched out to reconnoitre Aujah-Tekrit, and came under artillery fire at the former place; the 7th Brigade continued its march to carry out its task of testing the strength in which the trenches to the west and north-west were held by the enemy, and drew sufficient fire to enable the G.O.C. to report them held in strength. The Regiment suffered some seven casualties, of which one proved fatal, from shell-fire. We returned to bivouac at Daur that evening, reaching camp about 7.30 P.M.

“On the night of the 4th-5th the Division made a night march to a position west of Tekrit to co-operate on the 5th with the Infantry in their assault at that place.

“The Brigade was detailed to work close on the left flank of the Infantry, and the Regiment was held in reserve all day. This gave us an opportunity of watching from a good point of vantage the systematic advances of the Infantry behind an intense artillery barrage, and it was good to see them (in this case Punjabi Infantry) advancing shoulder to shoulder, slowly and deliberately, to the assault. What most struck me as a spectator was the apparent immunity from casualties of this system, although next day we learnt that they had had their fair share of casualties.

“The two native Cavalry Regiments of the Brigade—with the exception of two squadrons—had been operating on foot against the trenches to the west of Tekrit, and the 6th Brigade had been acting as a flank-guard some way to the north and north-west, and by its presence there had prevented an enemy Division, which had been marching presumably from Khanal Kharninah, from joining hands with the force holding the Tekrit position.

“About 4.45 P.M. General Norton decided that the time had come when we could materially assist the Infantry, and ordered me to send a squadron mounted to find the enemy first-line trench at a point about 1½ miles to the north-west of Imam Arbain, which was almost the only conspicuous landmark, and from there to sweep right-handed up the trench towards the left flank of our Infantry, who appeared to be assaulting the trenches between them and the Imam, from a south-westerly direction. I accordingly ordered Captain Robinson to take his Squadron (‘B’) for this duty, and Lieutenant Norton to hold his Squadron (‘C’) in readiness to support ‘B.’ When ‘B’ was well under way, ‘C’ Squadron was ordered out, and soon afterwards the Brigadier ordered me to take out the two remaining Squadrons in support. This I did, ‘D’ Squadron leading, and as we approached the trench line swords were drawn. I had meantime lost sight in the dust, and in the failing light, of the two leading squadrons, but saw about 100 or 150 men on foot on some rising ground, whom I took to be Turks who had held up their hands to the two leading squadrons, and I turned towards them, intending to round them up and prevent them from taking up their rifles again, as our experience at Lajj taught me they were apt to do. As I drew nearer, however, I saw they were our own Infantry, and seeing a British officer I rode up to him and asked him the situation.

“He told me that the two squadrons had gone on to our left front, and that there was a party of about 50 or 100 Turks some 200 yards straight ahead. I decided to go for these, and we passed a squadron of Indian Cavalry (13th Lancers) on our left as we advanced at a slow gallop with our left on a communication trench running much in the same direction I was pursuing. A good deal of rifle fire was being poured into us, and, from the sound of it at very close range, probably from the communication trench, but personally I saw no body of Turks nearer than 1000 yards.