| 2nd Lieut. A. C. Barrington | Lieut. M. R. Farrer | Lieut. F. G. Lawrence |
| Lieut. E. Goodman | ||
| Lieut. W. W. N. Davies | 2nd Lieut. E. P. Barrett | Lieut. H. G. Keswick |
General Marshall does not take up at this point the consideration of any general questions outside the immediate purview of the Mesopotamian force, but it may be observed here that the state of affairs in the various theatres of war had of late greatly altered. The collapse of Russia had made an immense difference in Europe, and also in Asia, where Great Britain was now left practically alone in face of the Turkish military power; and on the left of the great Turkish battle-line the enemy had made a notable advance, threatening the Caucasus and Northern Persia. On the other hand, it had now become fairly clear that the long strain of the war was telling on the Turks, who, it must be remembered, had entered into it when still shaken by their recent defeat at the hands of Bulgaria. The defence of the Dardanelles, too, though successful, had tried them more than the world suspected, and they had not shown themselves capable of throwing forward from their base in Asia Minor, either against General Allenby in Palestine on their right, or against General Maude on their centre, such masses of troops as some had expected. Indeed, on both these fronts, the British now seemed to be numerically superior. But to revert to the operations on the latter front.
In the circumstances presented to General Marshall he decided to attack at once, while the weather was favourable, the Turkish 13th Corps, in the country north-east of Baghdad, which had been so roughly handled earlier in the year. The attack was successful; the Turks in this part of the country were driven northwards with loss through Kara Tepe and Kifri, and the British hold on the great main road into Persia was securely established, whilst further progress was made in the Jebel Hamrin range. The Turks gave considerable trouble by flooding some tracts of land, and they, of course, resisted the British columns; but the fighting was not very severe, and it was soon over. On the 8th of December the bulk of the troops on this side were withdrawn into winter camps. It will be understood that they had now reached high rough country, where winter campaigning was not easy, and the enemy in this quarter also had got out of reach.
The winter months were spent by General Marshall in developing supply districts, in thoroughly opening up and establishing military control over the Lower Euphrates, from the neighbourhood of Baghdad to the sea, in relieving the state of famine to which the Turks had reduced some of the western provinces of Persia, and in numerous minor operations at various points of his widely extended charge. These, he writes, consisted generally of reconnaissances by Cavalry and light-armoured motor-cars, and of bombing raids by the Flying Corps. It was a winter of consistent rain in the lowlands, with snow on the higher ground, which made military movements difficult and threw a heavy strain on the lines of communication.
On the other hand, as General Marshall reports, “by the middle of December 1917 ... the military position had completely changed owing to the magnificent successes gained by General Allenby in Palestine,” and this greatly strengthened his hands. Much, therefore, was accomplished.
Finally, when the weather began to improve with the early spring, it was decided that another blow must be struck at the Turks on the left—that is, on the Upper Euphrates. In this quarter they had been reinforced, and during the months of December and January they began pushing their patrols down stream from Hit, where the bulk of their troops were concentrated. General Marshall gave orders that a column should march on Hit and drive away the Turks, and that it should be aided in doing so by a Brigade of Cavalry. Hit was occupied on the 9th of March, and the Turks fell back to a stronger position some miles up the river. Here again they were attacked, and this time with great effect. As at Ramadie, in September, the Cavalry succeeded in getting right round into the Turkish rear and cutting off their retreat. By the 30th of March the Turkish force had been completely beaten, and the remains of it had fled to a great distance, leaving over five thousand prisoners in British hands.
The Thirteenth Hussars had no share in what General Marshall calls “the magnificent work done by the Cavalry Brigade” on this occasion. After their exertions in the autumn and early winter they were given a rest, and remained from the middle of December 1917 until April of the following year at a winter camp on the Tigris forty miles above Baghdad. There they found plenty to do in training drafts and remounts and other work of the kind, for the Regiment had suffered considerable loss in men and horses and equipment; but for about four months they saw no more fighting or marching, and were able to enjoy a comparatively quiet time with some sport and amusement.
A few extracts relating to this period are given below.
Extract from letter from Lieutenant G. R. Pedder, dated 4th December 1917.