“I then started to run back as fast as I could go, as the Turks knew I was bringing up ammunition as well as I did, and meant to make it hot for me, but I got back quite safely. On the way down I passed the Colonel talking to a wounded man.

“As soon as I had got back, however, Sergeant-Major Tassie called me, and ordered me to go up to the line again with more ammunition. I again started for the first-line trench. I arrived in safety, and having put it down was told to stay in the trench. Here we hung on till nightfall, as the wounded on the field pinned us to the trench. Several were killed in the trench by rifle-fire, and the Turks heavily shelled V Battery, knocking out a gun and limber and killing several men. Whilst in the trenches the Colonel and Major Twist (second in command) were both wounded,[45] and the command fell on Captain Newton of ‘A’ Squadron.

“Towards night the Turks retired, so we collected the wounded, and slowly, very slowly we returned to camp, three miles to the rear, the end of a hard and terrible day. On arriving in, after taking over our horses we watered at the river-side.”

The writer proceeds to describe how in trying to get a bucket of water, he was carried away by the stream and nearly drowned. He was rescued, and the day’s entry finishes: “After getting into bed it started to rain, so I put on M‘Nulty’s cape and British warm, laying it all over the bed, as I knew poor Mac would never want his any more.”

To close the story of the fight at Lajj, the Colonel’s account of it is given in his own words. He had commanded the Regiment throughout the day, had led it in its charge, and after rallying it when the charge was over had taken it into action again dismounted. Conspicuous for his courage among many brave men, he had won the admiration of all; and the wound which disabled him towards the close of the action was happily not severe enough to prevent his commanding the Regiment again.

Colonel Richardson.—“The following extracts are taken from a letter written home about the middle of March, when events were fresh in my memory:—

