The Thirteenth Hussars in the Great War

by H. Mortimer Durand

Arab Village—December 8.—“Here we are at our destination and all well.... Maude, who commands out here, came and saw us march in.... General Headquarters is also here and some other Divisions. The trenches are about 8000 yards forward from here. We had an aeroplane over yesterday—a great shooting but no luck, so I expect they know of our arrival by now. We have two pontoon bridges over the river here, and there are other camps on the north side as well.... A light railway runs up from Sheikh Saad to the trenches.”

At last, therefore, the Thirteenth had reached the real Front. The Regiment was then in excellent health and spirits, and in full numerical strength. The list of officers shows Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Richardson in command, Major E. F. Twist second in command, four Captains, six Lieutenants, and sixteen 2nd Lieutenants—a young lot, but perhaps none the worse for that. At Arab Village the newly-arrived 7th Brigade and the 6th Brigade, which had been in the country over a year, were formed into a Cavalry Division under Brigadier-General Crocker. The 6th Brigade consisted of the Fourteenth Hussars and the 21st and 22nd Indian Cavalry. So, after a lapse of a hundred years, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth, the old Ragged Brigade of the Peninsular War, were again together on service, but some thousands of miles away from Europe.

It has been noted that Lieut.-General Maude, who now commanded the army in Mesopotamia, had met the 7th Brigade as it marched into the camp at Arab Village, and that his own Headquarters were there also.

General Maude had succeeded General Lake some months earlier, and had now made all his preparations for a renewed advance against the Turkish army, which ever since the fall of Kut in April had flaunted its victorious banners in face of the British invaders of Mesopotamia, and not only defied them to retake the place, but threatened to strike out beyond them at Persia and India.

Before giving an account of the memorable campaign that followed, in which the Thirteenth Hussars bore an honourable part, it may be well, at the risk of some repetition, to explain more fully how matters stood when the advance began.

It has been said that the military power of the Turks in Asia was in fact the Eastern wing of the great combination organised by Germany for the conquest of the world. In Europe the Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians were to overthrow and conquer the main armies of the Allies. In Asia the Turks, aided by German officers and military resources, were to strike out eastward and beat down such forces as the Allies could spare to meet them. Russia was to be attacked in the Caucasus, Russia and England were to be attacked in Persia, which was the highroad to India also, and England was to be attacked in Egypt. The Turkish armies, consisting of several hundred thousand men, securely based upon Asia Minor, were thus to act upon three great Asiatic fronts—the Caucasus on their left, Persia in the centre, Egypt on the right.

Their lines of communication were no doubt long and imperfect, for their railways were not complete; but holding the inner position, the handle of the fan as it were, they were very favourably situated in comparison with the Allies, who had to meet them by acting disconnectedly from outside the semicircle formed by the open fan, while the Turks could strike from inside along the spokes.

In 1914 and 1915 and 1916 there had been fighting on all three fronts of the semicircle—on the Russian frontier towards the Caucasus, the Turkish left; in Persia and Mesopotamia, the Turkish centre; on the frontier of Egypt, the Turkish right. The fighting had fluctuated, but it may be said roughly that on the two wings, towards the Caucasus and towards Egypt, the position was stationary. The Turks had held their own. In the centre they had pushed into Persia and gained some partial success, but as an offset against this, British forces coming from India by sea had landed in the Turkish province contiguous to Persia, and had overrun a considerable part of it. Even here, however, the most recent phase of the war had ended in favour of the Turks. They had repulsed a rash advance on the part of the British, and, shutting up in Kut the force which made it, had beaten off with great slaughter all British attempts at relief, and had finally captured a British Division of 10,000 men. The total loss inflicted upon the British in these operations had been over 30,000. In December 1916, therefore, the prospects of the Turks on their central front were not unpromising. Though they had not conquered Persia, still less succeeded in seriously threatening India, they had made matters very unpleasant for the British in Asia, and inflicted a severe blow upon British prestige. During the hot weather of 1916 both sides had been preparing for a renewal of the conflict upon this front, and the campaign was now about to open.

Judging from a variety of indications, it seems clear that the Turks and their German advisers had decided that the plan of the coming campaign in Asia should be as follows. On their two wings, towards the Caucasus and towards Egypt, the Turks were to content themselves with holding their own, or gaining such success as could be gained without any serious drain on their resources. There was not any vital object to be attained by an advance in force upon these fronts; or at all events a determined advance upon the central front offered a greater chance of decisive results. If Persia could be again invaded, with real success this time, and a Turkish army, or at least a vigorous propaganda, could be pushed on from Persia through Afghanistan to the Indian frontier, the great object of the Asiatic war, which was the overthrow of the British in India, might yet be secured. In comparison with that object nothing else mattered. The Turkish weight, therefore, was to be thrown upon the central front.

But this much being decided, there remained the question how, exactly, the blow was to be struck. Was the British force in Mesopotamia to be destroyed as a preliminary to a further advance into Persia, or were the two operations to be attempted at the same time, or could the British in Mesopotamia be left alone for the moment and an advance into Persia, into their rear, be made without attacking them directly? From the great city of Baghdad, the capital of Turkish Arabia, and the immediate base for operations on the central front, it was possible to avoid the Mesopotamian route, and to strike at Persia by a more northerly line. Which of the three schemes was the best to adopt? The question seems to have been considered in detail.