During the subsequent march on Baghdad, to quote again General Maude’s letter to General Symons: “Your old Regiment did splendidly,” and in the course of it, at Lajj, they had their first chance, while pressing the pursuit, of delivering a real Cavalry charge, mounted and sword in hand.
This charge, “a brilliant charge,” as General Maude called it, was the first of several which have been described in earlier chapters. At Tekrit, at Kulawand, and at Tuz Kermatli the Regiment got in with the sword; and if the final onslaught at Hadraniya was made on foot with the bayonet, it was none the less a hand-to-hand attack, after a gallop across the open to the foot of the bluff on which were the Turkish trenches. Nor is an assault with the bayonet less creditable than a mounted charge. Naturally a Cavalry Regiment will always long for that, and rejoice in it if it comes; but, as many leading soldiers have now recognised, Cavalry under present conditions, to be thoroughly efficient, must be able to fight on foot as well as on horseback. Ever since the American Civil War this has become clearer and clearer. The Thirteenth in Mesopotamia, as other Cavalry Regiments in this war, have in a measure reverted to their old rôle as Dragoons, to whom the firearm of the Infantry is as familiar as the sword.
Far from lessening the honour due to them, the fact that both at Lajj and at Hadraniya the Thirteenth showed they could fight either way, is very much to their credit. There was no lack of the Cavalry spirit. Their whole inclination was to charge on horseback, sword in hand. But, if necessary, they could do something more.
To conclude, perhaps the most valuable singly of all the services rendered by the Cavalry during the campaign, was the one of which the Hadraniya charge was only a part—namely, the long march round into the enemy’s rear and the closing of his line of retreat, which led to the surrender of his whole force. The credit of this daring feat is due in the first place to Cassels and his own 11th Brigade, but the 7th Brigade too deserved much credit, for it may be doubted whether without their timely help Cassels and his men could have held their own against the repeated and desperate attacks of an enemy so superior in numbers.
Altogether, the Thirteenth Hussars did their duty well from the beginning to the end of their stay in Mesopotamia, which lasted for two years and a half. During that time they gained much honour at a heavy cost. Of their officers, eight were killed in action or died on service, two were disabled and taken prisoners, and fourteen were wounded. In other ranks the numbers were 90, 2, and 176. It is an honourable record.
CHAPTER XXIII.
RETURN TO ENGLAND—CONCLUSION.
The Thirteenth remained in and about Mosul throughout the months of November and December 1918; but early in January 1919 they were ordered to return to Baghdad, and marching on the 11th of the month, arrived in Baghdad on the 29th.
There they remained in camp for some weeks, when the welcome order was received to embark for England. On the 10th March, the Regiment went on board a river steamer, and started on their journey down the Tigris. It was a large vessel, and with them were their old comrades of the Fourteenth Hussars. Trans-shipping at Basra to the Etna, and at Bombay to the City of Sparta, they arrived on the 29th April in the Mersey, and on the following day went ashore at Liverpool. On the 5th May they marched into the Cavalry Barracks at Aldershot, where they were to be quartered.
Here this History of ‘The Thirteenth Hussars in the Great War’ naturally comes to an end, for though the war was not formally concluded, the Regiment was now in England again, and its share in the military operations was over.
But so much has been written and spoken during the last few years regarding the value of Cavalry in modern war that, as remarked in the introductory chapter, it seems desirable, before leaving the subject of the services performed by the Regiment, to say a few words upon this question. It is one about which professional soldiers only can have an opinion of any value, and I therefore confine myself to quoting the opinion of professional soldiers.