“We started on the 5th of March, leaving camp an hour before dawn, and our orders were to march the Infantry to Zeur, twelve or fourteen miles on, and the Cavalry to Lajj, about six miles farther on still. Our Brigade, the Seventh, were leading, and we made Zeur, where we watered and fed the horses a little before 10, and we marched again at 10.30. Soon after we started armoured-car reports came in to say that there was a small convoy ahead of us proceeding in the direction of Baghdad with an escort of about 250 Infantry, and that otherwise the country was quite clear. The formation of our Brigade was the usual formation, with the 13th Lancers (Watson’s Horse) leading and finding one squadron advance-guard, and one squadron each on right and left flanks; then the Machine Gun Squadron, Thirteenth Hussars and 14th Lancers, and V Battery R.H.A. We had gone about two miles when our Brigadier ordered me to take the Regiment up abreast of Watson’s Horse with a squadron as advance-guard, and soon afterwards pointed out what he took to be the convoy on the march, and hinted that we might be able to get in on it with the sword and round it up. And so, having had a good look at this supposed convoy, which was about two and a half miles to our right front, I called up the squadron leaders, explained the situation to them, and sending ‘C’ Squadron well out to the right or exposed flank to work to the north of some small hillocks, I ordered ‘D,’ ‘B,’ and ‘A’ Squadrons in that order to advance in echelon of squadrons extended. (I should say here that the day was an exceptionally bad one for visibility, as a strong east wind had got up and was carrying along with us all the dust we raised and a good deal more, which filled the air and made it difficult to clearly distinguish things.) Of course a Regiment in this order covers a lot of ground and takes a certain amount of time to get its formation, and even before the formation was complete a shell bursting on our left warned me that we were seen, and that the enemy had at least one gun, and made me wonder whether the convoy was just a convoy, or whether it was not a gun or two with their ammunition-carts. At this time too, rifle-fire was opened on us from apparently a trench, for no Infantry were then visible, a few hundred yards to the front of the leading squadron; at the same time I heard rifle-fire well away to our left, showing that the advance-guard was coming into touch with the enemy. All this convinced me that we were up against a much bigger thing than the scattered bands of Turks reported by the aeroplanes and armoured cars, but already the leading squadron was on top of the first line of Turks, and the latter, about forty or fifty in number, were already running for all they were worth, or standing with their hands up. Some of these latter, I am told, picked up their rifles after we had passed and fired into our backs, but very few of that first lot reached their friends; they were either “stuck” or taken prisoners. In the meantime our impetus had carried us on two or three hundred yards, and into a very heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, from what I took to be a big nullah or water-cut some eight hundred yards to our front. Men and horses were dropping right and left, so I tried to wheel them right-handed and backwards until we had crossed the trench, or as it proved, small water-cut, from which the Turks had first opened fire on us. Having crossed that, I halted the remnants of the three squadrons (‘C’ Squadron was still operating by itself out on the right) some three or four hundred yards farther on, dismounted them, sent the horses back out of rifle-range, and advanced on foot until we had reached this trench originally held by the Turks, and which was still full of their equipment and rifles. I may say here that the test to which I put these squadrons—viz., of halting and dismounting under fire, and when the squadrons were all mixed up and actually retiring at a gallop, albeit a slow one—was a very high one, and the way in which they responded was beyond all praise. It was only when we reached the Turkish trench that we were able to take a breather and take stock, and then only did I fully realise the cost of our ride. Major Twist, I heard, was hit, though slightly; Captain Eve was missing, and it was feared killed; Captain Dawson missing, Lieutenants Rolfe, Pinnington, and Lynch Staunton missing, and Welstead hit; my trumpet-major killed, and my orderly badly wounded, and a number of sergeants and men missing. It was patent to me that the men who were missing must be lying, if hit, between us and the big nullah in which the Turks were, and that our only chance of getting to them was to draw the Turks out of this nullah, and it was very soon apparent that we could not do this by a frontal advance without considerable reinforcements: so I went back to Brigade Headquarters to consult with the Brigadier, and pointed out to him that I thought the quickest and cheapest method was to outflank the Turkish position to the northward. He said he would consult with the Divisional Commander, and in the meantime sent up two squadrons of the 14th Lancers to fill the gap between us and the advance-guard of Watson’s Horse. Soon afterwards I heard that the 6th Brigade was being sent to find the left flank of the Turks, and I believe they did find it, but late in the afternoon, showing that we could not be up against much less than a Turkish Division, and that I believe was corroborated later. In the meantime we hung on to our line, but were quite unable to advance, and it was whilst sitting in this shallow water-cut that about 4.45 P.M. I was hit by a rifle bullet in the right forearm. At the clearing hospital I was able to ascertain from the books that night and next morning the approximate extent of our casualties from wounds, and since then I have had a few corrections and additions to make, with the result that I can append a pretty accurate list as under:—

Killed—Captain Eve, 2nd Lieutenants Rolfe and Lynch Staunton.
Wounded—Major Twist, Captain Dawson, Lieutenant Pedder, 2nd Lieutenant Welstead, and myself.
Missing—2nd Lieutenant Pinnington (reported a prisoner of war).
Killed—25 N.C.O.’s and men. Wounded—80.

“The wounded men are all most extraordinarily cheery, tremendously pleased with themselves, and keen as can be to get fit and go back to the Regiment; and I am glad to say that quite 50 per cent of the wounded cases are very slight, and if not already discharged from hospital, are likely to be there only a few days longer.

“At about 4.30 or 5 o’clock the enemy opened a heavy bombardment with about twenty guns, knocked out one if not two of the guns of V Battery by direct hits, and at the same time opened heavy rifle-fire, and it looked as if they intended to make a strong counter-attack. The event, however, proved otherwise, for as soon as darkness fell, about 6.30, they withdrew from their positions in haste; we were able to get all our wounded in, and eventually retired a few miles to the river. Next day the advance was resumed, and we were then able to judge the strength of the position, where the Turks evidently had intended to put up a big rearguard fight, and it became apparent that the shelling of ‘S’ Battery of the 6th Brigade from their left rear had caused the Turks to realise the danger in which they were of being cut off, and had consequently hastened their retreat. The Regiment received congratulations from many Divisional and Brigade Commanders for the fine show they had put up on this occasion, and it naturally was very pleasing to us to realise that we had effected good work, and that our heavy casualties had not been altogether in vain.”