The Thirteenth Hussars in the Great War

by H. Mortimer Durand

In the first place, the Turkish force which he had beaten at Kut and driven through Baghdad must be pursued in its retirement northwards until it was destroyed or hunted away out of reach. General Maude was too good a soldier not to know that the annihilation of the enemy’s armed force, rather than the capture of any city, was the real object to be kept before him. And the necessity of a rapid pursuit to the north, up the line of the Tigris, was all the more urgent because of the near approach of the flood season. Control of the river “bunds,” or dams, and irrigation works up-stream of the city must be secured, or it would be possible for the Turks to cause extensive inundations, not only crippling the movement of the British army, but doing serious mischief in other ways.

Then it was important for the security of the military position that the surrounding country on all sides, not only to the north, should be cleared of Turkish troops for a considerable distance, so as to allow of the pacification of the neighbouring Arabs, and the free collection of supplies. To the westward there were Turkish troops on the Upper Euphrates, which threatened mischief down the course of that river on the British flank and rear. To the eastward, on the Diala, it was believed that there were also some Turkish troops, dominating a tract rich in crops and forage.

BAGHDAD—CLOCK TOWER IN TURKISH INFANTRY BARRACKS SQUARE
A STREET IN BAGHDAD	FRAMEWORK OF HANGAR IN BAGHDAD

Moreover, General Maude had to keep in mind the great strategical considerations involved—the exertion of continued pressure on the Turkish base in Asia Minor, and the possibility of co-operating not only with the Russians on the right, who were driving or following the Turkish invading force out of Persia, but in a measure with General Allenby in Palestine. The Russians, though weak, were comparatively near, and it might be feasible actually to join hands with them. Palestine was far away, out of reach, behind the great Arabian desert; but the harder the Turks were pressed on their central front, the less strength they would be able to spare for their right.

General Maude’s plan of operations therefore, after the capture of Baghdad, was to follow up that blow without delay by pushing out three strong columns. One was to strike at the Euphrates westward, and occupy Feluja on that river, thirty-five miles from Baghdad; another was to press the pursuit to the northward, up the line of the Tigris and of the Baghdad Railway; the third was to move out north-east towards the Persian frontier, so as to secure the rich Diala district, and if possible, with the help of the Russians, to crush the Turkish force retreating from Persia.

During the short campaign which followed, all these objects were in a measure attained. By the 19th March the western column had established itself on the Euphrates, and thus commanded the whole course of the river down to the sea, clearing Maude’s left and rear from Turkish pressure. The northern column had a hard fight at Mushaidi, twenty miles up the railway line, where the retreating Tigris force turned to bay, with the result that it was, on the 14th and 15th March, driven from its intrenchments and completely beaten, streaming away to the north in confusion. The eastern column at the same time surprised and occupied Baquba, a point on the Diala thirty miles from Baghdad.

It was with this eastern column that the 7th Cavalry Brigade was connected; and indeed during the remainder of the war, which was to last for more than a year and a half yet, the Brigade was chiefly employed in the country to the east of the Tigris.

The Thirteenth Hussars were left at the close of the last chapter in occupation of the Turkish Cavalry barracks in Baghdad, resting after their severe exertions. But their rest was short, for on the 23rd of March, by which time they were becoming tired of the heat and the dirt and the flies, they were warned for active service again, and on the following day they rejoined the Brigade at Baquba. The Regiment was now in good condition, men and horses restored and fit for service, and the prospect of further work in the open was hailed with pleasure.

General Maude’s despatches of 1917 show what the work was. The Turks, heavily defeated as they had been, were by no means inclined as yet to give up the game as lost, and the British forces east of the Tigris soon found that the enemy was still capable not only of resistance, but of determined attempts at offensive action. His troops consisted of two main sections, the 13th Corps, which was retiring from Persia, and the 18th Corps lately beaten on the Tigris, but rallied and reinforced in a few days from the Turkish reserves in the North. These two Corps began to act in co-operation, and to threaten attacks upon the British eastern and northern columns. It was an excellent example of the tenacity of the Turks, and of their quick recovery after defeat.

“About the 26th of March,” writes General Maude, “there were indications that a converging movement was being made by part of the 13th Corps down the right bank of the Diala from Deli Abbas, and by the 18th Corps along the left bank of the Tigris ... apparently with the intention of assisting the withdrawal of the 13th Corps from before the Russians.” These advances were resisted by the British northern and eastern columns, the former driving back the 18th Corps northwards, and the latter dealing with the 13th Corps. “On the 27th the enemy made a determined attempt to move down the right bank of the Diala ... but our Cavalry, skilfully handled in some difficult ground, resisted the enemy’s advance from successive positions, inflicting severe losses, and finally checked the forward movement that evening. Next day the enemy fell back towards Deli Abbas, followed up by our Cavalry.”