General Marshall had good reason to be satisfied with this result. “Owing,” he says, “to the distance covered by these operations, and to the bad weather which prevailed throughout, the work of the troops was very arduous, and I have nothing but admiration for the good work put in by all arms and the excellent co-operation which was maintained between them.” This co-operation included much continuous work done by the Cavalry, and on at least two occasions they had the chance of attacking the enemy as Cavalry, mounted and sword in hand.
On both these occasions the Thirteenth were well to the fore. They were no longer with their own Brigade, but had temporarily taken the place of their old comrades of the Fourteenth Hussars in the 6th Brigade, then commanded by Brigadier-General Holland Pryor. General Marshall describes the first action in the following words: “The 6th Cavalry Brigade ... after an arduous night march overtook the Turks who had ... taken up a defensive position at Kulawand.... Feigning a frontal attack, whilst gradually working round the enemy’s right flank, our Cavalry cut the enemy’s lines of retreat and then charged right through his Infantry, killing some two hundred, including two battalion commanders, and capturing 565 prisoners, a mountain-gun, and considerable booty.” This was a fine performance, and brought the Regiment much credit. It was followed up by some skilful manœuvring which induced the Turks to hold a position at Tuz Kermatli, where a day or two later there was another considerable action. Here again the Cavalry did well, and the Thirteenth got another chance. This time the actual charge was a smaller affair, confined to a couple of troops under Lieutenant Macdonald, but it was spirited and successful, the two troops galloping a nest of machine-guns, and taking a considerable number of prisoners with little loss to themselves.
On the 7th of May Kirkuk was taken, and the short campaign came to an end. “Difficulties of supply,” says General Marshall, “due to distance and state of ground, now made it imperative to stop further pursuit,” and a few days later most of the British troops were withdrawn to their summer camps. The Thirteenth returned to their old camp at Chaldari, near Baghdad, arriving on the 22nd of May, and there they remained throughout the summer months.
It proved to be an important and anxious time for the Commander of the Army, as a force under Major-General Dunsterville was sent into Persia, and eventually crossed the Caspian to Baku, where there was some severe fighting. There was much work to be done also in Mesopotamia itself, and so far as the climate permitted, military training went on steadily, a special feature being the development of schools of instruction. But owing to the extreme heat the summer was for the bulk of the troops a period of inactivity, and it was found possible to send a large number of officers and men on leave to India. They wanted all the rest they could get, for they still had some hard marching and fighting before them, and the Thirteenth, in their pleasant camp at Chaldari, thoroughly enjoyed the respite.
| AFTER THE CHARGE AT KULAWAND |
| PRISONERS TAKEN AT KULAWAND |
The following extracts refer chiefly to their doings at Kulawand and Tuz.
Extracts from narratives by Captain Gowan, enclosed in a letter from Colonel Richardson, dated 27th July 1918.
“April 26-27, 1918.—The column moved at midnight and marched till 4.45 A.M., arriving at Tel Sharif at that time. The road was difficult to find in many places, and in the numerous nullahs which were crossed the going was deep. When the position had been fixed at dawn, the column moved forward for 2 miles, and then fed at 6 a.m. After ½ an hour halt the Regiment with advance-guard of C. and C. moved to M. 27 Central, and halted till 9 A.M. At that time the Regiment was ordered to move on the Kulawund position, and with L.A.M. cars and Lewis guns and Ford vans turn it from the W. end by enfilade fire. Some difficulty was found in locating the position, and it was not till 11.30 that it was reached and found unoccupied. The L.A.M. cars and Fords had been unable to get forward owing to water-logged country and nullahs. A number of Turks with some tents were seen to be in position on the Tuz-Kifri road, close to the hills, and their numbers were estimated by an aeroplane at 250. By 12 noon the G.O.C. Brigade had moved forward, and arrangements were made for a simultaneous attack by the 3 Regiments. At about 12.20 a move forward was made, the Brigade advancing in line of column of wings, in the order 22nd, 21st, 13th from the right. I understand that both Indian Cavalry Regiments advanced in line whilst we were in column of wings: I am not sure whether the 22nd had all four squadrons or only two. The Regiment had ‘C’ and ‘D’ Squadrons in front line under Captain Godfree, ‘B’ and half ‘A’ in the second, at about 200 yards’ distance, the remaining troop of ‘A’ being left as guard to our left flank, dressing station, &c., and the H.G. guns being sent to the flanks. The leading wing on nearing the road shouldered to the right and were in a position to co-operate with the 21st Cav. when Captain Godfree received orders from the Brigade to take no further part in the attack, but to join the Headquarters near Kulawund village. While he did this the 2nd Wing, leaving a troop of ‘A’ as escort to the Regimental Aid Post, moved to the Kifri-Tuz road and scattered along it to the left or Tuz direction, and succeeded in collecting about 50 prisoners. Two or three machine-guns were in action against us until we were within 300 yards of the road, and were replied to by the H.G. troop of ‘D’ Squadron from our left flank. A number of the enemy succeeded in getting away into the ridge of hills E. of the road where Cavalry could not pursue, and after despatching the prisoners to Brigade H.Q. the wing rallied and moved to a mound at the edge of the Kulawund position. From captured officers’ statements it was clear that this Cavalry attack took the enemy entirely by surprise. The enemy troops engaged consisted of the 5th Regiment, which had received orders on the evening of the 26th to withdraw from Tuz. Expecting only an Infantry attack, on the following morning they evacuated their positions without undue haste, and after halting several hours ... were on their way to Tuz on the 27th, when they were overtaken.
“April 29.—We drew back and circled to the W. behind the battery, and were ordered to get touch with the 21st and 22nd Cav. and then attempt to get across the Tuz-Tan road to stop the enemy’s retreat. Moving W., it was found that the 22nd and 21st were held up by a nest of M. guns on a small knoll. At the time of our arrival these were not directed on us, and appeared to have left their position. Two troops of ‘B’ were accordingly pushed forward, and led off so as to leave this knoll on their right. After a short distance they came under M.G. fire, and 2nd Lt. MacDonald wheeled the two troops to the right, thus putting his own troop in front and that of Sgt. Brencher in rear. He galloped the hill and took it—the enemy, except two, escaping being sabred by putting their hands up when the men were on them. This action opened the way across the plain, and the three Regiments, 21st, 13th, 22nd from the right, moved across, meeting small bodies of the enemy, and killing or taking them prisoners.”