CHAPTER IX.
MESOPOTAMIA.
The campaign in which the Thirteenth Hussars were now to share was of great importance to England, and not without importance to the decision of the world-war. It may be well to say something here on the subject.
The designs of Germany in bringing about, after many years of elaborate preparation, the conflict of 1914, were not fully understood until they were laid bare in Chéradame’s book, ‘The German Plot Unmasked,’ which was published in 1916, with an Introduction by Lord Cromer. Though England was the greatest of Asiatic powers, and more concerned in the march of events in the East than any other nation of Europe, except possibly Russia, she had to learn from a Frenchman how her Eastern Empire was threatened by Germany—just as she had formerly had to learn from an American sailor, though she was the greatest of maritime nations, the influence of sea-power upon History.
To put it in a few words, Germany aimed, as Napoleon had aimed a century earlier, not only at supreme dominion in Europe, but at supreme dominion throughout the world. To effect this aim she had brought about the alliance with Austria, which placed at her disposal the whole resources of the great central European block, about a hundred and twenty millions of people highly organised for war, and had also succeeded in establishing her paramount influence over Turkey, which meant not only another twenty millions of people, but a vast territory stretching very nearly from the frontiers of Austria across the Bosphorus and far into Asia. The inclusion in the alliance of the comparatively small but powerful state of Bulgaria practically completed Germany’s line of communication with Turkey, and made her in fact dominant from the Baltic to Constantinople, and on through Asia Minor to Arabia. A great strategic line of railway had been designed, and in part constructed, which was to run from Constantinople to Baghdad, and was to be continued to a terminus on the shores of the Persian Gulf.
“GERMANY AND HER CONFEDERATES”
Italy was a doubtful ally, but was nominally with Germany too, and might at least be regarded as neutral.
The German scheme was to deal first with the two great Continental powers which stood in Germany’s way, France and Russia. If they could be attacked and overthrown, as she believed they could be, by a swift onslaught upon each of them in turn, the Continent of Europe would be at her feet. It was calculated that England would be neither willing nor able to interfere in their behalf before their fate was sealed. Then, with France and Russia powerless, or even possibly enlisted as vassal States, Germany would turn upon the only power which stood between her and the dominion of the world—England. Having a contemptibly small Army, and no allies in Europe, England would either come to heel without fighting, or would be attacked in India and overwhelmed, probably with the help of the Indians themselves. Her fleet would not be able to help her against vast armies, German and other, marching upon the Indian frontier from Asiatic Turkey, and the few hundred thousand trained men she could put into line would be swamped by ten times their numbers. Afterwards, if America or Japan or China gave any trouble, it would be easy enough to deal with them. The only powers that really counted were the three great European powers—France and Russia with their trained armies, and England with her trained fleet.
It was an ambitious scheme, but not one that could be regarded as visionary. It did not take sufficient account of England’s sea-power; but undoubtedly if France and Russia had both been struck down, and England had been left standing alone, he would have been a very fearless Englishman who could have faced the future without apprehension. Even supposing that no immediate attack upon England had followed, her prospect of holding her own indefinitely against a Germany rapidly outgrowing her in population and wealth would not have been promising. The silent deposition of the naval power of France by that of Germany in the course of a few years before the War had been a striking lesson. But as a matter of fact a great attack upon England was undoubtedly contemplated. “Der Tag” was to have come, and come soon.
Can any one feel sure that if England had stood by while France and Russia were overwhelmed she could afterwards have successfully resisted that attack? The Boer War had shown that at the beginning of the century a combination of the Continental powers against her was not improbable. Would it have been less probable fifteen or twenty years later, when the sea strength of those powers compared with her own had vastly increased, and when France and Russia had been incensed against her by her failure to help them in their time of need? And if all the navies of Europe had joined against her, could she have drawn for help on India and the Dominions beyond the seas? Would she not have found it hard enough to protect her own coasts? Happily for her she did not stand aside, and that issue was never put to the test. Unready for war as she was, and unwilling, she struck with sure instinct before it was too late.